SKETCHES

OF

THE RELATIONS

SUBSISTING BETWEEN THE

British Government in India,

AND

THE DIFFERENT NATIVE STATES.

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BY

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SKETCHES, &c.

THE ARMY.

EVERY principality, from the Himalaya to Cape Comorin, and from near the banks of the Indus to those of the Berhampooter, may be considered to bow in implicit obedience to the will of the British Government—all look to it as the supreme ruling power—all acknowledge and appeal to it as the arbiter of foreign relations with neighbouring states—all submit with apparent good will to the relations and conditions by which they are bound to that Government. The power of uniting, or of being individually able to free themselves from that supremacy is now less obvious than at any former period of our history. Prolonged peace will tend to remove still further that hope and that power, so that with what may be considered the internal states of India, there is every prospect of permanent tranquillity. With the external powers there is nothing that immediately threatens to disturb our relations; but with them those relations must rest on less secure grounds than with states more immediately in our neighbourhood, more within the influence of our power, and to whom the extent and presence of that power are more obvious; yet the very remoteness of their position, the little intercourse we hold with them, and the few interests we have in common, are reasons why our relations with them should long remain undisturbed. Our treaty with Runjeet Singh has lasted longer without modification, than any other in India.

Over our own subjects our sway seems complete. Its object is to extend the greatest good to the greatest number, and although with particular classes of the community, and with particular tribes, our rule must ever be unpopular, yet all submit to their destiny; some cheerfully from the good it brings them, and all patiently, perhaps because in their eyes it is their destiny, and the day has not yet arrived which opens to them any prospect of a beneficial change.

The Indian Army, by which principally these results are produced, like every other army, naturally looks forward to war and its advantages as the time of promise; and reverts to the period of its triumphs with pride and satisfaction. Those periods, although aiding foreigners in the conquest of their country and of their own

tribes, seem to bind the old soldier in sympathy to us and to our cause; and there will, I think, be found a heartiness and frankness in the soldier of those days, which are wanting in him of a later period.

The Hindoos, of whom the great majority of our army consists, have no national cause of their own to support, nor is there any period in their history to which they can revert as furnishing them with any thing national. India, under its Hindoo dynasties, was apparently split into numerous petty states, each contending with the other for supremacy, some of them obtaining it for a time, and extending their empire over tracts of country equal to European kingdoms of the first magnitude. But these have ages ago passed away; the Hindoo of the present day knows not to which dynasty his forefathers belonged, nor does he care. He belongs himself to some great class or portion of the Hindoo people. The religion and privileges of that class are things very sacred in his eyes; and these give to him and to them a separate political existence, which is unconnected with Government, and which is apparently sufficient to all. The tribes accustomed to the use of arms either are, originally, or very soon became, distinct from the great body of the Hindoo people. Those who are disciplined in our ranks have undoubtedly a character which separates them in a great measure from their own families, and which unfits them in old age for those pursuits, and tranquil and domestic enjoyments in which their childhood was spent. They have but little interest in or concern with the form of our civil institutions; they are generally employed in camps, and separated from the great body of the people; and although they watch with interest and anxiety the effect of our administration on their own villages or possessions, yet this is the extent of their anxiety; and the most arbitrary Governments in India may calculate with certainty on implicit obedience and support from its mercenary soldiery in the most tyrannical of its measures towards its subjects. A great majority of the Hindoos in the Bengal army unfortunately belong to foreign possessions; they are more liable to be influenced by our political than by our domestic economy, and the former has been throughout our career less defined and worse regulated than the latter. The Hindoo sepoy of the Madras army is still further removed from the great body of the Hindoo people than his brother of Bengal. He is very generally of low caste, born and bred in camp. His regiment is his home, he neither knows nor cares for any other. It is a little moveable colony, separated in a great measure from every other regiment, and from the rest of the world. The Hindoo and Jew of the Bombay army, are perhaps less removed from civil life than the Madras soldier; but they too, that is, the Hindoos, are very often of separate caste from the great majority of their fellow-countrymen, have no rights or privileges in civil society worth defending, and like the Madras sepoy, are satisfied with their condition in our army, because they have advantages there which would not belong to them elsewhere.

The Indian Mahommedan, whether in our ranks, in cities, or in villages under our Government; whether in the ranks, the cities, or the villages of foreign states, will every where be found nearly the same. He belongs to a great family, having a united religion and united interests. He will every where be ready to support with his services or with his purse his national cause against all others. Religion and Government with Mahommedans are never separated, and it is never forgotten that the supremacy of the Mahommedans in India has been finally overthrown by us. The eyes of the whole Mahommedan population of India will be turned towards him who shall successfully proclaim a crusade against infidel Governments and infidel people. He in the most remote village of the Dekhan will turn towards such a prospect with the same anxious attention as he of Calcutta or Dehlee. No one in communication with the Mahommedan population of India was blind to the anxiety with which the crusade preached by the late Seyud Ahmed against the Sikhs and against us was watched by that united people. In his triumphs over the fanatical army of Seyud Ahmed, Runjeet Singh claimed our sympathy and congratulations, considering them triumphs in a common cause. Levies of men to the extent or five or six hundred might be seen assembling in the neighbourhood of Dehlee from our own provinces, and traversing desert and hostile regions to join his standard in his well selected position (the Mahommedan world in his rear, the infidel world in his front) in the neighbourhood of Peshawur; contributions in money and goods and jewels were freely given from the palace at Dehlee, from the cities of Lucknow, Calcutta, Hyderabad, and the palace at Triplicane; all Mahommedans, whether Sheeas or Soonees, and although professing tenets differing widely from the Wahabeeism and purer doctrines of Seyud Ahmed and his disciples, joined in prayers and more substantial offerings for his success. It is more difficult to say what effect was produced on the minds of the Mahommedans of our army, for it was of course more hidden. They are more mixed up with their Hindoo fellow-soldiers, and more watched by them and by us than the inhabitants of cities. They have other duties to attend to, and their minds are more subdued by discipline and a long course of service. It may therefore be fairly supposed that they would be the last of the Mahommedan population whom this infection would reach. Fortunately the Sikh army of Runjeet Singh stood between us and these crusaders, and we never came in contact with them, and wisely never noticed their proceedings in India. Seyud Ahmed and his Moolavee instructors and friends struggled for a time with adverse fortune, supported principally by the Yoosuffzies and levies of men and money from India. Could he have called to his support the Afghauns or Persians as he expected, defeated the armies of Runjeet Singh and gained possession of Lahore, our position would have become more precarious than a combination against us of all the princes of India could make it. The doctrines of Seyud Ahmed

have reached in a greater or less degree to every part of India. They are preached at Dehlee, in Rohilkund, in Rajpootana, in Calcutta, at Boorhanpoor, and in the Hyderabad territories. It is not however probable that they will spread in any great degree amongst the Mahommedans of India, for they are too pure, and too far removed from the taint of Hindooism, which they have imbibed. If they should prevail, we may be sure that a struggle for government will go hand in hand with them. We lately saw a fanatic of this persuasion, with a few wretched Bengalee followers, worked into a degree of religious enthusiasm, which led them to oppose, at the very seat of our Government, with sticks and stones, the sabres, and pistols of our troopers; and who, believing themselves invulnerable, stood forward to be cut down by the grape of our artillery with a degree of boldness and self-devotion, which must have left on the minds of all, who witnessed this spectacle, an impression of the effects which this religion is capable of producing in the most ordinary men. We have lately a remarkable instance of the spirit and union which may be produced in the Mahommedan population by the measures of our Government. The unwise and arbitrary proceedings of the Commissioner who first assumed the Government of Mysore, and who seems to have resumed grants of land and money, which threw 8,000 families destitute on the world, until they could prove their rights to these possessions, and who commenced his operations by the discharge of troops, has raised a spirit in the Mahommedan population of those parts which may not easily be subdued. Mahommedan soldiers from our own ranks, seem to have slaughtered a pig at the Eedgah or in the mosque at Bangalore, and to have proclaimed that the mosque was defiled by Christians; such was the feeling against us, that the story was for a time eagerly believed, and produced great excitement in the Mahommedan population. A still stronger proof of the hatred to us is, that when the perpetrators of this atrocity were detected, they escaped death at the hands of their brethren, and were even said to have been sheltered from the punishment which was due to their crime by our Government. The example of polluting mosques has been followed or threatened by other Mahommedans at Cuddapah, Arcot, Palaveram, and Triplicane. The actors in these scenes do not seem to have brought on themselves the hatred or vengeance of Mahommedans, solely because they were directed against us; and it has now become a part of the duty of our Government to protect the mosques from pollution by those who worship them. A still more recent instance of hostile spirit has arisen in Mysore. A drunken drummer boy of one of the regiments insulted a Fukeer. It was immediately proclaimed that he was instigated to this by the other Christians, and a collision was apprehended. This spirit may die away, but these are instances of its existence, if any such were wanting, and of the readiness with which it may be called into extensive operation.

I may here add two instances which have come within my own observation in the last four years, of the prevalence of this spirit

amongst the Mahommedan soldiery. In the Madras Cavalry, which almost exclusively consists of that class, Major O'Donell was shot by one of his troopers about 1817. Five years ago, Lieutenant-Colonel Smyth was wounded, and Major Wallace killed in the same way. The latter officer was harsh with the men and unpopular, but had not particularly offended the trooper who shot him. In a fit of jealousy, this man killed one of his comrades, concealed himself, and shot his commanding-officer at morning stables, saying afterwards that as he was sure to die, it was as well to perform a good work before going out of the world. He was tried, convicted, and hanged in chains on a hill near the Regimental Lines, and about six miles from the city of Hyderabad. Presently it was given out that those who visited the body were cured of disease, that barren women produced children, with other stories, which Fukeers and priests know so well how to propagate for their own benefit. Thousands of Mahommedans poured from the city of Hyderabad, and all parts of the country, to the spot, to touch the body, and to catch the drippings which fell from it in its progress towards decay. It was the corpse of a Mahommedan, who had suffered by the hands of infidels in a cause which it is to be feared too many of that tribe would consider meritorious. A guard was placed over the body to prevent the crowd from approaching, but persons lingered near the spot, principally during the night, and at last it was thought right to remove the body.

The other instance has reference to the fate of my first and best friend Lieutenant-Colonel Davies. It is unnecessary to enter in any detail into the circumstances which produced such dissatisfaction throughout the Nizam's Cavalry Brigade, which he commanded from its first organization in 1817; and where his gallant bearing on all occasions had gained him the admiration, and his conciliatory disposition, his justice, and his attention to their wants, ensured him the affection of his men. It is sufficient to say, that the nature of the discipline introduced about 1826 was disagreeable to them; that some of the officers had not been selected with sufficient care, and that they had risen too rapidly to command, in a service where none but men of temper and discretion should be entrusted with authority. Some of these officers thought that Mahommedans in the ranks looked better without than with beards; promoted and otherwise rewarded those who cut off what to a Mahommedan is the principal ornament of his face, and to which, all who wear it, attach some religious prejudices. At last, in May, 1827, a party of thirty or forty men of the 3rd Regiment planted a flag on the parade, and at day-light, were found drawn up in a state of mutiny. Colonel Davies attended only by a few orderlies rode to the spot. The mutineers signalled him off, calling out that they were irritated, and advising him not to approach. With that fearless confidence which belonged to him in so remarkable a degree, he sent his orderlies to a distance, and rode up to them. After listening to their grievances individually, and sending most of them on one side, he came to the ringleader and

unwisely told him that he would not be pardoned. The man drew his pistol, seized Colonel Davies' reins, and before he had time to draw his sword, shot his commanding-officer through the body. Other shots were fired at him, and he was cut almost to pieces by men who, only a few short months before, would have laid down their lives to save his. The mutineers were charged by a squadron of cavalry, their own comrades, which had been drawn up near the spot, and most of them, with the ringleader, were killed.

Shortly after my arrival in camp from Dehlee, in 1827, to assume the command of the brigade, I saw that the grave of the ringleader had become an object of interest to the Mahommedans of camp, and those of the surrounding country. A Fukeer, who had before established himself there, had been removed, and Fukeers were forbidden to visit the spot. It was known however that assemblages of people continued to visit the grave during the night, and that Fateeas and other religious ceremonies were performed there. Those whitewashed and upright stones which mark the grave of a Peer were placed round it, and at last, during the Mohurrum, lights were placed at the tomb, and the green flag was raised over it.

It was impossible any longer to endure such proceedings in the neighbourhood of camp, and when the Mohurrum was over and the religious feelings of the people had a little subsided, I rode to the grave, and sent for the commanding-officer of the troop, in whose lines the priest of the ceremonies had been harboured. He happened at the time to be under a tree at his devotions. I asked the Jemadar how he permitted such a scene in the neighbourhood of his troop lines; whether his respect for the memory of Colonel Davies, whom he had so long known, and with whom he had served with so much distinction, was not sufficient to save it from such an outrage; whether he did not know that there was a positive order against any Fukeer performing any rites at the grave of Colonel Davies' murderer, and whether there was any objection to hanging the Fukeer on the tree under which he then was? Mahommed Beg Khan told me that he could not as a Mahommedan move of himself in the affair, without bringing on him the reproaches of the Mahommedan world, but that he and his men were perfectly ready to do whatever I might order. The Fukeer was put in irons, the troop was ordered from its lines to encamp on the parade, and the regiment was put under marching orders. In the evening I inspected the troop, talked to the men individually, most of whom I had known for ten years, eight of which I had commanded the regiment to which they belonged, found them in perfect good humour, and they were sent back to their regimental lines. The regiment continued under marching orders, and on the third or fourth night, the flags were taken from the grave; and the white stones, which marked it as the resting place of a Peer, were taken up and thrown to a distance. The men knew what was required of them, did it of their own accord, were relieved from marching orders, and returned to their duty. They were at the time several months in arrears of

pay, which is always a sufficient ground to demur, but on this occasion that seemed to make no difference. There were no other troops within a hundred miles of the Cavalry, and I received their conduct as a proof of their good taste and feeling. But it obviously depended on the humour they were in, and on the extent to which their religious feeling was excited, what turn an affair of this kind should take.

Such is the material of which our army is composed; that of Bengal is perhaps one-eighth or one-tenth Mahomnedan; those of Madras and Bombay, one-third Mahommedan and two-thirds Hindoo; consisting of 10 or 12,000 Cavalry, about 1,10,000 Infantry, and supported by 30,000 European troops of all arms; protecting a land frontier of 3,536 British miles, and covering and giving protection to 1,111,162 square miles within that frontier, with a population of 123,000,000 souls.

Such with the force, moral and physical, of our civil institutions, are our resources for the government of this conquered land.

It cannot have escaped the most ordinary observation, that the army which we have thus raised up for the support of our power, and which even at its present reduced numbers is perhaps sufficient for this purpose, whilst we are not assailed from without, may in the progress of events become the instrument that will work our own destruction. Except this, we have not I conceive any thing to fear in internal India. Whilst an army sufficiently extensive to meet danger where it shall arise, and sufficiently powerful to put it down, remains true in its allegiance to us, we must be safe.

Those who have confidence in the fidelity of our native army may well appeal to its past history. It has fought our battles with a gallantry and a devotion to our cause which could hardly have been surpassed by our own countrymen. Examples are not wanting of its rejection of the most tempting offers that could be made to soldiers to desert our cause in the day of our utmost necessity. The few instances of either individual or general disaffection, or treachery, that have occurred in the long period of their connection with us, may well be considered to give promise of future security: yet there are not wanting, those who see a change in the spirit and temper of our native army, which they consider to be full of forebodings of evil; who call to mind within the few last years the assassinations or attempted assassinations of officers of the Madras army, the conduct of the 47th Regiment, and the men of some of the other Regiments at Barrackpore, the conduct of the native troops in Arracan, and above all the partial disaffection of a great portion of a division of the army before Bhurtpore. The material of combination is more apparent in the Bengal Infantry than in any other branch of our service. The men composing it are mostly of the same caste, from the same part of the country, and have a similarity of interests and of feelings—touch one regiment touch them all, and it would not I think be very surprising to see a mutiny which might originate in very inadequate causes like that at Bhurtpore, extend rapidly to every portion of those

troops. The Madras army would be almost as far removed from the probability of catching the infection as so many Europeans, but there is no calculating on the degree in which their fidelity to us might be shaken by the scenes which they either witnessed, or heard of as affecting the stability of our power generally. The Bombay army assimilates more with that of Bengal than with the Madras army, and might be supposed to be influenced by either. Indeed, what portion of the whole of the delicate fabric of our administration, Military or Civil, in this vast empire can receive a shock without being felt in a degree injurious to us, whether it commence at the centre or the extremities. The day for such events may still be distant, but it is incumbent upon us to look at things as they are, and to adopt such measures of precaution as are calculated, in our short-sighted and finite views, to save us from evils of such magnitude.

As in our conquests in India we succeeded principally through the disunions which existed amongst its people, and their division into tribes, so are we likely to render our supremacy over them most durable by holding an army composed as far as we can of different tribes of men, most of whom are likely to be equally faithful to us, whilst they will not possess that power of combining against us which at present so strongly characterises the Infantry of Bengal.

The ground-work of our power in India is our substantial body of British soldiers. But they are scattered over a vast tract of country, and liable at any time to be carried away on foreign service. Our next safeguard is the difference between the Infantry of the several Presidencies, and next to that the difference between the whole body of our Cavalry and our Infantry to whichever Presidency they belong. Then follows the body of Irregular Cavalry, and the Goorka, and other Local Corps.

In Europe a period of peace is the season when Governments can afford to forget their armies, for there are few countries in which either kings or ministry do not receive some support from the interests and affections of their people. In India a large standing army is absolutely necessary to our existence; without it we should not collect a shilling of revenue from any portion of the country, nor hold its administration for a day. A period of peace is too the time when the native army is most calculated to become an instrument of danger to us. It will not then have the incentives of war and conquest to carry it along with us. Its numbers will probably be greatly reduced, whilst the same amount of all those duties which are most harassing to our native soldiers will remain. It is left under these circumstances comparatively neglected by its Government, to brood over its present condition, its future prospects, and to contrast both with its past glories and its claims on the state. Such is said to be the present condition of the Bengal army, nor must it be supposed that the late discussions and dissatisfactions amongst the European officers are disregarded by the troops, or that we are free from the danger of this disaffection extending to them, in a shape far more

serious and alarming. Mr. Elphinstone perhaps said truly, that "we are more likely to lose India by causing dissatisfaction amongst our European officers, which should spread in the shape of mutiny to the troops, than in any other way."

That we must maintain a large native army in India, and that danger greater or less must exist from this instrument of power, is not to be doubted. The question then is, from what description of force, which is sufficient for the support of our power, is there least danger to ourselves?

I would not exclude from our ranks, nor from promotion to the highest grade in our service, people of all classes who are willing to submit to the necessary degree of discipline; and if there are objections to entertaining high and low caste Hindoos in the ranks of the same regiment, I would form separate regiments from each class. The measure of shutting our ranks against the outcast Hindoos, as has been done in the Madras and Bombay armies, where they have hitherto formed the great bulk of these armies, and when their fidelity to our cause, and competency for the performance of all the duties required of them has not been questioned, is of very doubtful policy, and ought surely to cease. Their fidelity may be the more relied on, as they certainly hold a higher place in our service than they would in any other. The Mahommedans have been brought too prominently forward in the army of Madras: for they are the people from whom we have most to fear. The new modelling of our Cavalry, in the manner I have already suggested to the Governor General, would without any additional expence go far both to satisfy that branch of the service, to afford a provision for the sons of the native officers of the army, and to increase their efficiency as a useful body of horse.

The only relief that it appears to me we can extend to our Infantry is, to save them, as far as possible, from treasure escorts, which might generally be done by making our remittances through Soukars, and which would perhaps cost less than the present charge for batta to the officers and men, and for carriage for the treasure: to relieve them from those duties of guard and sentries at our Civil and Military stations which are so harassing to the troops, so destructive to their discipline, and which are generally to an extent that should only be necessary in presence of an enemy.

At Barrackpore, where it might be supposed that hardly any guards would be necessary, the six regiments are frittered away by constant duty, more than one-half of their number being employed. British soldiers would not submit to this; they expect that they should have three nights out of four in bed, and why should we put the fidelity of the Bengal sepoy to so severe a trial? I would order, that in all situations, except in presence of an enemy, the men should only be brought on duty every third or fourth day. It is far from my intention to say any thing in dispraise of the Rajpoot sepoy of the Bengal army; there cannot be a more patient or obedient soldier in any army under the sun. But it is our duty to

lead him and not to drive him, for once turned against us, and we may find his obstinacy and his inveteracy, those qualities which belong to the degree of his civilization, as prominent as his loyalty has hitherto been.

We are very apt to fall into the error of measuring every thing according to the standard of European discipline, forgetting the different characters of the native and the Englishman. No officer of the French army ever thinks of requiring the same order on a line of march, or the same strict discipline in quarters, as we require of the British soldier. Great latitude may be given to the French soldier in foraging and marauding without endangering his discipline, and he will live when the English soldier will either starve or die drunk. The drum will call him back to his ranks in the condition in which he left them, and without any further evil than that which he may have inflicted on those whom he chose to visit. If the severe discipline which it is evidently necessary to uphold in the British army be not necessary in that of France, how much less in that of India. There is an Asiatic sensitiveness about, and propriety in, the conduct of the sepoy, which renders the roughness and severity with which we treat English soldiers, offensive and unnecessary towards him.

Greater latitude, except when there is a prospect of plunder, may be given to the sepoy than to the soldier of almost any other country. All that sort of discipline and parade which is necessary to keep the English soldier sober and orderly may be entirely dispensed with in the case of the native: an army of infantry in particular without its united and strong field discipline is of course a rabble, and the army of India requires this discipline as much as any other. But this is almost the only form of discipline that it needs. The Madras army is more harassed by needless parade than any other, and its Cavalry more than its Infantry, until the condition and legs of the horses have been altogether, and the temper of the men almost, destroyed.

The greatest of all injuries has perhaps been inflicted on the discipline of the Indian army by taking too much power and authority out of the hands of commanding-officers of regiments. The native soldier looks more to the individual authority of his officer than to the general authority of the Government, under which all serve; and although it may be necessary to hold checks over men in power, it is still more necessary to leave in the hands of officers commanding native regiments the power to reward and to punish.

We should too, without any very great expence, give great satisfaction to the old soldiers of the army, and hope to the young, by allowing them an increase of pay, corresponding with their period of service. A sepoy might receive one rupee per mensem after ten years' service; two rupees after twenty, and the same system would extend to the Naick, the Havildar, the Jemadar, and the Subadar. The only boon that I am aware of that has been conferred on our native army, for the last twenty years, is a slight increase of pay,

and the designation of Subadar-Major to an individual in each regiment. When it is recollected, that no native in the whole of this vast army can rise above that rank and that pay, and that this has been their condition for the last twenty years, it is surely time to think of extending to them some pecuniary advantages.

I shall not here attempt to advocate the cause of the European officers, for they will find able advocates every where, and there may even be some danger that the advocating of their cause too prominently, whilst their native brother soldier is neglected, may lead to invidious and injurious comparisons on the part of the latter. Observing only that if something be not done to accelerate promotion, more particularly in the upper ranks, the Indian army, as compared with the British, will very soon have but few officers, for even the ordinary commands; and those more fitted for invalid and pension establishments, than for the active duties of their profession.

CIVIL INSTITUTIONS.

Certain great changes are, within the last few years, apparent in our civil administration, which cannot fail to be attended with beneficial results. We have ceased to think that the best collector, and he to be most rewarded, is the individual who could collect most revenue from a given tract of country. We have discovered that the labor in the revenue and judicial affairs of this vast country is far beyond the competency of the few European hands that we can bring to bear upon it, and we have sought, and are seeking, to raise up by education and competent remuneration, from amongst East Indians, and the higher classes of natives, persons the best qualified and the most willing to assist in these great works. We are gradually discovering, that truth, and honesty, and attachment to our cause are the only requisites in which a great portion of the people of India are inferior to ourselves, in all the attainments that are necessary for the performance of the ordinary duties that have hitherto devolved more exclusively on the members of our European Civil Service; and we are endeavouring to correct these imperfections of the native character by education, and by giving them emoluments, and fixing responsibility on them, which shall render it their interest to be honest; and a place in our service, and in our confidence, which shall attach them to our rule. We have in a great measure ceased to look on the press as an instrument of evil, and we can now witness with complacency, and without fear, discussions in both the European and Native portion of the press, touching the character and effects of our Government on the happiness of the people, the proceedings good and bad of the Government itself, and of every functionary employed under its authority. We see in these discussions a great preventive and corrective of public abuses and delinquencies; an incentive to good actions; and we may yet go further and witness in this great instrument a guide which

shall direct our Government and its European officers in the detection of corruption and extortion where they exist in the great majority of its native Civil Servants; and which in this respect may work a beneficial change in our courts of justice, in our territorial and custom revenue departments, and in the police of the country. We may discover in the progress of free discussion greater good than evil towards the stability of our power: and if the instrument which is to work so much good must also produce some individual suffering or agony, it is satisfactory to think that the characters of individuals most subject to this are, after all, generally public property; and they must, with the advantages, take the disadvantages of their official station.

Those secret and mysterious communications and combinations which Sir John Malcolm so forcibly and so justly describes, which every person who has been prominently employed in the interior of India, and has paid common attention to what was passing around him, must have been put on his guard against; and which are generally levelled at the stability of our power, may be expected to yield before free discussion. Our secret news-writers, and those spies and intelligence establishments, the employment of which is so repugnant to the feelings of an Englishman, but which most persons in power have thought it necessary to maintain, will gradually be swept away when the present enlightened Government shall accord to the provincial press, that freedom and encouragement which have been extended to the press of the capitals. Free discussion is now inevitable. If Governments can deport Europeans for offending against their press laws, they cannot hold East Indians or natives subject to other than British law, and the verdict of a British Jury, publish they what they please.

It should therefore be the object of our Government to encourage rather than discourage the ablest of their servants to enter the lists as editors of, or writers in, the public journals, against such as may appear unjustly to assail their measures, or those of their servants.

TERRITORIAL DEPARTMENT.

Much has been said and written on the nature of our India revenue assessment, and on land tenures, by Sir Thomas Munro, and persons of his time; and of later date, Mr. Mill, Mr. Chaplin, Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Ellis, are the great advocates of Ryotwar or Assamewar assessments. Mr. Elphinstone seems to consider it immaterial to the great body of the people, whether the assessment be a permanent one, extending to a large tract of country; whether it be a Mozewar or village assessment; or whether it be the more minute Ryotwar or Assamewar assessment, provided that it bears light on the people, and leaves them a fair return for the labor and capital employed. But by his minute field measurement, classification, and assessment

of a great portion of the Poona territory, he shewed his opinion that all systems must commence there. Few writers that I am acquainted with have come very prominently forward on this question in Bengal; most of the persons of Lord Cornwallis' time were in favor of permanent settlements on a large scale, and many of the revenue servants of that presidency, having been brought up in the Bengal Provinces, are advocates of the same form of settlement. Except the Bengal permanent settlement of those days, less has been done in the way of fixing or defining the rights of the Government and those of the people in Bengal, than in either of the other presidencies. No progress has hitherto been made in defining those important points in the western provinces, although Government has been urging its revenue officers for the last ten or twenty years to commence and proceed in this good work.

I believe I am right in describing Sir Charles Metcalfe's opinion to be in favor of the villiage assessment for a period of years, leaving the village institutions unimpaired to assist in the collection of the revenue, and in the police of the country; and yet defining, as far as is compatible with this system, the rights of the several cultivators in the village, and the amount of rent which each is to pay.

A late writer in the Edinburgh Review gives a very broad preference to the permanent settlement of Bengal over the Ryotwar settlement, principally on the ground, that the latter is calculated to reduce the great mass of the people to great poverty, whilst the former will raise up a rich native aristocracy in the country, which will turn their accumulations into channels of commerce, or local or national works of public utility. There can be no question that the sacrifice by a Government, of a portion of its rents in favour of a portion of its people, will tend to enrich them, and that the smaller the portion of people for whom this sacrifice is made, and the greater the sacrifice, the richer will they become. But whether it is most just and most reasonable that Governments should sacrifice in favor of the few or in favor of many, is a question which does not seem to admit of a doubt? whether too the great majority of the people under the Bengal permanent Zumindaree settlement are more prosperous than those under a Ryotwaree, or produce more than £4 19s. each, per annum, would be very problematical, but that Bengal is a richer country than the ceded provinces—whether through this permanent settlement the people are so much under the protection of our laws, as under the Ryotwar assessment managed by our own officers must be doubtful likewise. What hope has a poor Ryot of meeting with support and redress in our Zillah Adawluts against the oppressions of a powerful and permanent Bengal Zumindaree family, compared with that which he would have against a transitory collector? Yet, although our Adawluts may be considered powerless, as affording protection to the people, it will most probably be found that the rights and possessions which the simple cultivator had in the soil, at the time the permanent settlement was completed, have

remained untouched to this day, whilst the benefits which we meant to confer on the great families with whom the settlement was made, have long since passed away,—such is the sacred tenure by which through all changes of dynasties the cultivating classes in India cling to their homes and their fields.

The enormous increase which the writer in the Edinburgh Review calculates on as having taken place in the value of landed property in certain parts of Bengal, under the permanent settlement, will most likely be found to arise from the Government officers having made either through ignorance or corruption, an unnecessary sacrifice of the rights of the Government. I am not aware of any great works which have been undertaken by the Zumindars of Bengal, that should have so enhanced the value of their property. Cultivation has most probably increased greatly since the introduction of our Government, and so it will under ordinary protection throughout every country in India.*

Those portions of the country which at the period of settlement were least cultivated, or least known, and which had for a series of years paid least rent, have of course benefited most. The Bengal Baboos and persons of that description, who now appear to be the principal Zumindars, are as much foreigners in their habits and pursuits to the cultivating classes as we are. They live in cities and towns far away from their Zumindarees, and know less of the people than either our judges or collectors who live amongst them —the recklessness with which they allow their Zumindarees and family possessions to go to the hammer, and the vast transfers of landed property that have taken place since the permanent settlement, are proofs that their's is not a very beneficent form of administration, and that whatever sacrifice we made, has been ill bestowed on them. This sacrifice was however made in favor of those whom we considered the first Zumindars: the property has now attained a marketable value like every other property, has in very many instances long since passed out of their hands, and the present occupants have most likely paid its full price.

Persons practically acquainted with the several tenures enjoyed in land by the several classes throughout India, whether as in the Dekhan and southern parts of India they be styled Zumindars, Patails, Bara Baloota, Meerasdars, Ooperas, or common Ryots, or whether as in Rajpootana and Hindoostan they be styled Zumindars, or Istumrardars, or Mokudums or common Ryots, are surprised, that officers like Mr. Christian and others of the Bengal service, should experience difficulty in defining the various interests of these

* There is no reason why cultivation and population should not proceed in India in the same ratio as in America and other unimproved countries, except that the government of foreigners cannot be so favorable to improvement, as the home government of other countries, and that we are here more subject to famines than most other parts of the world: there is therefore no fear that population will follow so close on the heels of produce, that there will be no more waste land worth cultivating, or that those horrors will soon commence which the present school of Political Œconomists anticipate from such a state of things.

classes; or that they should consider their several interests a bar to the formation of a permanent settlement, that settlement being the same in principle whether it extends to a single field, a village, a Pergunnah, a Sirkar, or a Sooba. Is it supposed that these rights in the soil did not extend in some shape or other to Bengal at the time the permanent settlement was made, land being there more valuable than in most other parts of India; or is it supposed that they do not now exist under the permanent settlement itself? Is it because these tenures and rights were neither known nor inquired into at the time of the permanent settlement, and that the holders of them and their possessions were consigned over to a Zumindar, who in the administration of revenue affairs took the place of the Government itself; because a set of regulations was framed suited to this new condition of things; because many of our Bengal revenue servants have been trained under these regulations, and have had all their views formed under this influence, that they have so often failed to investigate the real nature of property, and have so generally, as in the western provinces, failed to define the rights of any class of occupants, and those of the Government itself, as well as to arrive at any fixed or defined settlement of the revenue.

Wherever I have been employed in revenue affairs, that is in Hindoostan, in Rajpootana, and in the Dekhan, one uniform system seemed to me to prevail; though, perhaps, under different designations.

The Prince or the Government, for the time being, is the universal proprietor; all lands pay rent either to him, or to some person to whom he or former Princes or Governments may have assigned it, either on a life tenure, for a term of years, or in perpetuity. No person in India will claim the rent of land or exemption from the payment of rent as belonging to himself or his family, except through some such grant. The person to whom the rent, or a portion of the rent of a village or a district, is assigned, may either take the place of the Government in the management of the village or the district, or the management may be held by the Government itself. In either case, the rights of the district, and village officers, and of the occupiers of the fields, remain untouched. The person holding this right is styled Jageerdar or Enamdar.

Zumindar is a very undefined term amongst Mahommedan Governments. The Princes of Rajpootana, Jeypore, Oudeepore, Kotah, &c. were designated by the Dehlee Government Zumindars: so are the Gudwal and Soorapore chiefs of the present day, although only tributaries, designated by the Nizam's Government; so is the person to whom it consigns the revenue management of a district, granting him 5 or 10 per cent. on the amount of his collections. Next below him comes the Patail or the Mokudum, who in addition to some rent-free land has, or may not have, a percentage on the collections from his village; the village accountant is generally in the same condition; the priest or other persons necessary for the internal government of the village have

each an allowance from each cultivator, generally in kind, but the amount is always defined, and the offices are hereditary. In case of failure of heirs, some of these offices under Mahommedan Governments revert to the state, and are saleable ; others are by election or sale through the members of the village community amongst the cultivators. Some are hereditary occupiers of whole villages or of fields, for which under good Governments they pay a fixed rent ; nor is there any reason why the officers of Government, whether district or village, should not hold land on this tenure. The local and hereditary village officers, the Patails, Mokudums, &c. and the several members of their families, will indeed be found the principal holders; others are tenants on lease, or at will, either holding from these hereditary proprietors, if such they may be called, or from the Government. The hereditary field is of course saleable, and its value is in proportion to the favorableness of the terms on which it is held, and to the confidence in Government. I have known the most arbitrary minister of an arbitrary prince (Raja Chundoo Lall) endeavour to purchase this Meeras, or Mokururce, or Istumrar land (or as in Bengal it has been called this Pottedar land, from the Zumindars having granted, at the time of the settlement, Pottas to the Ryots) and failing to obtain it in this way, rent it as an ordinary farmer would have done. The rent in this case not being that which belongs to Government, for the use of the land, but the difference between the Government rent, which the hereditary field proprietor has to pay, and the intrinsic value of the land ; which intrinsic value may arise either from the favorableness of the terms on which it was originally granted, or from its improved condition by outlay on it in the shape either of labor or of capital. Under an arbitrary government, it is possible to raise from these permanent village landholders a greater rent than could be obtained from common farmers, because they have an interest in the soil superior to the others, and remain under these exactions longer than the others would, in the hope of some change for the better.* Under good Governments they have advantages over farmers, more I think from having improved their lands, than from originally having obtained them at a lower rate ; for every village and every pergunnah in the country has its own field rates, regulated by the several qualites of the soil. The principle of taxation is every where governed by this, and the original or improved quality of the soil necessarily governs the crop, sugar-cane, cotton, ginger, tobacco, wheat, gram, and so on to the inferior sorts of grain ; hence the higher rent arising apparently from the superior description of crop, and which would seem lately to be considered an objectionable mode of taxation. †

* See Mr. Elphinstone's Report on the Poona Territory.

† It has been proposed by the Court of Directors, in a discussion originating at Bombay, that there should only be one description of rent, and that in assessing that rent the poorest or lowest description of soil should be taken as the standard from which it is to be levied. Did the difference in the quality

Out of all these apparently conflicting interests, there is no difficulty in arriving at a settlement, which, in so far as the people and the Government are concerned, may as easily be made permanent as be fixed for a year or a period of years, provided the whole fields of the village are under cultivation; if they are not, to render it equal on all villages, the permanent settlement must of course only be in prospect, and will be completed when the cultivation of the village is complete. The truth is, however, that nothing in revenue affairs can be permanent. Whenever one or more of the fields of a village falls out of cultivation, there is an end to permanency. The persons with whom we made our permanent settlement are of course subject to these fluctuations, and supposing a famine or some great calamity which should throw whole districts out of cultivation, or when the profits arising from their ten per cent. or whatever percentage we have allowed for the sake of this settlement, should not cover their loss, there would of course be an end to the contract, and the management of the country must revert to us. It is even now said that the difference which is working in the relative value of money and of produce has already reduced very

of soil exist only artificially, by the employment of labour or capital on it, this would be a just and equitable decision of the court; breathing that spirit which governs all their decisions where the interests or the happiness of the people of India are concerned. But as there is a natural as well as an artificial difference in the qualities of soil, and as that difference is now held to constitute what is termed rent, would not governments, whose principal source of income is their rent from land, sacrifice unnecessarily a great portion if not the whole of their revenue, by taking the lowest class of soil as the standard of assessment? Suppose that in taxing the people of England, we were to take the lowest standard of income, and tax all according to that; the richer people would escape comparatively untaxed, and the amount of taxes would be small indeed. This is so obvious, that it must be doubtful whether the court's meaning has been correctly expressed in their letters. Yet, if we look to what is the foundation of all money rent in India, a share of the crop, something like this will be found to exist; for here governments take an equal share of all crops, (charging separately for outlay of capital in the construction of works to facilitate irrigation, &c) whether the crop be valuable wheat or valueless rale. The expence of ploughing, sowing, and reaping is nearly the same in each case, or if there be a difference, it is proportionably in favor of the superior crop. The share of wheat taken by government is of course of far greater value to it than the share of rale, but so too, is that which remains with the cultivator of more value to him. The quantity in each instance being the same in amount, the government advantage from its superior land arises from the superior value of the crop which it produces, and this constitutes a difference between that mode of assessment and the money rent which the court now authorizes to be levied, and which is a money rent limited to the lowest class of soil: the superior value of the cultivator's share is too a sufficient inducement to him to prefer the cultivation of the superior description of soil. There is to my understanding a similarity between the mode of assessment proposed by the court, and that arising from the share of crop; but it requires a clearer head than mine to describe it.

In making the division of crop, there is great minuteness. In some crops, where a greater quantity of seed is necessary than in others, or where there is a great chance of its perishing from being sown amongst rocks, thorns, or briers, a corresponding allowance is made to the cultivator on the division of the produce.

much the profits of the Bengal Zumindars, and that a further change will in many places destroy the settlement. The more remote the tract of country from the capital, and from rivers, the more of course will this change be felt. But even at Dacca, it is said to be in rapid operation. Bengal is less subject to calamities arising from famine, and to fluctuations in price, than other parts of India. In most places, a much greater proportion than 10 per cent. would be necessary to enable the person with whom a settlement was made to bear the contingencies of failure from season and other causes. In any case, the person who has one-tenth or two-fifths need not be designated a proprietor to the exclusion of the Government, which has a larger share, and a share without risk.

To form a settlement of a village, it is only necessary to know what rent the whole of the fields under the village, belonging to, or taxable by Government yield. From this deduct the value either in kind or in money of the several Government assignments to Zumindars, Patails, Mokudums, or any other description of persons, (for these as surely fall on the Government or proprietor as the tithes of England and Ireland do,) and the remainder, either in money or in kind, is the Government share. If the Government wishes to make what we style a permanent settlement, it has only to deduct from the revenue thus shown 10 or 20 or any other percentage, which may be considered equal to cover contingencies for a period of years. If this remission be made to the individual holders of fields, the settlement would be a Ryotwar; if to a village and in favor of the village manager or managers, it would be a Mozewar: if it be extended to a district, each of the villages of which has been subjected to the same operation, and the remission granted in favor of an individual, it would be a district or a Zumindaree settlement; and in either case, the tenures by which land is individually held, and the several rights or claims on it, would remain undisturbed, unless indeed the people were consigned over, bound hand and foot, to a powerful Zumindar, and placed beyond the pale of the laws: even then, they would struggle for their rights, either individually or collectively, and in all probability they would prevail. In the Ryotwar settlement, the remission is made for the benefit of the individual cultivator; in the Mozewar, it is made for the benefit of the managers of the village; in the Zumindaree, it may be made for the benefit of a person altogether unconnected with cultivation, or with the people: the first is calculated to produce a prosperous and happy peasantry, the second to raise up a middle class, the third an aristocracy:—each of course reaping profit just in proportion as the remission extends beyond the risk. In either case, the mode of managing the collections is sufficiently simple; for the village manager will pay the amount of the two first modes of settlement into the public treasury, the same as the Zumindar will do in the third. There is nothing new in these forms of settlement, the Ryotwar and the Mozewar will be found all over

India, so perhaps will the Zumindaree, although not with the regularity and to the extent that we introduced it into Bengal.

It is difficult to understand what important duties the present Collectors of Bengal should have to perform, or what important duties can any where belong to the receiving of a fixed rent. One of the great benefits arising from a permanent settlement, whether a Ryotwar, a Mozewar, or a district settlement, would be the prospect of dispensing with this highly paid class of servants, and of substituting inferior and worse paid instruments. Treasurers would appear to be sufficient, and on this account, the district settlement is, so far as the mere saving to Government, on account of collection is concerned, preferable to the Mozewar, and the Mozewar preferable to the Ryotwar. In the expense attending the operations so ably conducted by Mr. Pringle, under the orders of the Bombay Government, and in other operations of that nature, the prospective saving of the yearly charge of our present expensive machinery should surely be taken into account. Those who argue so strongly and so conscientiously on the advantages of the Zumindaree over the Ryotwaree system of management urge, generally, in addition to the tendency which they believe the latter to have, to impoverish the people.

1st. That Government is never sure of receving for a series of years the same amount of revenue—and 2dly, that the Ryotwaree is not so permanent as the Zumindaree; but that it carries in it the seeds of destruction.

On the 1st proposition, I would observe, that it is only the favorableness of the terms granted which enables the Zumindar to meet the fluctuations that must take place in all revenue affairs through a period of years; and that where his losses are through a long period of time greater than his gains, he must fail. Governments can through other instruments collect in a period of years the same amount of revenue that the contractor can; and thus like him make the profits on good cover the loss on bad seasons. In the progress of time, when these Zumindarees come to the hammer, and are bought at their market value, on a calculation grounded on the mean rents of too favorable a state of things, where will be the Zumindars' power to meet the losses arising from bad seasons* ?

In the 2nd proposition, it seems to be forgotten, that if the Ryotwar system of even Sir Thomas Munro has in some respects failed, or that if any other Ryotwar system fails, a Zumindaree, on similar remissions, could not last. For Governments have as much the means of exacting to the uttermost farthing as the Zumindar would have, although perhaps not the same inclination, for ours are British collectors, who do not pocket the money, and he is a

* If too these Zumindarees are divisible, according to the Hindoo laws of inheritance, they must very soon lose whatever importance may belong to them as district revenue settlements; and like all other Hindoo property, except principalities, which apparently are not subject to those laws only because there is no one to administer them, be reduced to the nature and extent of Mozewar and Ryotwar settlements.

native collector, who does. Is it because Sir Thomas Munro's estimates were too high, or that the value of money is enhanced every where since the period of that settlement—is it because we carry away specie in the bulk to purchase our teas in China, our piece goods and other articles in England, and like the absentees of Ireland, send the revenues and the accumulations of individuals out of the country; whilst we do not allow the sugars and other products of India a fair competition in the English market with those of our slave colonies, that the Ryotwar system of India, to the great bulk of the people the most beneficent of all systems, and which might be extended with so much present advantage to more civilized countries, is to be condemned before the people have been heard in its defence? The Zumindaree settlement will last, according to the favorableness of its terms, through this unnatural state of things; but it too must sooner or later break down. Those who doubt the power of the Ryotwar settlement to last through centuries of good government with undoubted benefit to the people, may with advantage consult Mr. Sullivan's late evidence before the Select Committee of the House of Commons, the principles on which the Ryotwar assessment of Mulik Umber was framed in the Dekhan, that of the Polegar chiefs of Nuggur Bednor, and of the native chiefs in Canara and other parts of Southern India.

CUSTOMS.

This branch of revenue, exclusive of our salt monopoly, is said to yield returns very disproportioned to the expence incurred in the collection, the tax which it imposes on the people, and the obstructions which it offers to commerce. Mr. Mackenzie, I think, calculates the nett revenue in Bengal at 22 lakhs per annum, and the revenue throughout India is perhaps not double that amount. The additional cost to the people could only be estimated by discovering the charge of our custom-house establishments, and the amount which the officers of custom levy in fines, as bribes, and which they receive as douceurs. Mr. Elphinstone's scheme of levying a custom tax on exports by sea, (although apparently contrary to all principle,) and abolishing our inland customs with their thousand and one inflictions, would be hailed as the greatest blessing by the people; and might be made a relief to commerce without involving any sacrifice of revenue.

EXCISE.

I am not aware that any calculation has ever been made of the amount of excise revenue separate from the opium monopoly, or of the expence of collecting this tax. It has never, that I am aware of, been bade a matter of calculation in India, whether by reducing

the amount of our tax, we should increase consumption? For Governments have never so trifled with the morals of the people. In India every thing in the shape of spirits and intoxicating articles is of the worst description, injurious to the health of the people, and destructive to their morals; for the use of them in any degree is considered to degrade a person from his station in society, and is therefore calculated to render him a worthless or desperate character. There is neither the wholesome and invigorating ale of England, nor the generous wines of the other parts of Europe; nor would even these or any other stimulants of that nature be required by the inhabitants of this climate. The nearer therefore that our tax serves as a prohibition by checking consumption, the better.

OPIUM MONOPOLY.

In defence of this monopoly, except in so far as it may be necessary to our revenue, I am not aware that one word can be said. It seems to be on the eve of dying a natural death, for in spite of all our attempts to limit cultivation, in the fertile regions of Malwa and Rajpootana, or to get what is produced in the tributary states of that country into our own hands, production has there been so abundant, and the drug has found its way so extensively in the last few years to the China market; as to reduce its value to one-half the original standard, and pretty nearly to destroy our Patna and Benares monopoly price.

SALT MONOPOLY.

Nearly the same may be said of the defencelessness of this as of the opium monopoly; but what tax is not objectionable, and would not be resisted if Governments could not persuade the people that it was necessary for their defence, or for the administration of their affairs, or if they had not the power of enforcing it? It seems a question whether the revenues of India will suffer by the abolition of all the commercial speculations of the Company in that country; but there is no question that great loss will be sustained by the abolition of the monopoly in tea, and as both these events are now likely to happen, this is not the period for relinquishing the advantages of the salt monopoly; on the contrary, similar measures with those existing in Bengal might be extended, if likely to prove equally productive of revenue, to Madras and Bombay.

There is perhaps no other article on which the Government could derive an equal amount of revenue at so little cost to the people, provided the monopoly be well administered. Salt seems, to even the poorest class, to be generally cheap enough every where. But when one hears that there are places (Assam, Cachar), where the poor man cannot get salt to his rice, and sees that the fisherman is

not allowed to carry in his boat sufficient salt to cure the produce of his night's toil, one wishes tax-gatherers where salt comes from in the deep blue sea.

The stories of hardships inflicted on the Molungees or manufacturers are most probably very much overcharged; if those sufferings exist in any degree, they may very easily be removed, and the simple management of the monopoly in its present shape is certainly a less evil than a custom tax with its cloud of gatherers would inflict on the public. The defence of the system and the management of it may very safely be left in the hands of the talented Secretary to the Board of Customs, Salt and Opium.

JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION.

It is a common observation that our laws and revenue regulations of the times of Hastings and Cornwallis were more applicable to the condition of native property and native society than those of a later period. The servants of those days had a superior acquaintance with the native character, they consulted more natives of intelligence and learning, they were altogether more thrown amongst and mixed up with natives; and therefore had advantages in legislating for them beyond servants of a later date. The science of jurisprudence has since those days made great progress throughout Europe, principally by simplifying the laws and suiting them to the understandings and the wants of the people. In India those most qualified for this great work lead such an official existence, they are so far above and so removed from the people, so little acquainted with them, except when trying them or taxing them, that the formation of a Code of Laws suited to their wants and condition by the officers that could be brought to work upon it, would seem a hopeless task. The nature of society in the different portions of so extensive a region must be supposed very dissimilar, and the laws which would be applicable in one portion might be very inapplicable in another.

Some progress was made in a Code of Laws under the enlightened administration of Mr. Elphinstone at Bombay. It is probable that Sir Thomas Munro was not inattentive to such a work at Madras; and that out of the various changes and attempts at legislation in Bengal, something that is good must be found.

Call together therefore these scattered laws, and those of the olden time; with the ablest of the Company's servants from the several presidencies; join with them the judges of the several Supreme Courts who may be most able and willing to assist in such a work; with them unite the most learned of the Mahommedan and Hindoo Law Officers of India; and a Code of Laws which the judges, the lawyers, and the people may understand, must, although lawyers are said not to be the best legislators, be the result. Years may be necessary to the fulfilment of this great work; but when completed, it would be a monument of our

wisdom to which we could appeal, and which the natives of India might respect through future ages. One system of Mahommedan Law prevails every where, and the laws of the Hindoos are too every where nearly the same. Our Government has however to legislate for both these great classes of society, and for Christians (European and Indian), who are already extensively settled throughout India, and who in the progress of time must hold a still more prominent place there. This Code of Laws must therefore not only be modified in conformity with the local interests of the people of the several portions of India, but it must extend to each class of our subjects its own laws, and blend those laws together so as in civil processes to embrace the conflicting interests of all. A more difficult undertaking never was submitted to the wisdom of legislators; those of Indian experience may be supposed more fitted for the task than those of European. But united, and with the experience of the present age in legislation before them, there is surely wisdom enough in the land for any undertaking. Much assistance may be expected from the able writer who has lately appeared in Bengal on this subject.

A Code of Laws which should bring home to the understandings of the various classes of our subjects a knowledge of their rights, and the decision which they might expect from an appeal to our tribunals, would necessarily be of the utmost importance to the people, as well as to those by whom the laws are administered. Those who are to administer our laws cannot much longer continue to have and to struggle with one another, and with Government, for separate and extended jurisdiction. It may be supposed that the whole of the law officers of India will be united for one purpose, and acting in concert for one great object. That instead of the anomaly of one set of judges calling themselves King's, and another calling themselves Company's, all will, in so far as it is right or necessary that judges should, in administering the laws, be subject to either legislative or other council, yield to one supreme and ruling authority.

Such a code in full operation, with a sufficient number of respectable and educated natives to administer its laws in all the minor concerns of life, civil and criminal, with European judges to appeal to in all cases from their decision, and we should have the best security that justice would be brought to every man's door—Supreme Courts at the presidencies, and whenever required in the provinces, a judge of circuit in each division of the country, and district judges, should be the whole of the European machinery. There might be as many grades of native judges as seemed necessary, and the whole, European and native, should be criminal as well as civil. One of the great advantages attending the employment of natives more extensively in a judicial capacity is, that they may so easily be multiplied to any degree that may be necessary to work off all arrears of business; the whole should be magistrates and justices of the peace, but no prosecution should originate against any person

in the court of the authority by whom the accused was committed. There should be an appeal in all cases from the decision of native judges to an European judge; but, in any case, the decision of the Court of Appeal, confirming the award of the lower court, that decision should be final. In case of a reversal of decree, an appeal should be made to the next tribunal, until two uniform decisions were obtained, or until the appellant reached the Supreme Court, whose decision in all cases should be final. Plaints or prosecutions might be directed into the several courts, according to the amount of property or of crime involved. But the Supreme Court being reserved as a Court of Appeal, no prosecution should originate there; although the individual judges of that court, when the business there was not pressing, or when their services were required in the provinces, might be employed as judges of circuit. The great object being to open as wide as possible the door of justice to the people, and to render its stream pure, it would be necessary to increase or limit our checks and our instruments according to their demands. Advantage might be taken of Europeans or natives of respectability throughout the country as referees or arbitrators, at the option of the parties seeking redress, or they may be admitted to assist the judge as assessors. Europeans and natives not in the service might too be employed as justices of the peace, and on reference by the parties to them have powers conferred on them to decide in matters of trifling criminal offences or inferior civil suits. The Punchait, that instrument under native Governments which is as sacred in the eyes of their subjects as our juries are in ours, might be had recourse to with great advantage as an aid to our judicial institutions. The members of a Punchait having been elected by the plaintiff and defendant, each of course naming his own members, and a Sirpunch or head appointed either by their united voice, or by the judge who has the power of confirming their decree, its decision must be final, unless there be proof of corruption. It is the want of this support which has hitherto rendered the Punchait of so little avail, and so little calculated to live with our judicial system. The Punchait system after all may be found to flourish only when there is a denial of justice through courts instituted for its administration, or when these courts are corrupt, or so expensive as to amount to a denial of justice; yet arbitration amongst ourselves is not uncommon; and the native Punchait, though more subject to rules and better defined, does not differ materially from the system as known in our own civilized land. The remarkable instance of the most intelligent of all our native subjects, the Parsees of Bombay, withdrawing in a great degree from the Supreme Court there, and instituting Punchaits amongst themselves for the regulation of their own affairs in civil cases, may have its origin in the ruinous expence attending appeals to our laws.

The instruments which will thus be at work throughout India may be expected to bring us nearer to the people, to give them an

interest in our cause, and to be of more assistance in the formation and regulation of an efficient police than in even the other branches of administration. It is the distance to which we have been removed from native society, the want of connecting links between that society and ourselves, and the absolute revolutions that some of our sweeping measures have introduced, which have enabled bodies of men like the Dakoits of Bengal, or Dakoits wherever they are found, to combine and become the enemies of all property. It must not be supposed that there were not influential persons in the society acquainted or perhaps connected with these miscreants, or that the great majority of the society did not know them. But they saw that we had not the power to protect them, and that their chief hope of safety consisted in their silence. The second description of land revenue settlement which I have noticed, which preserves the village institutions unimpaired, and which throws responsibility upon them, would be the most efficient instrument of police. Under such a system, it would be impossible that offenders against property should attain combination, or that they should remain long undetected.

The great question of combining judicial and revenue powers in the hands of the same persons, remains to be considered. This union is admirably suited for a certain condition of society, in an inferior state of civilization, and consequently inferior complication of affairs, in which rights and interests are more easily defined; and if we could calculate on good instruments, and none but good instruments, I should be disposed to the system which placed a small district under the exclusive management of an individual European officer, with sufficient native instruments in subordination to him, and with a superior European functionary who should have the general superintendance of a given number of these districts, in all their judicial and revenue concerns. But as we cannot calculate on the necessary degree of industry and integrity in any service which it would be possible to organise, I see no alternative but to separate for ever these two great branches of administration, the officers employed in them being held available for either, according to their qualifications and the exigencies of the service. There is no reason why both Europeans and natives employed in the revenue department should not be the most useful of our magistrates. But they should have no judicial bench, nor should our judicial authorities have any concern with revenue affairs;—the rights and interests of those paying land revenue, as of the other classes of society, whether with reference to the claims of Government or of individuals being left exclusively to the protection of the laws.

The danger of the officers administering revenue and judicial affairs, when colonization becomes more extended, getting involved in property which should give to them a bias, either in reality or in the opinion of the people, in the performance of their duty; and thus injure that high reputation which the Civil Service has

hitherto held, and that confidence in its integrity and impartiality which has hitherto so justly existed in our native subjects; must have struck every body as the principal, if not the only danger, which would result from granting to Europeans free permission to hold property in land. Those administering our laws and our revenue have hitherto been far removed from the people. Opposing interests which should bring the parties into collision would be full of danger. Laws will of course be enacted for the purpose of saving the people and ourselves from this worst of evils. But whether these laws can be effectual for such a purpose, time alone can show. The probability is that they will not.

It is a question of old standing whether an exclusive Civil Service consisting of about 950 members and costing upwards of a crore and a half of rupees per annum, or nearly one-ninth of the territorial revenue of India, is the best suited to administer our affairs. Whatever objections may be taken to a service in such a form, it has at least hitherto maintained a reputation for high-toned honor, and for talent, which has certainly never been surpassed by any service in the world, and which will perhaps never be equalled by any thing that may take its place. It is true that this service has had incentives to exertion in the importance of the duties entrusted to its management, in the confidence which has been reposed in it, and in its splendid emoluments and prospects which have never before been enjoyed by any service of equal magnitude, and which cannot be expected to last. Whether the Civil Service is to continue in its present shape, whether India is to be thrown open to adventurers from England, or whether there is to be one united service for India, are questions of great importance as concerns our future administration. It is probable that the present exclusive and highly-paid service will not last under the doctrines which will now govern people at home. Yet it will probably be found expedient that there should be an united service in India, and that persons to administer the affairs of that country should have an Indian education: on the other hand it may be supposed that new vigour and energy would be imparted by the introduction from home of persons of matured judgment, who had experience in the administration of affairs in our own or other countries.

If rendered, as has so often been proposed, one united service, that service would of course require to be military, and those entering it to be trained in the first instance to habits of military life. What would free England say to a country, whose civil institutions were administered entirely by military men? Yet there is no reason why military men, educated as they would be, should not lay aside their swords and their regimentals, and take their seat on the judgment bench in this conquered land, carrying with them all the attributes for the administration of justice. The united service, although still an exclusive one, would give great advantage to Government by extending the sphere of its selection for employments the most important. An evil to be guarded against would

be that of selecting for Civil employ, where it may be supposed the pay would be better, those of most talent and promise; and so leaving the army degraded, and the officers who remained with it a discontented portion of the service. This would in some measure be corrected by interest and patronage, but still it must be supposed that this evil would exist to a greater and more injurious degree than it now does.

But whatever the form in which the Civil Service may be maintained, it is quite clear that the country cannot afford, nor will it any longer be necessary, to extend to it the present high rate of pay. The first step that was taken for increasing the pay of our native establishment, by placing it on a respectable and substantial footing, was likewise a signal for the reduction of the pay of our European establishments. Formerly, the European Civil Service had a monopoly of high pay, and it is very evident that we cannot afford to pay both highly. The pay of the principal Sudder Ameens and other native judges is perhaps higher than was ever given by native Governments for the performance of similar duties. The natural tendency is too towards increase of expenditure. The only reductions that have hitherto been made are in the Military and Political Departments. The increase of expence in the European portion of the Bengal Civil Service alone is said in the last year to be eight lakhs, as compared with the former year; whilst the expense of the principal Sudder Ameens, the Sudder Ameens, and Moonsiffs will amount to upwards of three lakhs and a half.* By what corresponding reduction is this charge to be met? Similar increase in the Civil Service of the other presidencies would in one year give in the whole, as compared with the civil expenditure only a year or two ago, twenty lakhs, a prospect sufficiently disheartening.

With our forty millions of debt, and with the uncertainty of continuing to hold these monopolies, which at present give us a surplus revenue for the payment of that debt, it is surely unwise to increase our expenditure in any department, unless the necessity for this is very apparent, or unless the increase can be met by corresponding reductions either in that or in some other department of our administration.

* Former native Judicial establishment, ...	7,28,844
Increase, ...	3,64,416
	10,93,260

POLITICAL RELATIONS.

These are of three kinds:

1st.—Foreign.

Persia, Cabul, Senna, Arab Tribes, Siam, and Acheen.

2nd.—External, on her Frontier.

Ava, Nepaul, Lahore, and Sind.

3d.—Internal. All of which have relinquished political relations with one another and with all other states.

They may according to the nature of our treaties with them be divided into four great classes.

1st Class.—Treaties, offensive and defensive—right on their part to claim protection, external and internal, from the British Government—right on its part to interfere in their internal affairs.

1st.—Oude.
2nd.—Mysore.
3rd.—Berar.
4th.—Travancore.
5th.—Cochin.

2nd Class.—Treaties, offensive and defensive—right on their part to claim protection, external and internal, from the British Government, and to the aid of its troops to realize their just claims from their own subjects. No right on its part to interfere in their internal affairs.

1st.—Hyderabad.
2nd.—Baroda.

3rd Class.—Treaties, offensive and defensive—states mostly tributary, acknowledging the supremacy of, and promising subordinate co-operation to, the British Government; but supreme rulers in their own territory.

Rajpootana, ..
1. Indore.
2. Oudeepore.
3. Jeypore.
4. Joudpore.
5. Kotah.
6. Boondee.
7. Ulwur and Machery.
8. Beekaneer.
9. Jessulmere.
10. Kisengurh.
11. Banswarra.
12. Purtabgurh.
13. Doongerpore.
14. Kerowlee.
15. Serowee.
16. Bhurtpore.
17. Bhopal.
18. Cutch.

19. Dhar.
20. Dholpore Baree.
Saugor and Bundlekund,..... 21. Rewah. 22. Duttea. 23. Jansee. 24. Tehree.
25. Sawaut Waree.

4th Class.—Guarantee and protection—subordinate co-operation; but supremacy in their own territory.

1. Ameer Khan.
2. Puttealah.
3. Naba.
4. Keytul.
5. Jeend, and other protected Seik and Hill States.

5th Class.—Amity and friendship.

Gwalior.

6th Class.—Protection, with right on the part of the British Government to controul internal affairs.

1. Sattara.
2. Kolapore.
3. Dehlee.

FOREIGN.

PERSIA.—The relations of England with Persia may be considered to arise altogether from our position in India, from the apprehension at one time of designs on the part of France against our possessions there, and at another on the part of Russia. Whether either of these powers ever in reality entertained any such designs may be considered doubtful, and whether any of our measures in Persia would have tended in any great degree to frustrate those designs, may be considered doubtful likewise. Whether, but from the fear of injury to our position in India, it would not have been, or is not still, desirable to see either of these great powers, or any other European power, establish their influence in the possessions of the Porte, of Persia, or other eastern nations, is still more doubtful. The spread of their possessions eastward would tend to weaken them in the seat of their own power; to give at no distant period rise to new dynasties: and in either case a degree of civilization, compared with what now exists in those countries, must be the result.

But whilst we fear the encroachments of Russia, Persia from her position must always be an object of great interest to us. We never can hope by any exertion that we can make in that quarter to save Persia from entire conquest by Russia, should such be the will of the latter. Our treasures and military stores would be more wasted in the attempt than they were in our first efforts to save Spain from Napoleon's usurpation. She is too remote in posi-

tion, and the consequences which her downfal would involve are too little apparent, to render it desirable, even if we had the means, to employ a portion of the army of England for her support.

England may however afford to put forth one of her best known and most approved ambassadors to support the interests of India in Persia, and India can afford to pay the expense. All the political and commercial powers in the gulf of Persia might be brought under H. E. and the post would not be unworthy of one of the first ambassadors of England. Our relations political and commercial, in the Red Sea, and in Arabia, or wherever authority is claimed by the Porte, might in the same manner be brought under our ambassador at Constantinople, until Mahommed Ali Pasha has founded a separate empire for himself: and these two measures would tend to identify England with her Indian empire. It has been supposed that the ministry of England has withheld their countenance from Persian negotiations, and left the responsibility with the Company, that they might thereby be safe from involvement with Russia.

Our treaties with Persia, looking back at them with our present experience, show that the Indian diplomacy of those days was not very well calculated to manage distant relations. We have wasted vast treasures to obtain the support of Persia against the invasion of the French and the Afghauns, from which we never in reality had any thing to fear* ; and it is surely to the eternal disgrace of Indian diplomacy that we should have obtained the Firman of the King of Persia to his governors and servants, "to expel and extirpate the French, and never to allow them to obtain a footing in any place;" and his announcement to them, "you are at full liberty to disgrace and slay them." In the treaty we stipulate with Persia, "Should an army of the French nation, actuated by design and deceit, attempt to settle with a view to establishing themselves on any of the islands or shores of Persia; a conjoint force shall be appointed by the two high contracting states, to act in co-operation for their expulsion, and extirpation, and to destroy and put an end to the foundation of their treason." The same article of the same treaty concludes, "and if ever any of the great men of the French nation express a wish or desire to obtain a place of residence or dwelling on any of the islands or shores of the kingdom of Persia, that they may raise the standard of abode or settlement, leave for their residing in such place shall not be granted." This treaty was negotiated by Sir John Malcolm, in 1801, under powers delegated to him by the Marquis of Wellesley, Governor General in India.

Whatever the power of Persia may at that time have been, it is now very limited. The expedition of the Prince Royal into Khorasan, with the flower of the Persian army, for the purpose of subjugating the revolted portion of that province, and of collecting

* We have only lately escaped from our subsidiary obligations to Persia, by paying two hundred thousand tomans of the six hundred thousand which Russia compelled her to pay as indemnity for the expences incurred in the war of 1828.

the arrears of tribute from Herat, promises at present to be a complete failure. He has apparently not received supplies either in men or money from Tehran, and the resources of Khorasan have already failed. The chief of Koochan, the Usbeks of Khiva, and the Afghauns of Herat under their Prince Kamran, have apparently united against him, whilst the Persian army at Meshed is hardly equal to cope with either of these tribes, and its position has become highly critical, although Dost Mohammed Khan would appear, from Cabul, to have opened a negotiation, offering to assist the Prince Royal in his designs against Herat. In Persia itself the Princes of Kerman Sha, Huroojun, Fars, and Kurman have some of them revolted from the throne, and their armies are now opposed to one another.

If there be any truth in the notion that Russia is interested in the operations of the Prince Royal in Khorasan, as paving the way to their united designs on India, we could not surely be in a falser position than that of assisting with our officers and military stores in this enterprise against ourselves.

The presence of some members of the Russian Embassy, or of some Russian officers with the Prince Royal's army, has led in India to the belief that the designs of Persia, whatever they are, have the support of that great power; whilst in reality the object of Russia seems to be the humane purpose of releasing from captivity her own Russian and Georgian slaves, or the Christian slaves of other nations, who are described to be in great numbers in a state of the most hopeless bondage.

But however this may be, the Russian officers have left the Persian army, satisfied most probably that that army has not the power of assisting them, either in obtaining the release of slaves, the extension of commerce, or of forwarding the ambitious views which Russia is supposed to entertain.

The present period, and the nature of Russia's power would seem peculiarly ill calculated for entertaining designs against a territory so remote as India. Her moderation, her want of means, or the necessity she was under of yielding to the will of the other powers of Europe in her late wars with Turkey and Persia, when being at the very gates of their capitals, she turned back her victorious army from the prosecution of a just war, to a result almost certain and glorious to herself; do not justify the belief which is now so generally prevalent of her designs on India. It is natural enough that the Russian governor of Georgia and the officers of her army there, and in Persia, should think and talk of India, and that persons should have been deputed to survey the several routes, and report on the topography and the resources of the intermediate country: and even if any doubt could be entertained of the ambitious views of Russia, there is sufficient in these incidents to give rise to the reports which have been so prevalent of her designs on India.

Russia is in Europe surrounded by powers which only await the absence of her armies to endeavour to throw off the yoke which

she has imposed on them; and there is a spirit abroad in most of the nations which will require, for years to come, all the armies that the most despotic powers can bring to bear upon it. Russia it is true has an army of sufficient magnitude to conquer most of the nations of Asia, supposing that army could be spared from home. But has she or any other nation of Europe resources to send forth an army of such magnitude as could march from the banks of the Caspian or from Orenburg to those of the Indus, through hostile and desert regions, equipped in artillery, stores, and commissariat as modern armies must be? Must Russia or any other Christian power which attempts the conquest of India by land, conciliate, conquer, or colonise the intermediate nations? or may she attempt so extended a line of march* with the Persians, the Usbeks, the Afghauns, and the Dooranees in her rear, with the army of India posted on the Indus in her front, its ordnance and engineer departments equal in magnitude and in science to those of any army in the world; and the steam-boats and floating batteries of England covering that river to oppose her advance, interrupt her communications, and cut off her retreat? The former system of enterprise will take years to accomplish, and we shall know of the commencement of the attempt in sufficient time to arm ourselves against it, and to give our assistance in organizing and preparing the intermediate powers, as well as those of India. The latter is an enterprise which it may easily be supposed would stagger the boldest general of the age. We ourselves have looked with something like wonder at General Goddard's march across the peninsula of India, and cannot forget that the Bengal army could not find a road from Arracan or Silhet to join their brethren in the neighbouring province of Ava.

The army of Alexander, after conquering and retaining possession of Persia for a period of years, and it may be supposed organizing in some degree the intermediate countries for his purpose, failed in the enterprise, and turned back after crossing one or two of the rivers of the Punjaub, although it had not at the end of its march an army in discipline equal to its own to contend with. The Russian army, by the time it reached the same point, would perhaps in the present day be as tired of the enterprise as the Grecian army of Alexander was. The first Mahommedan conquerors of India made descents on that country from their advanced position at Gizni; and if Zengis Khan, Timoor, Baber, and Nadir Shah performed long marches, the latter nearly the same that Russia would have to do, and Timoor ranged from the wall of China to Moscow, it must be remembered that their armies consisted mostly of large divisions of light cavalry, moving most probably on different lines of operations; that they carried along with them in the enterprise the Mahommedans of Western and Central Asia, and stood in a position altogether different from that of a Christian and foreign army

* The following information on this subject is from Major Everest, Surveyor General of India.

entering these tracts. I purposely omit the consideration of the question whether any European power could advantageously hold possession of India through a land communication, a hostile fleet having command of the seas and the mouths of her rivers.

CAUBUL.—The unfortunate king of Caubul, Sha Sooja-ool Moolk, having been dethroned so shortly after the treaty was concluded with him by the Honorable Mounstuart Elphinstone, and having been almost ever since a pensioner of the British Government at Loodeanah, that treaty may be supposed a dead letter. It is remarkable that in the treaty Mr. Elphinstone is made to say, that the French and Persians had entered into a confederacy for the purpose of invading the dominions of His Majesty the King of the Dooranees.

The treaties with Siam, Acheen, Senna, the Arab tribes, and other foreign states, being mostly either commercial, or directed against piracy, need hardly be noticed here.

STATES ON OUR EXTERNAL FRONTIER.

AVA.—The condition of Ava, at the commencement of the struggle with us, and her resources both in men and money, were very imposing. The state which could send forth ten or twelve thousand men to such distant points as Arracan on the one hand, and eight thousand to Assam, Cachar, and Muneepore, on the frontier of Silhet on the other, which could place in position an army estimated at sixty thousand men, to oppose our advance from Rangoon; and which, during a contest of two years with us, preserved, to all appearance, her internal condition and resources unbroken, must be of the first magnitude.

It is true, that in all our contests with the Burmese, her raw levies proved themselves the least formidable enemy that we have ever encountered. The disaster at Ramoo, where 500 regular sepoys and 500 irregulars were overthrown by the Arracan division of the Burmese army, is the only reverse of any magnitude that occurred on our own frontier during the war. Even this "might have perhaps been avoided by a more decided conduct on the part of the officer commanding, and by greater promptitude, than was shown in the dispatch of the expected reinforcements."* On the Silhet frontier, Colonel Bowen retired from before the stockade of Doodpatlee, after several unsuccessful attempts to carry it. At Talain, Colonel Innes similarly failed, and although, in the last instances, the troops were not withdrawn in the best order, yet the Burmese had not sufficient enterprise to leave their stockades and harass them on their retreat; neither did they after the overthrow of the Ramoo detachment follow up their success by a demonstration against Chittagong; when, at Dacca, and even at Calcutta itself, their short-lived and ill-merited success caused no small excitement. Maha Bundoola's attention

was however about the same time (May 1824) called to the defence of Rangoon, where 13,000 British and native troops landed for offensive operations against Ava.

On the Silhet frontier operations ceased from the inclemency of the season, and the nature of the country; the Burmese retaining their advanced positions which our troops had failed to carry. On the opening of next season they were easily expelled from Assam and Cachar. The division of the army which was assembled under General Shuldham on that frontier, for operations in Ava, through Muneepore and the Kuboo valley, struggled through February and March, against difficulties which no exertions could overcome, and eventually gave up the pursuit. This afforded Lieutenant Pemberton a fine opportunity for the display of his enterprising spirit. With Gumbheer Singh, the chief of Muneepore, and with his undisciplined levy, that officer advanced to the capital, expelled the Burmese from the valley, and established the authority of its ancient chief there. It must never be forgotten, that the army of Rangoon, with the usual assistance from our glorious navy, dislodged the 60,000 Burmese from the entrenchments they had drawn round the British position; mostly at the point of the bayonet, and with the loss of only fifty men killed, and 300 wounded, capturing two hundred and forty pieces of ordnance of every kind, and killing, it is said, 5,000 of their numbers; nor that the army of Sir Archibald Campbell pursued its victorious career through the heart of his country, never (where European troops were employed) receiving a check, except at the stockades in front of Donabew, where 500 men in two columns, after carrying one stockade, were at the second, "received by a destructive fire from all parts of the works, which checked the progress of the columns, and inflicted so severe a loss upon them, that it became necessary to retreat. Captain Rose, who commanded, and Captain Cannon, of the 89th Regiment, and the greater number of the men were killed or wounded."* The force, which latterly consisted of only 3,000 European and 2,000 native troops, advanced to within forty-five miles of the capital, and there dictated peace on its own terms to the Burman empire.

The only other disasters that occurred in the campaign were the defeat of 1,100 Madras sepoys with four howitzers and some Pioneers under the command of Colonel Smith, which had been detached from Rangoon against the stockaded positions at Kyloo. The force was repulsed, and instead of taking up a position for the night, fell back rapidly to Yadagee; and eventually, to head-quarters. Colonel Macdowell's force, consisting of two brigades of Madras Infantry, moved from Prome to attack the Burmese stockades at Wattegong; they were unprovided with artillery, and coming in front of works of greater strength, with far greater numbers opposed to them than was expected, estimated at ten or twelve thousand men, the whole force, after sustaining severe loss in front of the stockades, and on the retreat, returned unsuccessful to Prome. Lieutenant-Colonel Conry, with the 3rd Madras Light Infantry, was

* H. H. Wilson.

repulsed in his attack on the stockade of Latang near Pegue. There were no European troops in either of these instances, nor in those where we sustained defeat or repulse on our frontier in our defensive operations, to point the columns of attack; and although it is possible, if there had been, that they might still have been defeated, yet as Europeans were so seldom defeated, and as their enemy had been taught to respect them, the impression naturally must be that it was their absence which led to these disasters.

There seems nothing in our relations with Ava calculated to disturb the harmony which has existed since the conclusion of the treaty between the two states, unless it be that the King of Siam is included in the provisions of the treaty as our ally. Why it was necessary to include that state in our treaty with Ava, in a manner calculated hereafter to embarrass ourselves, does not appear. It seems a question whether the possessions in Arracan, which we gained from the Burmese in the war, pay the expence of maintaining our Civil and Military establishments there; and whether, if any of the old dynasty, to whom we might entrust the defence of that unhealthy and inhospitable region, remain, we might not withdraw within our former frontier of Chittagong. There is no question that our new possessions on the Tenasserim Coast have entailed an expence on us of ten or twelve lakhs a year, and that we ought if possible to relinquish them. These distant possessions, independently of their expence, tending to weaken our position in India by withdrawing our European and native troops. Selling them, because we sell the inhabitants with them, and the interest of those who have been led to settle there under our protection, may be objectionable. But our relation to these people cannot surely be considered a reason for our maintaining, for ever, expensive establishments in a country useless to us.

The conduct of the Burmese in the payment of the amount settled by treaty as indemnity to us for the expences of the war, and their conduct with respect to any frontier differences, may be received in proof, that the lesson which they were taught of our power has not been forgotten; and this may render us the less scrupulous in the concessions which we now make to them, particularly as they well understand that neither the Tenasserim Provinces nor the Kuboo valley are of any value to us however they may be prized by themselves.

One of the advantages of the war, for which we paid so dearly, is the knowledge which it has opened to us of our own and the Ava frontier. If we had to go to war again with that power, we know the season for commencing operations, and we know that whilst a division of the Madras army lands at Rangoon, another can ascend the Aeng Pass from Arracan, and that both may reach the Burmese capital in one campaign; whilst another division of the Bengal army from Silhet can, through Muneepore and the Kuboo valley, make a diversion in their favor, taking the capital in reverse.

In February, 1829, Sir Archibald Campbell, who is the first authority in such a question, reports to Government:

"For my own part I should enter on such a service with every certainty of success, with from three to four thousand European Infantry, two or three native corps, a brigade of Horse Artillery, a company of Foot ditto, a detachment of the Rocket Corps, a Corps or strong detachment of Cavalry, with the same of Pioneers." "At no period of the late war had I any thing to the amount of it available in the field." The whole to advance through the Aeng Pass.

NEPAUL.—Although not the next in importance, Nepaul is the next in position on our external frontier.

As a power to carry on offensive operations, Nepaul was not formidable even before her position was so much circumscribed by the results of her war with us, and was not likely to become so. The nature of her army confined her to her hills, and although in the progress of time she might have organized force capable of acting in the plains, yet there is not at any period of her history any appearance of this. The course of her conquests was westward through mountains, extending only into the forest tracts at their foot. It spread rapidly from the valley of Nepaul through Kumaon and Gurwal, had crossed the Sutleje, and came in contact with the "hill people of Kote Kangra." It might have flown still more westward and northward, had it not in the Sikhs met a rising, and therefore a victorious army like their own, which gave to the Goorkas their first defeat, and obliged them to retire behind the Sutleje.

In coming into collision with the British power, at the foot of their hills, when endeavouring to extend their frontier and to taste of the rich fruits of conquest in the plains, the Goorkas found an army whose Cavalry could keep possession of the latter, and whose Infantry could follow and punish them in the fastnesses of their mountains. The struggle was however more severe, and in the commencement of it far more disastrous, than any we had before encountered; for we met an enemy in courage, in discipline, and endurance more like ourselves, and more worthy of our steel. The principal divisions of our army, where was the strength of our European force, and which were directed against the capital, did not receive that impulse which was necessary to carry them there; but remained inactive, and paralized throughout the first campaign. The left division under General Gillespie, where there were European troops likewise, wasted its strength and lost its commander in its attack on the stockaded position of Kalunga, when it had not the material of a siege, and where the place, but that it was garrisoned by Goorkas, hardly seemed to deserve one. That portion of the army on the extreme left under Colonel Ochterlony, which had no European troops, played a game more of manœuvre than of battle with the Goorkas, turned their positions, fought them, and generally defeated them, when to fight them was necessary; and by the end of the first campaign, possessed itself of most of their

positions on their western frontier, reducing the Goorka general, (the patriotic Ummer Singh Tappa,) and his troops to submit to the condition of retiring to their own valley. Colonel Gardener, with a body of partisan Rohillahs, amounting to 3 or 4,000 men, raised and embodied for the occasion, played nearly the same game in Kumaon that Ochterlony did in Gurwal, turned the enemy's positions on his line of march, and crowned the heights of Almorah. A brigade of native troops under Colonel Nicolls marched to his support, carried the positions round that capital, and reduced the Goorka force to the condition of submitting to be sent behind the Gogra.

The results of the first campaign must have confounded the calculations of the noble Marquis and every one else. That portion of the army, with which it was meant to make an impression on the enemy, in the seat of his power, remained inactive ; whilst the skirmishes on the left flank, which could only have been intended to produce a diversion, succeeded to an extent that shook the Goorka on his throne.

Having been reinforced by troops from the westward, whom Colonels Ochterlony and Nicolls had sent back to Nepaul, that Government at the commencement of the next season still considered itself strong enough to renew the contest ; but our army having been concentrated and brought, under the master mind of Ochterlony, to bear directly on his capital, almost unconditional submission or entire subversion became the alternative, and Nepaul chose the former.

The military resources of Nepaul are highly respectable. Her army, which is paid principally by assignments in land, is upwards of 40,000 strong. One-third of this force is on constant duty, relieved at fixed periods by the remaining portions. But for the limited sphere in which they are posted, all can be called into action at the shortest notice. Their discipline under this feudal or militia system, even for offensive operations, is far more perfect than we (accustomed only to regular, and in many respects, to native troops, harassing and unnecessary, discipline,) would readily imagine.

Since the termination of this contest, a well defined frontier, and a wholesome conviction of our resources and power, have preserved peace with the state of Nepaul, which there is nothing in our present relations calculated to disturb.

LAHORE.—The most important of the states on our exterior frontier, whether we consider the character of its people, its resources, the degree of their civilization, or the position of the country itself.

The progress of the British power northward found two nations about to contend for supremacy in Upper India, each of them in their character of conquerors nearly as new to those parts as ourselves. The Mahrattas from the south, and the Sikhs from the north. The former people, from their condition, only a hundred

years before, of obscure cultivators in a corner of the Dekhan, had overthrown the Mogul empire and were organizing a power which promised to claim supremacy throughout India. The latter, which likewise, only a few years before, was unknown in its religion, and which became known at a still later date for its military exploits, had obtained possession of the Punjaub, one of the most important divisions of the empire, and had pushed its advanced post almost to the gates of the capital. From their position and character, these two nations must at no very distant period have appeared in hostile array on the plains of Dehlee, and the Mahrattas would no doubt have prevailed.

The appearance of the British on this theatre pushed back the Mahrattas within the Gwalior and Indore frontiers, and the Sikhs were a few years after persuaded by Sir Charles Metcalfe, backed by a military force, to retire behind the Sutleje.

We have never come to blows with Runjeet Sing, nor have we any very good standard by which to judge of the martial character of the Sikhs, or of the condition of Runjeet Sing's army. Of the former we must not judge from the dastardly behaviour of our own Sikh partisans in the Goorka war; for the Sikhs on the left of the Sutleje are universally allowed to be inferior in every martial quality to their brethren of the Punjaub, and we may be sure that, they are not a very inferior people, who have conquered Multaun and Cashmere, and who hold the Afghauns of Peshawur tributary. Yet the very qualities, (their discipline,) which enabled them to prevail on those occasions, may in a contest with us only lead the more suddenly to their defeat. Their discipline under their few French and East Indian officers, we may be assured, is not, and never can be, equal to our own; their Artillery and Engineers must be immeasurably inferior; and as in a contest with us they must depend on these alone, and would meet us, as the Mahrattas did, in a pitched battle, instead of pursuing their own irregular, and to us harassing mode of warfare, their overthrow would be immediate and complete. Runjeet Sing's revenues cannot exceed two crore of rupees. We know that these will not enable him to maintain a standing army of more than 20,000 horse and 80,000 foot, and as he is avaricious, the probability is that he does not keep up near that number. He is however considered to be rich, and in case of a contest with us, could draw from our own provinces, almost any number of men on whom he could depend; and from Baloochistaun and Afghaunistaun as many as he would trust in his ranks. There is however little chance of this wise and moderate prince ever provoking a war with us, until some reverse of fortune gives him a better chance of success than he has hitherto had. During our late operations against Bhurtpore, he drew back his forces towards our frontier, to watch the progress of events. Had any thing happened to shake our supremacy in Upper India, and the conduct of a great portion of one of the divisions of the army before Bhurtpore was sufficient to give hope to Runjeet Sing, Dehlee must have fallen before his

power. Although still young, he is infirm in health, and it is hardly to be supposed that on his death, any leading mind like his own will spring up, to retain the Sikhs in their present united position, and to serve as a barrier between us and the powers of the north and west.

There is nothing in our relations with Lahore calculated in any way to embarrass either us or Runjeet Sing, unless it be that the Sutleje is by treaty made the boundary between that country and ours, and that this river loses its name and takes that of the Gharra before it enters the territories of Bhawulpore. It is of course our object to confine Runjeet Sing to the right bank of the Gharra, as well as of the Sutleje; for the territories of the protected states of Beekaneer and Jessulmere, as well as those of our friend the Newab of Bhawulpore, would otherwise be open to Runjeet Sing. However, if the Gharra be not a boundary to Runjeet Sing, on the one side, neither is it by the terms of the treaty a boundary to us on the other.

SCIND.—Our first treaty of 1809, with the Ameers is of amity and friendship, they binding themselves not to allow the establishment of the tribe of the French in Scind. In the second of 1820, they bind themselves not to allow any European or American to settle in their dominions. But subjects of either state are allowed mutually to establish their residence in the dominions of the other. In the treaty of the present year, the Indus is opened to our merchants, and navigation, except for the conveyance of military stores or armed vesssels. English merchants are not allowed to settle in Scind, but a Tariff is to be established by mutual agreement, and its provisions are to be binding.

Our first treaty was with three of the Ameers, our second with two, and the last with two.

By a note of Mr. N. H. Smith's, appended to the 2nd vol. of Sir John Malcolm's History of Persia, it appears, that after Nadir Sha's invasion of India, the Calore family, the rulers of Scind, became tributary to Persia. In 1197 Hejree, the Calorees were expelled by Meer Fatte Ulee Talpooree, and the present dynasty (the Talpoorees) established in that country. The chief of the ancient dynasty of the Calorees is residing at Joudpore under the protection of its Raja, and frequently calls for our assistance, to enable him to gain his lost possessions. The Ameers of the Talpooree family appear to be now united, considering themselves the head of the powerful tribe of Baloochees, each exercising supreme power within that portion of the ancestral dominions which fell to his share; all tributary to the throne of Cabul, but all ready to unite to oppose aggression, whether it comes from that quarter, from the Sikhs, or from us. The Kheyrpore chief, whose possessions touch on those of Runjeet Sing, would eagerly have entered on any treaty with us which should have promised to save him from the grasp of his powerful neighbour, to whom he would appear to be tributary for some of his possessions. His brother of Hyderabad,

and the other members of his family, would have benefited by this stipulation as well as himself. But he would not treat with us on a footing which should have separated his interests from those of the Hyderabad branch, which all acknowledge as the superior.

Our relations with the Ameers of Scind are likely to be very much improved by our late negotiations with them: and if no great benefit should result from the opening of the Indus to our trade, and the establishing of a fixed Tariff; an advantage of first rate importance in a political point of view has been gained by the knowledge which we have attained of the character of that noble river, of its capabilities of becoming, in a more important degree than it ever has been, a powerful barrier between India and the nations of the west; and of its fitness to become the channel of commerce with the people of Northern India, and the various tribes lying between us and Persia. The Ameers of Scind, when their jealousy of us ceases, and they have reason to fear the encroachment of other powers, may be turned to great account in strengthening this boundary; and the spirit in which they have now come forward to aid in the punishment of the Nuggur Parkur tribe, and others, their subjects or dependants, who are implicated in violating our frontier, or that of states in alliance with us, may be received in proof of their disposition to cultivate terms of amity and friendship with us.

We have but little knowledge of the resources of the Ameers of Scind, either in men or money. They do not appear to have a standing army, but that they can command the services of the powerful tribe of Baloochees seems undoubted, and that they might obtain the aid of Cabul in any struggle with us, seems probable likewise, if they did not fear to trust to such assistance. Their position behind the *Run* and the deserts of Jessulmere and Joudpore, and the nature of their power, which is clannish, and therefore not calculated like a regular army for offensive, however much so for defensive, operations, must prevent their ever being formidable to us as an invading army. The material of combination between them and the Rajpoot powers is wanting, and they would find that people as much opposed to their advanced movement as ourselves. They might become a useful auxiliary to the Sikhs, or the Sikhs to them. The stories which are told of their enormous wealth are most likely as unfounded as any of those with which we have been deluded in former days. The arid plains of Baloochistan, and the neglected banks of the Indus, are not the description of country from which to collect wealth, and the family is not of old standing.

The territories of these four great states constitute the line of our external defence, which extends to 3,536 British miles, being from Cape Negrais on the north-east, to the boundaries of Scind on the west.* The area of the tract comprehended within that line is 1,111,162 square miles. Our regular army of 150,000 men, giving of course 42 men for the defence of each mile of external

* Major Everest, Surveyor General of India.

frontier, and an average of one man to every seven miles within that frontier.

Whether these external powers have the means of combining against us or of acting in concert, must be doubtful.* The Burmese and the Nepaulese may be supposed to hold communication with one another, and so may the Nepaulese and their neighbours the Sikhs. The Burmese and the Nepaulese cannot have forgotten that we have stripped them of some of the fairest portions of their empires, and the Sikhs do not forget that we pushed them beyond the Sutleje. But although they might so regulate their operations that their attacks on our frontier might be simultaneous, yet they have not, from their positions, the power of uniting, nor would they have that of combining, their operations, after war had commenced. Our communications with their several courts, and our positions on their frontiers, would give us timely notice of their designs, and enable us to mature a system offensive and defensive to meet such an exigency.

Madras and Bombay, with their twelve regiments of European Infantry, their two regiments of Dragoons, their eleven regiments of Native Cavalry, and their twenty-six regiments of Native Infantry, could put forth six regiments of European Infantry, a regiment of Dragoons, and as many regiments of Native Infantry as might be wanted. One division could land at Rangoon, the other on the coast of Arracan to ascend the Aeng Pass, and these two forces moving straight on Umerapoora with such diversion as we might make in their favor from the Silhet frontier, to take the Burmese capital in reverse, would be sufficient to dictate terms to that state. Bengal with her nine regiments of European Infantry, her two regiments of Dragoons, ten of Native Cavalry, and seventy-four of Native Infantry, could furnish a division of four regiments of European and ten of Native Infantry, to move on the capital of Nepaul; whilst, by strengthening our position at Almorah, we should confine that state within its own limits in the hills. Two European regiments of Infantry, the Dragoons, the Native Cavalry, and as many regiments of Native Infantry as might be necessary, supported, if still further necessary, by the advanced divisions of the Madras and Bombay armies, would remain for operations against the Sikhs in the plains of the Punjaub.

Could we afford so to drain India of her European and native army? In our present position almost every body will answer that we could not. If in addition to this state of affairs on our frontier, some of the native powers in Internal India should arm against us, our position would become highly critical. Such a combination is not probable, but it is possible, and it should be our business to prepare and to guard against it. Can any force which we can

* They are, curiously enough, all of different religions, and different races of men.

afford to maintain be sufficient to save us from this danger; and if not, where is our remedy?

Our conquest or subjugation of the native states of Internal India has been so gradual, and our supremacy over them has been so partially and so irregularly enforced and acknowledged, that we do not, even at this advanced period of our administration, stand in that position with respect to them which is necessary as well for their safety as our own, always supposing that our interests are united, to guard India from foreign conquest.

As we deny them the exercise of foreign relations, protect them from foreign conquest, and secure the stability of, and the succession to the principality or throne; whence the use of their armies, except as auxiliaries to us, for the maintenance of their position and our own? Would these armies in case of foreign invasion, or any contingency, which should call our troops from their present positions, be likely to co-operate in the general cause, or would they without any reference to their obligations to us, be applied to forward the individual and separate views of their several princes, and would not many of them be thrown into the scale against us?

Past experience, witness the treacherous attacks at Poona and Nagpore in 1817, on the weak brigades left at those capitals, when the strength of the subsidiary forces moved in advance; the present state of their organization, and the temper of the majority of the states in India, who have all long accounts to settle with us, and we need have no doubt on this head; these considerations may serve to convince us that our army can never be withdrawn from its local positions, until we have organized the forces of these states under our own officers, as we have done the army of Hyderabad, and as we did that of Nagpore, and a portion of that of Poona. We had not in either of the last instances any difficulty in bringing these contingents, thus organized, into action against the princes who paid them, when they became our enemies; and portions of the Nizam's contingent thus organized served throughout the last Mahratta war, in Malwa, in Berar, and in the Poona territory, with the same gallantry and devotion to our cause as our own army. In this condition they may be rendered each amply sufficient to support our interests in the dominions of their own prince, and to aid in the general military defence of the empire. The manner however in which this important result could best be produced, may more suitably be considered under the next general class of our political relations.

In the present reduced state of our military power, and with the material of combination against us, which we should leave behind, it is evident, that we could not now place 100,000 men in position on the Indus, or at whatever point it may become necessary to make our first stand. In preparing for the general defence of India against foreign invasion, we naturally turn to the north-west, for that is the only quarter from which it can come in any formidable shape; and although the best military

authorities of the present day may satisfy us that we must not put our faith either in rivers or in mountains as affording even lines of defence, yet there is no doubt, whenever India is seriously threatened from that quarter, that we must step in advance to the Indus, and we shall then have reason to congratulate ourselves that the topography and resources of the country in its neighbourhood have been ascertained and improved; that the noble river itself is capable of supporting our steam-boats and our floating batteries, that all the steam-boats of India have been built with a view to the navigation of that river, and that they can so easily advance or retire with a division of our army, to operate either on the front or rear of our enemy, through the 700 miles which separate Attock from the mouths of the Indus.

INTERNAL RELATIONS.

All of which have relinquished political relations with one another and with all other states: these may, according to the nature of their several treaties with us, be divided into four great classes:

1st Class. Treaties, offensive and defensive. Right on their part to protection, external and internal, from the British Government. Right on its part to interfere in their internal affairs.

1. Oude. In 1768, the Wuzeer agreed not to maintain an army of more than thirty-five thousand men, of whom not more than ten thousand should be trained and disciplined like English troops.

In 1773, the King of Dehlee having abandoned Allahabad, and given Corah and Currah to the Mahrattas, which places had been assigned by the British Government for H. M.'s maintenance, that Government bound itself to place the Wuzeer in possession of those districts, on his paying fifty lakhs of rupees; and the Wuzeer further agreed to pay a brigade consisting of two battalions of Europeans, six battalions of Sepoys, and a company of Artillery, at the rate of two lakhs and ten thousand rupees *per mensem*, whilst their services should be required.

In 1775, the British Government undertakes the defence of the Oude country, for which the Wuzeer makes certain cession of territory.

In 1781, the temporary brigade is withdrawn, and the troops left in the Oude territory limited, the cost to be only Rupees 3,10,000 per mensem. The Wuzeer is permitted to resume all Jageers, except those guaranteed by the Company. The Governor Geveral recommends the Wuzeer to reduce his troops to the number he has the means of paying; that he receive into his private purse, only a sum sufficient for the expences of his person and household, and that he leave the remainder in the public treasury, under the management of his minister, and the inspection of the resident.

In 1787, the Marquis Cornwallis negociates with the Wuzeer the terms of his future subsidy, which was to be fifty lakhs a year; when more troops were required, the Wuzeer was to pay for them; when any of those for which this payment was made, were recalled, the amount was to be reduced accordingly. The entire management of his country is to remain with the Wuzeer.

In 1797, the Wuzeer agrees to defray the cost of a regiment of Dragoons, and one of Native Cavalry, provided it does not exceed five lakhs and a half of rupees *per annum*.

In 1798, a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance is entered into with the Wuzeer. The subsidy is encreased to seventy-six lakhs of rupees, to commence from the accession of Saadat Alli Khan to the Musnud. The subsidiary force maintained in Oude never to be less than ten thousand men of all arms. The fortress of Allahabad ceded to the Company. The Wuzeer agrees to reduce

his establishments and to consult the Company's Government on the best mode of effecting this. No political relations to exist on the part of the Nuwab, without the knowledge of the Company.

In 1801, the Wuzeer cedes to the Company in perpetuity, and in commutation of his money payments on all accounts, territory yielding one crore and thirty-five lakhs of rupees per annum. The number of the Wuzeer's own troops limited, the British Government undertaking the defence of his territories against all foreign and domestic enemies, a detachment of British troops, with a proportion of Artillery, remaining at all times attached to H. E. The possession of the remaining territory guaranteed to H. E., his heirs and successors, with the exercise of his and their authority therein. His Excellency will always advise with and act in conformity to the councils of the officers of the Hon'ble Company in the Government of his country.

In 1816, certain territory, conquered from the Goorkas, was ceded to the Wuzeer, in commutation of the second loan of a crore of rupees, furnished to the Company in the previous year.

There is no state in India with whose Government we have interfered so systematically and so uselessly as with that of Oude. But this interference has been more in favor of men, than of measures; and has apparently been utterly useless for the purpose of securing to the people of Oude any improvement in their institutions, or in the form of administering them. We at one time sent our officers and troops to enforce the payment of the revenue claimed by the Oude Government from its subjects, without having the means of judging whether that claim was just or unjust, and we have lent our troops almost for the performance of the ordinary duties of police. We at another time supported a minister in his office, and during our support of him, borrowed money from the treasury of the state, the interest of which we guaranteed in perpetuity to him and his family, though in lending it he was guilty of betraying the interests of his sovereign. We have at another time withdrawn our troops from the support of the minister, and left him to his own resources. We have on several occasions placed ourselves in the humiliating condition of debtors to the Oude Government; we have shut our eyes to extortions and oppressions which have driven its subjects into rebellion, and then we have lent our army to punish and reduce them to obedience. But in the whole history of our interference, there does not seem to be one measure calculated to produce any lasting benefit to the people of Oude.

The present sovereign of Oude is just what might be expected of a person brought up in a *harem*, and who had never been permitted to enter on even the ordinary concerns of life, until the period for acquiring habits of business or usefulness had gone by. He is suddenly raised to administer the affairs of a small sovereignty, and being himself unequal to the task, wisely called to his councils, an old dismissed servant of the state, whose abilities had before been conspicuous in the revenue management of a portion of the country, but whose honesty was of a very doubtful kind, and

who had been obliged to fly for refuge to the neighbouring territory of the Company, with the treasures which he had amassed. He is suddenly, by his over indulgent master, placed in the exercise of almost supreme power. His administration very soon restored the Oude territory to a degree of comparative prosperity. The amount of assessment was considerably reduced, the police of the country was organized, courts of justice were established. The rabble, amounting, it was said, to 60,000 men, which had been raised by the former administration, to aid in the collection of the revenue, when the assistance of our troops was withheld, were mostly paid up and discharged. There was a degree of protection both of person and property throughout the country, which bore some comparison with the neighbouring districts of the Company; and the able minister, who had so suddenly produced all these admirable results, seemed to enjoy the entire confidence of his sovereign. He was however a reformist in too broad a sense for the meridian of Lucknow, and whether trusting to our support, or from whatever other cause, had failed to strengthen his interests with the Queen Mother and the ladies of the seraglio. He had even been improvident enough to touch the stipends of the King's uncles and other relations. They had not much difficulty in prejudicing the royal ear against him, and at the very time that His Majesty was sounding the praises of his minister to the Governor General, and receiving his lordship's congratulations on the admirable effects of the minister's administration, he had resolved on his dismissal and degradation. The pretended cause was disrespectful language on the part of the minister towards the King's mother, and something insulting towards the picture of the King's father; all showing that the King was at a loss for a reason on which to justify his measure to the Governor General, to whom indeed no justification was necessary, for the King had been told, that he was supreme both to appoint and to dismiss his servants. The whole proceeding is however a good sample of the duplicity and the folly which we may expect from Eastern Princes, educated as they now are, having no sympathy with their people, and whose misgovernment can have no effect on the stability of their dominion, guaranteed as it is by us against invasion from without, and insurrection within.

This imbecile Prince thinks to hold the reins of government in his own hands, and professes himself equal to the administration of the affairs of an extensive country in all their departments. He is encouraged in this belief by the interested and sycophant courtiers by whom he is surrounded. In the mean time, rebellion is stalking abroad in every part of his dominions. Half the amount of revenue only is collected; there is insecurity of life and property every where, and this state of anarchy must endanger the tranquility of neighbouring countries, whose sovereigns have a right to hold him answerable for the due administration of his own. Unless therefore some great improvement takes place, a very short period must witness the reins of government fall from hands which could never have been destined by Providence to hold them.

2. Mysore.—On the subjugation of the Mahomedan dynasty of Mysore, we were fortunate in finding, amongst Tippoo's ministers, a virtuous man like Purneah, to be entrusted with the administration of that portion of the country which was reserved for the minor son of the old Hindoo princes. We were further fortunate in finding amongst our own servants men like Close, Webbe, Malcolm, and Wilks, to aid and support Purneah in his administration When the young Prince attained maturity, his able and virtuous minister delivered over to his charge a flourishing country, well administered in all its departments, and a treasury containing 75,00,000 Pagodas, the accumulation of his stewardship.

The British Government had the merit of restoring this Hindoo Prince to the throne of his fathers, from which they had been driven by a Mahomedan usurper; it had further the merit of withdrawing from interference in the administration of his affairs, to which from the nature of his education under Purneah, and from the place which his family held in the estimation of the Hindoo population of the country, he should have been more competent than any other sovereign in India. Tippoo Sultan was in the first war stripped of half his dominions; and half of what remained, on the final conquest of his country, was transferred to the Raja. This did not however, as appears by Schedule C of the treaty, exceed 13,74,000 Pagodas a year, and by a subsidiary treaty with the British Government, the Raja agreed to an yearly payment of seven lakhs of Pagodas. The management of a country yielding at the time of the transfer the above sum was thus left in the hands of a descendant of its ancient princes.

The political relations with Mysore rested with the Madras Government. The interference of the resident, except in administering advice, was interdicted, and little notice seems to have been taken of the Raja or his affairs until Sir Thomas Munro's government of Madras. It was then seen that matters were not proceeding prosperously in Mysore, and good advice was not wanting. But our interference proceeded no further until the Raja's misgovernment drove the inhabitants of a portion of his country into open rebellion ; to quell which it was necessary to call for the aid of our troops. Further inquiry proved that the Raja's own troops and entire establishments were greatly in arrears, and in a state of mutiny : that he had during his profligate career not only squandered the accumulations left him by Purneah, but that he had incurred debts to a large amount. All confidence in the Raja and his servants had been destroyed in the minds of the people of Mysore. The material of a native Government had been destroyed, and the Governor General was, in accordance with the terms of the treaty, under the necessity of setting aside the administration of the Raja, and appointing under his own authority a Commission for the management of affairs in Mysore.

3. Berar.—This principality was, at the termination of the first Mahratta war, in which it joined against us as Scindea's confeder-

ate, stripped of the province of Cuttack, of the country to the westward of the Wurda, and to the southward of the Nernullah and Gawil Gurh range of hills. The territory of Sumbulpore and Patun was afterwards restored gratuitously.

In 1816, Berar subsidized a British force, consisting of a regiment of Cavalry, six battalions of Infantry, &c., agreeing to pay therefore Rupees 7,50,000 a year.

In the following year, it joined the Mahratta confederacy against us, was defeated, and its possessions were at the disposal of the British Government. The Raja was again restored on conditions, amongst which was that of ceding territory in lieu of the money subsidy. He again confederated with the Peshwa against us; was deposed, and the next heir, a minor, placed in succession to him. During the minority, the Nagpore territory remained under the management of the Resident, Mr. Jenkins, who placing British officers in charge of small and compact districts, administered all its affairs, revenue, judicial, and police. This best of all systems of Indian administration could not have fallen into better hands. The amount of revenue was defined, cheap and abundant justice offered to the people, both by European and native instruments, and responsibility was thrown on the people themselves for the regulation of the police. Under almost any instruments a country through such a system of management must prosper, under the general superintendance of Mr. Jenkins, assisted by such officers as Captains Gordon, Hamilton, Wilkinson, and Cameron. Nagpore, in the ten years during which this administration lasted, became comparatively a garden; those who knew that country and the nature of its government when this system commenced, and who saw it when it terminated, can alone judge of the benefits produced in so short a time.

When the Raja attained his majority, certain portions of his territory were retained for the payment of the contingent which had been disciplined by British officers, consisting of four regiments of Cavalry and five of Infantry. The surplus revenue, if any, after the payment of the contingent, was to be accounted for to the Raja; and the management of this tract of country was to remain, as the whole had formerly been, under the Resident and British superintendants. The remainder of the dominions of Nagpore were transferred to the Raja's sole management. It was further declared that whenever the success of the Raja's management should justify the measure, the reserved districts should also be transferred, His Highness appropriating sufficient funds from his resources for the payment of the contingent. By the concluding articles of the treaty, it remained for the British Government to controul the Raja's administration in all its branches; and when a failure of resources should be apprehended from the mal-administration of the Raja, it was at the option of that Government to resume the management of all or any portion of his dominions. The instrument by which these conditions were recorded, need not have

been called a treaty. They were terms dictated by us to a conquered country, and to a person whom we chose to raise to such authority over it as it suited our purpose to give to him.

That portion of the treaty, which anticipated the restoration to the Raja of the tract of country reserved for the payment of the contingent, was the first retrograde step from the most desirable position in which we can stand with respect to the native princes. The army which in their hands must be useless to them for any purpose except to be employed against us, and which is generally an undisciplined, ill paid, and mutinous rabble, becomes under our management, an efficient portion of the forces for the defence of the empire, sufficient not only to maintain our position in the territory of the particular state to which it belongs, when it may be necessary to call our armies to an advanced scene of action ; but sufficient either for the purpose of accompanying these armies, or of aiding in the maintenance of our authority and of tranquillity in neighbouring states. By accepting of a money payment, instead of a territorial cession for this contingent, we weaken our position by placing our resources at the mercy of the native state. It is true that in this treaty we reserved to ourselves the power of resuming a competent portion of country when the money resource should fail. But whence the benefit of giving up a stronger position and taking a weaker, when the end to be obtained is the same ?

The view taken in the treaty of 1826, regarding this contingent is the more to be lamented, since it apparently led only three years thereafter, to a revised engagement with the Berar state, by which we made the most, or only retrograde movement, that has been carried into effect since the days of Sir George Barlow. Through it we sacrificed without remorse the whole of this contingent, forgetting the services which it had performed, and overlooking those which it was prepared to perform for us, receiving in lieu thereof a promised subsidy of eight lakhs per annum, and thereby rendering the British subsidiary force an appendage to the Berar Government, necessary for the support of our relations there, and unavailable for any extended movements for the general defence of the empire. As we have thus ceded what was of the utmost value to ourselves, we might as well restore Sumbulpore and Sirgooja, territories which are of no use, but entail much trouble on us, and which would be highly prized by Nagpore.

By the new and definitive treaty, the British Government reserves to itself the right of advising, remonstrating, and when the stability of the resources of the state for the discharge of its obligations are considered to be endangered, of re-appointing its own officers for the management of districts in His Highness' name, for as long a period as it may deem necessary. A thousand horse are to be maintained by the state under the command of their own officers, and liable to serve with the British forces in the field in time of war.

4. TRAVANCORE.—The Raja of Travancore having failed, in 1788, to obtain the loan of British officers to discipline six of his regiments, entertained two battalions of the Company's troops, which he was to pay either in money or in paper, with these the Company undertook the defence of the Travancore territories, strengthening these battalions, or adding others as might be necessary, at their own cost. On the termination of the first war with Tippoo, certain districts, which he had conquered from this state, were restored to it. The subsidiary force was at the same time strengthened by an additional battalion with artillery, and the Raja agreed to aid our troops, in case of need, with troops of his own, to serve beyond his own frontier. In 1805, the Raja agreed to pay a sum equal to the expense of one more regiment, the distribution of the force was to rest entirely with the Company, and the expense of any further force required for the defence of his country, was to be borne jointly by the parties. When failure of resources is apprehended, the Company's Government has full power to introduce its own regulations and ordinances.

The subsidiary force has lately been withdrawn from the Travancore territory. And a Nair Brigade is organized under the command of British officers, for the support of the Raja in his internal administration.

5. COCHIN.—The Raja of Cochin pays to the British Government 2,76,000 Rupees a year, on which account it binds itself to defend and protect the territories of the Raja with a force which shall not cost beyond this sum, against all enemies whomsoever. If however a larger force becomes necessary, the Raja is to bear a just and fair proportion of the expense. Whenever failure of funds shall be apprehended for the fulfilment of these obligations, the British Government has the right to introduce such regulations and ordinances as shall be deemed necessary.

These five states constitute the first class into which our internal relations are by the nature of these treaties divided. These differ principally from those with other states, in the right which we have to interfere in their internal affairs. The revenues of the Mysore country would appear to be very much under-estimated in the treaty.

2nd Class. Treaties, offensive and defensive. Right on their part to protection, external and internal, from the British Government, and to the aid of its troops, to realize their just claims from their own subjects. No right on its part to interfere in their internal affairs.

1. HYDERABAD.—This is the most important of all the states of Internal India, whether we consider the extent of its dominions, its resources, the variety and richness of its soil, or the extent of its disciplined army.

It is unnecessary to enter on the early period of our relations with the Nizam's Government. The Peshkush payable by the

Company to the Nizam for the Northern Sirkars (7,00,000 a year) began to be regularly liquidated after Lord Cornwallis assumed the Government of India in 1788, and the Nizam's order to Seyf Jung, to deliver up the Guntoor Sirkar to the Company, was passed at the same time. A treaty offensive and defensive was concluded with the Nizam in 1790. Two battalions were subsidized for the prosecution of the war against Tippoo; the Peishwa agreed to join the league on the same conditions, each furnishing troops to act in concert with those of the Company, and all receiving an equal share of conquests. In the same year, it was further agreed, that from four to six more battalions, with a complement of Artillery, should be lent to the Nizam at the charge in which they stood the Company:—the detachment to be at any time recalled, or dismissed by the Nizam. In the war which ensued, Tippoo ceded to the three allied powers half his dominions, and the Nizam received, for his share, territory yielding 13,16,000 Pagodas a year.

In 1798, a further addition was made to the subsidiary force, extending it in all to 6,000 men, with a complement of Artillery, at a yearly cost to the Nizam of 24,17,100 rupees. The Nizam's Government at the same time agreed to disband the French regiments in its service, promised never to commit any excess or aggression against the Peishwa, and in the event of any differences arising between the two states, the British Government agreed to mediate.

In 1800, a further treaty of perpetual and general defensive alliance was entered into. The subsidiary force was rendered permanent, and increased to 8,000 firelocks, with two regiments of Cavalry and a proportion of Artillery, &c.

The Nizam's share of the second conquests from Tippoo was 7,93,000 Pagodas, which, with his share of the former conquests, 13,16,000 Pagodas, he now ceded to the Company in lieu of a money payment for the above subsidiary force. Two of the battalions are always to remain near the Nizam; the remainder to be held available for general service, joined by as many more of the Company's troops as the exigency may require, by 6,000 Infantry and 9,000 horse of His Highness' own troops, and by whatever other force he may be able to supply from his dominions. His Highness relinquishes foreign relations, and the Company agrees not to have any concern with his children, relations, subjects, or servants. The subsidiary force to be ready to reduce to obedience any of His Highness' subjects or dependents who shall withhold the payment of the Sirkar's just claims, after the reality of the fact shall be duly ascertained. By the partition treaty of 1804, the Nizam received of the territory conquered, from Berar that to the westward of the Wurda river, and to the southward of the Nurnulla and Gawil Gurh range of hills; and of the territory conquered from Scindia, that lying between the Adjunta range of hills and the Godavery, including the districts of Jalnapore and Gandapore. By the second Mahratta war, the Nizam escaped from the payment of Chout to both the Poona and

Berar Governments, except the sum of 1,20,000 Rupees, which had been guaranteed to the Peishwa's Jageerdars, Appah Dessae, and the Putwurduns. He also received territory conquered from the Poona, Nagpore, and Indore states, which was intermixed with His Highness', yielding Rupees 8,83,013, whilst he transferred territory to the Company and to Berar, intermixed with their's, and yielding Rupees 5,05,735, and this was his amount of benefit from conquests in which his troops so largely participated, and to which by treaty he was entitled to share. It is doubtful however whether the conquests in this war have ever met the expences incurred by the Company during and subsequent to it.

A better place for discussing the possibility or impossibility of refraining from interference in the internal affairs of the internal states of India will occur after the various relations in which we stand to these states shall have been described; but I may now describe the circumstances which have led us so largely to interfere in the internal affairs of the Nizam's Government, whilst by treaty we are bound not to interfere in them at all.

After the war with Tippoo and the first Mahratta war, which left us in a very strong position in the Dekhan, the Nizam's prime minister, Meer Allum, who had negotiated the first treaty with the Marquis Cornwallis at Calcutta, and who had been our friend and supporter in the councils of Hyderabad, died. Yet we did not apparently find ourselves strong enough, with the Poona Mahrattas on the one hand, and the Nagpore Mahrattas on the other, to be without a leader in the Nizam's councils, and we accordingly interested ourselves in the appointment of a minister. Nuwab Mooneer-ool-Moolk was, by the Nizam, appointed Dewan, on a salary of six lakhs of rupees a year, but under an arrangement through which he was by no means to meddle in state affairs. A talented Hindoo, Raja Chundoo Lal, was appointed Peishkar.

There is something curious and interesting in the dispatches of this period, when compared with the opinions which now regulate our proceedings in the political department.

On the 25th of December, 1809, the Resident at Hyderabad observes, "Whoever should be minister, it would be for our interest that Chundoo Lal should possess the largest share of active influence in the administration, and as long as he held a confidential situation about the Nizam, we might almost be assured of the security of our interests at this court. On the other hand, it is impossible to mention the name of any Omra at this court, who is qualified for the situation of principal minister. One person may be less objectionable than another, but they are all equally incapable.

"Although I am far from ascribing to the Raja any distinguished or extraordinary merit in his capacity of minister, yet when his character and qualifications are brought into comparison with those of any other public officer at this court, I can conscientiously declare, that in my judgment there is no other arrangement which is likely to be more conducive to the prosperity and happiness of this country."

On the 31st December, 1809, the Chief Secretary to Government observes to the Resident:

"The right of the British Government to interpose its influence in the selection of a successor to the office of Prime Minister to the state of Hyderabad is a point so well understood, and was so fully discussed in the instructions of Government contained in my dispatch to your predecessor of 22nd May, 1804, on the occasion of the death of Azeem-ool-Omra, that it is unnecessary to state any observations on it upon the present occasion. It is however obviously inexpedient to exercise that right, excepting only in the event of the Nizam manifesting a resolution to adopt an arrangement for the administration of his affairs incompatible with the security of the interests of the alliance. At the same time, it is not only extremely desirable, but essential to those interests, that the person appointed to the situation of minister should consider himself indebted for it to the approbation of the British Government, and should believe the favor and support of that Government necessary to enable him permanently to hold that situation, and to discharge its duties. The Governor General therefore highly approves your intention of inducing the Nizam to suspend a final arrangement, until the sentiments of Government should be made known with regard to that which His Highness may propose to adopt."

It is curious enough that a common Moonshee of the Residency was employed to negotiate the important matter of the appointment of a successor, both with the Nizam and with Chundoo Lal; and accordingly in the following month, the Nizam addressed a letter to the Governor General.

"Raja Chundoo Lal has made a representation to me, on the subject of adopting some arrangement for the management of the affairs of my Government. On this point, Captain Sydenham has received the fullest information.

"By the favor of God, the political connection subsisting between the two states is firmly established, and will last as long as the sun and moon shall remain.

"The respected Buhadoor above-mentioned is well acquainted with all affairs. Such an executive minister is necessary for the duties of administration, as will devote himself entirely to the conduct of the affairs of his sovereign, in the spirit of obedience to the orders with which he may be furnished for that purpose.

"As your Lordship is celebrated for your distinguished virtues I desire to consult your judgment also, with regard to what is advisable and proper to be done on this occasion.

"Let your Lordship write me a short answer, communicating detailed information of your sentiments to Captain Sydenham."

The Governor General would have preferred the nomination of Shums-ool-Omra, but there was no objection to Mooneer-ool-Moolk provided he was satisfied to receive his splendid salary, and to leave Raja Chundoo Lal undisturbed in the administration of affairs.

Chundoo Lal's father is understood to have been engaged as a farmer of customs in the Hyderabad territory, in which department it may be supposed that the son received a useful business education. He became subsequently better known to us from having held charge of the territory which the Nizam received as his share of the conquests from Tippoo, and which Chundoo Lal delivered over to our officers when it was ceded in commutation of the money subsidy. From this situation he had a rapid rise to that of Supreme Governor of the Hyderabad dominions: the sole dispenser of good and evil; and the depository of its magnificent revenues of nearly three millions a year. The Nizam did make a struggle against the condition into which he found himself falling under our supremacy, but having been defeated in rather a rough collision by the Resident of that day, His Highness desisted from further concern in the affairs of his own dominions, retired to his Zenana, was believed subject to occasional fits of melancholy or madness, and continued in this state till his death three years ago. An endeavour was made at a later period, when the British Government interfered extensively to promote the real benefit of his subjects, to interest His Highness in that good work, but he either was or assumed to be so entirely ignorant of the state of things in his own country, that the attempt was given up as hopeless. His Highness on one occasion issued orders to persons who had been in office when he exercised authority, but most of whom were now long dead.

Maha Raja Chundoo Lal leaned for support on the Resident, at the court of his master, and on the British Government. Knowing that his place and his power depended on that support, he was ready to sacrifice every thing at this shrine, and necessarily gained the reputation of being our friend. Every movement hostile to him was attributed, and most probably justly so to this cause; and these struggles only tended to bind him faster, to us, and the more to ensure our support. At last something like a pledged support was given to him. This state of things at Hyderabad was undoubtedly highly favorable to our interests. It was a position in which Chundoo Lal must necessarily sacrifice something in the duty and allegiance which he owed to his own master, but the condition might have been less dishonorable to him and to us, had the interests of the Nizam and the welfare of his subjects been the rule by which the conduct of both parties was governed. In a compact of this nature, that interest was however too likely to be lost sight of. We had not the power of controlling Chundoo Lal either in his financial, his territorial, or his judicial administration; we did not allow the prime minister to interfere, and the Nizam did not or could not: so that the administration of Chundoo Lal was more irresponsible to, and uncontrolled either by the people, the sovereign, or the foreign state, than was perhaps ever any other administration in the world for so long a period.

Unhappily it was not an administration for good, but for evil. Where, amongst the most virtuous of mankind, is the servant who

can be trusted with such power, and what right had we to expect that a man educated as Chundoo Lal had been, in all the corruption of perhaps the most corrupt court in the world, would be an exception? From the very position in which he was placed and maintained, we ourselves taught him the lessons of treachery, and a betrayal of the interests of his master, to serve our own purposes.

I was for seven years a witness of the afflictions in which the reign of Chundoo Lal in the Hyderabad provinces, and that of his brother Govind Buksh in those of Berar, involved this unhappy country. Like most irresponsible rulers, he was lavish of the public money, and cared not by what means it was obtained. His connexion with us too involved him in large expenditures, for it is not to be supposed that without some corresponding advantages we would have continued our support. Of this description was the disciplined force which he maintained under British officers, and from which there was a treble advantage, that of employing them on duties of internal coercion, for which the subsidiary force would not have so readily been lent; that of supporting his own authority, and being an instrument of intimidation at court; and that of aiding more effectually our army in foreign wars, than any other portion of His Highness' troops could have done. There was too the expense of winning and keeping in his interests those who either were or pretended to be powerful in any way to support him with us.

The system of administering the revenues was that of farming large tracts of country to whomsoever could best afford to pay for them. Portions of these tracts were again sub-let to other farmers; large advances were taken from all in anticipation of their collections, and the tenure on which all held office was insecure, for it was a common saying in the country, that these farmers proceeded from the capital to their districts, looking over their shoulders all the way, to see whether other farmers were not following on their heels. These farmers were supreme in the several tracts of country entrusted to their charge. They had even the power of life and death in their own hands, and there was no appeal either to the head of the Government or to the Laws, from their tax-gatherers; who, be it observed, were gathering for their own benefit. Those barriers which the village communities of India, or which groups of villages form, like small republics, for their mutual defence against bad Governments, were broken down by the power of the Nizam's; and when these combinations became more extended, as mis-government increased, troops organized by British officers were brought to bear upon them, and British blood was spilt in this bad cause. The evil of rebellion against authority was apparent to all, but the cause of that rebellion was unknown, for the British Government and the Resident had not the right of interfering in the internal affairs of the Nizam's Government; although their interference had effectually polluted at the fountain-head the stream of good government, and their power had prevented the people

from rising and redressing their own wrongs. At length, although not until the country was half depopulated, and the insecurity of all property amongst the cultivating classes and others had raised the price of the common necessaries of life almost to famine rates: the employment of British officers, whose eyes and ears could not be closed to the condition of the country, and the grievances of the people, drew the attention of those in high places to these intolerable evils, and Mr. Russell, before he resigned the office of Resident, made several steps towards the attainment of an improved condition of things; amongst others, the appointment of collectors instead of farmers of revenue; and he obtained authority from the Governor General to exercise, on the part of the British Government, interference in every branch of His Highness' administration, for the amelioration of the condition of his people. Having accomplished so much of this good work, Mr. Russell resigned his office, and proceeded to Europe.

It is unnecessary to cite instances of the evils which this system of government had produced in Hyderabad. The whole country was an instance of it, and its inhabitants and foreigners were the witnesses. Almost all government had ceased, the country was in the possession of organized bands of plunderers, the roads were only to the travelled under the protection of armed bodies of men, and life and property were every where insecure. In travelling on the great road between Aurungabad and Hyderabad, I have had, when moving before day-light, an alarm that the baggage was attacked; it was saved by the presence of a party of horse, and was afterwards only considered safe under its protection. These were not common night robberies, but open attacks by bodies of armed men. When the Company's Government took the place of the Peishwa's, and our eastern frontier touched the Nizam's territory, the insecurity of the one very soon spread to the other, and the voice of the Poona and Ahmednuggur authorities was about the first that roused the Nizam's Government to a sense of its duty and danger.

About this time, Sir Charles Metcalfe, from the situations of Political Secretary to the Supreme Government and Private Secretary to the Governor General, arrived on the scene to assume the office of Resident at Hyderabad. Almost the first thing that attracted his attention was a party of 200 of the Reformed Horse under the command of a British officer, arrested before a Ghuree of some strength, and calling for reinforcements. After some hesitation, and inquiry into the circumstances which led to this condition of things, reinforcements of Infantry and Ordnance were granted, and the Nizam's officers were put in possession of five or six places of this description, within a circumference of fifty miles, which had for some time been in possession of rebels, and which had effectually resisted the endeavours of the Government to gain possession of them. The more formidable rebels Naosaju Naig, Luximun Naig, Kone Rao, and others, had before been reduced to subjection. The

first thing to be done was to establish the authority of the Government throughout the country. But Sir Charles Metcalfe had experience enough of Indian affairs to know that this was not the only, nor the most important, thing to be done; and to see that it was necessary above all things to save from the tyranny and oppression of a bad Government those whom our power had placed at its mercy. It was soon discovered that nothing short of the employment of British officers in the several divisions of the territory, who should define the amount of revenue which the Government, the district, and the village officers were entitled to levy from the people, and who should watch for a period of years that only this amount was collected, could be sufficient for the purpose of extending effectual protection. The system adopted was to inquire, with the assistance of the Nizam's revenue officers, into the present capability of villages, the average amount of revenue which they had paid in the last few years, and the means of the people to increase cultivation: from these various sources of information, a village assessment was formed generally for a period of five years. Leases were granted on these terms, and a written acceptance of the conditions, and a promise to abide by them, was taken from the people. One of the errors of this settlement was, that of taking too much into consideration the means of the people to extend cultivation, and fixing an yearly increase on the village accordingly. This was too sudden a tax on improvement, and drew into the coffers of the Government the profits arising from increased outlay of capital and labour, which would much more advantageously have remained with the people. When no increase of cultivation followed the settlement, this increasing demand was still more injuriously felt; altogether it was detrimental to the interests of the Government and of the people, and any future settlement of this nature, for so short a period, had much better be made without it.

No sooner however had Government commenced the good work of inquiring into the rights of the people, thought of redressing their grievances, and fixed the extent of their own demands on them, than the country was restored to comparative tranquillity. Men began to feel secure of reaping a return proportioned to their exertions, and industry took the place of rapine and sloth. There was no element in which the rebel and the robber could live; police responsibility was thrown on the heads of villages, and it became the interest and the object of the whole community to rise against him and to put him down. It was no longer necessary to employ troops in the collection of the revenue, or in asserting the rights of the Government, and I believe I may safely say, that from the period when the Nizam's country came under the superintendance of British officers, until that superintendance ceased, not a trooper marched, not a musket was shouldered in support of their measures, except in tracts inhabited by Bheels and professional plunderers. This too in a country where for years before no measure of Government could be carried into execution without their aids, and when

without them the principal roads of the country could not be travelled. In India, a moderate village revenue-settlement for a period of years, in a country that has before been oppressed, gives more immediate relief, goes further to quiet and satisfy men's minds, and does more to restore prosperity, than perhaps any one measure that could be adopted by a Government in any other part of the world. The Catholic Emancipation Bill and the Reform Bill are nothing to this. The occupation of the turbulent asserter of the people's rights is gone, he sinks peaceably amongst the rest of the community, and becomes for a time at least a harmless if not a useful subject. He is sooner absorbed than the demagogue of a more civilized land, for he is generally only a desperate character, without any mental superiority, who is either put forward or calls others to aid him in asserting, with arms in their hands, the rights of the people. The employment is generally attended with danger to all, and when the people no longer require a leader, he is concealed or deserted, though seldom betrayed, and they return to their several occupations.

A short period of security drew capital and labour in great quantities from other employments to agriculture, which was consequently so rapidly extended, that prices were soon injuriously affected. From a country situated as the Dekhan is, there can be few exports, particularly of grain, and produce remained on the hands of the growers. This was so rapid in its progress, that it was felt in even the first years of the settlement, and by the fifth year, wheat and gram, which for years before had sold for twelve and fifteen seers per rupee, might now be bought for fifty or sixty. This may be felt as a great evil by Governments, as affecting their revenues, but it is at all events a great blessing to the poor man, and in India more than in most other countries. Government will very soon reap the benefit of his labour in some shape or other. When he is at his ease as to the means of subsistence for himself and his family, he turns his attention to other articles of produce than grain, and accordingly in the fifth year of the settlement, the people had in many districts the means of paying their rents from sugar, cotton, tobacco, and ginger cultivation alone. There is no country in India so highly favored as a great portion of the Nizam's, both in climate and soil. Blessed with a good Government, it would soon become a garden. Cursed as it has been and is, with that of Raja Chundoo Lal, and, his *Kaets* and *Kutries*, it had almost become and is again likely to be a desert.

This failure of price, in parts of the country where grain was the only produce, materially affected all our calculations, and at the end of the five years' settlement, there was a considerable outstanding balance, and the whole equal perhaps to the amount that had been fixed as an increasing settlement on the period, or as it is there termed the "*Istowa.*" The country here, as elsewhere, no doubt suffered from that struggle which always arises between the collector and the people when there is a failure of his estimates, and

when there is no Adawlut to appeal from his operations. The more valuable villages of the Nizam's country, and those which at the time of the settlement were found the most prosperous, generally suffered under its operations, for they were of course settled up to the mark of their then capabilities. Less cultivated and less prosperous villages gained fast on their heels; the one was rising, the other stationary or gradually retrograded. People broke through their engagements, sought cheaper and found equally good lands elsewhere: the amount of rent, which according to the principle of the village settlement, they were obliged to pay, fell on those who remained, and eventually it became necessary in these villages, which before might be considered to have held a monopoly of cultivation and of prosperity, to make large remissions. These were trifling evils, and the remedy is always in the hands of Government: the great good which the village settlement afforded to the great bulk of the people in the Nizam's country was on a scale which, in so short a period, has perhaps never been surpassed in India.

About the end of the first five years' settlement, Sir Charles Metcalfe was called from Hyderabad to a still more important scene. His successor was selected from amongst the most talented of the Company's Civil Servants, for his qualifications alone. Many of the first superintendants had too disappeared. The best of them were Colonel Seyer, Captains Hollis and Clark, Mr. Wells, Lieutenant Sutherland and Lieutenant Hislop; and as Sir Charles Metcalfe has added my name to the list, I need not omit it, Captain Sutherland. Two of these were dead, and three had sought other employment. Under a new Resident, and with new assistants, that bane of all good government in India, rapid change of measures took place with change of men. One of the great merits of the whole system was that of working with the native instruments of the Nizam's Government, and introducing none of our own. These it may be supposed were corrupt, and bad enough at first, and perhaps continued so to the last. They were however better and far more respectable than any that we could have put in their places, and by the end of five years, they seemed to us in many instances so much improved and so efficient, that comparatively little interference on the part of the superintendants was necessary. One of the great evils that we had to contend with throughout the whole of these measures, was the counteraction of the Nizam's minister. It may be supposed, that the man who had for so long a period been all-powerful, did not sit easy under the control which was now exercised over him and his officers. When he found, however, that the resident was supported by his Government, and the superintendant by the Resident, the struggle which at first he himself maintained, and which he taught his officers to maintain against us, gradually ceased.

The management of these affairs, when brought to this point, should therefore have been comparatively easy. But I consider that some important errors were committed in the commencement

of Mr. Martin's administration. The most important was that of taking the old settlement as the standard on which to form the new. It was even proposed to fix the new assessment of each village at the sum at which it had arrived, with the increasing "*Istowa*," at the expiration of the former five years' settlement. But it was soon discovered that the former settlement was not sufficiently perfect to admit of its extension to five more years, that circumstances had materially changed the condition of villages, for that although the great majority had improved, some had deteriorated. This scheme was therefore after long discussion abandoned. But instead of taking a new *departure*, and allowing superintendants to frame the new settlement, according to their capabilities, it was resolved to adhere to the general amount of the former Pergunnah settlement, and to distribute it amongst the villages; thus going from the aggregate to the detail, instead of proceeding from the detail to the aggregate. This too was an evil, for it may be supposed that the original settlement was not in all cases perfect, but that some Pergunnahs received more favorable terms than others, and that they, from this very cause, must have proportionably improved. There was however in the distribution of the amount amongst villages, some discretion left with superintendants. But there was in the measure alone an evident want of confidence displayed on the Resident's part towards the assistants with whom he had to act, which the minister was not slow to perceive. The whole system gradually became impaired. The minister had not much difficulty in representing to the Resident at the capital, that the measures of the superintendants in the provinces were injudicious; of which neither he nor the Resident could have much means of judging. A struggle arose in many instances between the Resident and the superintendants. He on the showing of the minister assailing and objecting, and they defending, until at last that interference, from which in its first years so much good had resulted, became in many respects injurious by establishing double Government, leaving the people in some measure unprotected, and not knowing to whose authority to look.

The old Nizam died, and his successor having claimed the privilege of administering the affairs of his country in his own way, the right was conceded to him, and interference on our part in the civil affairs of his Government ceased, except that of watching, that the amount settled on villages under our guarantee should not be exceeded till the expiration of the period for which the several settlements had been made. His Highness did for a time take a part in public affairs, but the general belief at Hyderabad was, that Chundoo Lal, overwhelmed and confounded with business a person who had hardly ever been out of his Zenana till his fortieth year, and who had never been schooled in public affairs; holding out to him at the same time temptations far more alluring, that it is no wonder His Highness preferred the latter. He has accord-

ingly entirely withdrawn from public life, adding to the vices and follies of his father that of drunkenness.

At the time the civil interference was withdrawn on the desire of the new Nizam, His Highness was told that he was supreme to dismiss or retain his minister, and the other servants of his Government. Chundoo Lal is said to have had address enough to convince the Nizam that his influence with the British Government gained His Highness quiet succession of the throne, which else there was a chance of being disputed by Meer Tufuzool Ali, a younger son of the Nizam's, but of more legitimate birth, being also the son of a lady of rank, the niece of Mooneer-ool-Moolk; whilst the mother of the present Nizam is a person of low condition, with whom only the ceremony of the *Nika*, and not the *Shadee*, had been performed. But however this may be, there is no doubt that Chundoo Lal is now, in so far as the Nizam and his subjects are concerned, as supreme for good and evil, as he was in the first years of our support. He will, however, be more watched by us, and neither he nor any other minister will in all probability, whilst our supremacy lasts, be permitted to inflict on the inhabitants of that country all those sufferings from which our Government so lately stepped forward to save them. It is of course now seen, that from the very nature of our position at Hyderabad, we may lend the sanction of our authority to measures which may be injurious to the Nizam's subjects. To lessen this evil, it has been resolved that a person in the capacity of commissioner shall on all occasions accompany the troops when called on to act in the Nizam's territory, and that he shall have the right and the power of inquiring into and redressing the grievances of the people. If this is fairly done, and the people are satisfied that it is his wish and intention to redress the wrongs which have led them to take up arms, it will never be necessary to call the troops into active operation against the Nizam's subjects, nor perhaps even to call them to the scene of disturbance. For the people of India are not fond of rebellion for its own sake, nor do they ordinarily take up arms, except under a consciousness of suffering, from which it is the interest and the duty of all Governments to relieve them. When they do assemble, there is however greater danger than in more civilized countries, that they will do so with arms in their hands. We may be sure that the wasteful extravagance of the public resources by the Nizam's minister, will lead to undefined and intolerable exactions from the people; and that if no ear is open to their grievances, they will in all parts of the country rise in rebellion. In proof that these evils are again in operation, we need only look to the frequent calls for the aid of troops, which is to the extent of five or six times in the last five or six months. The system which is now in operation at Hyderabad must necessarily have the effect of restraining in some measure the oppressive acts of the Nizam's minister. There is danger however that it may prove a premium to rebellion, by leading the people to resist the measures of their own Government whenever they want

our interference; and the interference may become nearly as great, whilst for all good purposes it must be far less effectual than that from which we escaped when the present Nizam ascended the throne.

The auxiliary force, which has been organized under British officers at Hyderabad, is the substitute for the six thousand Infantry and the nine thousand Cavalry which the Hyderabad Government is bound by treaty to provide, to serve with our troops in time of war; and which were on the old footing generally useless or worse than useless for the purposes for which we required them. The auxiliary force consists of five regiments of Cavalry, eight regiments of Infantry, three small corps of Artillery, and an Engineer Corps; all as highly disciplined, as efficient, and as devoted to the cause of the British Government, as any troops in India. The value of such a body of troops, either to maintain our position at Hyderabad and in the neighbouring countries, when it may be necessary to call our own forces to another scene of action, or to accompany those forces to fight our battles, as they so often have done, will not be doubted by any one. It costs the Nizam's Government about thirty lakhs a year, or one-seventh of what a few years ago were the state revenues, exclusive of Jageers. There is an irregularity in the payment of this force, which should be corrected; and if the Nizam's Government will not enter into measures for this purpose, it might not be too much to require that the revenues of a tract of country equal to the amount should be set aside to meet the demand.

Baroda.—In 1780, a treaty, offensive and defensive, was concluded with the Guikowar. It was agreed by the contracting parties, there being war with the Poona ministry, as the Peishwa's administration was then called, to expel that Government from Guzerat: the Guikowar to keep the share of that country which he then had, and the Company to take that which belonged to Poona. From the advantages derived by the Guikowar, through this treaty, he agreed to cede to the Company the district of Zinnore, and certain villages in the Broach Pergunnah.

In 1802, the Guikowar subsidized a force of 2,000 men with Artillery, the monthly cost of which was sixty-five thousand rupees. He likewise ceded the district of Chickley in return for favors conferred on him. The Company advanced money to the Guikowar to aid him in the payment of arrears to his troops. Also entered into a private engagement with the minister of the Baroda Government, to render his office permanent, and to secure him, his heirs, and relations in their just rights.

In 1803, one thousand more troops were subsidized at the yearly cost of 2,90,000 rupees, which with the cost of the former subsidiary force makes in all 11,70,000 rupees per annum, for which amount territory was ceded to the Company.

In 1805, a definitive treaty, offensive and defensive, is entered into with the Guikowar, and the subsidiary force is made permanent.

It is to protect the person of the Guikowar, his heirs and successors; to punish rebels, and correct subjects or dependants who may withhold the payment of the Sirkar's just claims; but it is not to be employed on trifling occasions. The Company having lent money and guaranteed loans to the Guikowar to the amount of rupees 41,38,732, the yearly revenue of territory yielding 12,95,000 rupees, is ceded, until the debt is liquidated with nine per cent. interest at half-yearly settlements. In case of war, the Guikowar troops to serve with the Company's to the frontiers of Guzerat.

In 1817, a further increase of one battalion of Native Infantry and two regiments of Cavalry was made to the subsidiary force, Territory was ceded for the payment of the additional force, and certain exchanges and cessions of territory were entered into. In case of war, the Guikowar engages to bring forward the whole of the military resources of his country. An efficient body of 3,000 Cavalry is to be maintained by the Guikowar, to act with the subsidiary force wherever it may be employed, and to be subject to the general control of the officer commanding the British troops, to be formed, paid, equipped, and armed in conformity with the advice and suggestion of the British Government, but according to the customs of that of the Guikowar.

The murder of the Guikowar minister in 1817, at Punderpore, by the minister of the Peishwa, Trimbukjee Dainglea, at the instigation, it was believed, of the Peishwa himself, led to the war in which the Peishwa lost his throne.

The British Government was under an obligation to effect the adjustment of some pecuniary claims between the two states, and the Guikowar's minister was sent to Poona under its guarantee for his safety, and with the object of effecting this purpose.

"The British Government demanded the punishment of Trimbukjee. This was refused until an army had been marched to support the demand. Yet it made no claim on the Peishwa for its expenses, and inflicted no punishment for his protection of a murderer. It simply required the surrender of the criminal, and on Bajee Rao's compliance, it restored him to the undiminished enjoyment of all the benefits of the alliance. Notwithstanding this generosity, Bajee Rao immediately commenced on a new system of intrigues, and used every exertion to turn all the powers of India against the British Government. At length before the signal for disturbance, by fomenting an insurrection in his own dominions, and preparing to support the insurgents by open force, the British Government had then no remedy but to arm in turn."—*The Hon'ble Mr. Elphinstone's Proclamation.*

Three questions have lately arisen, all of some difficulty, and giving rise to much acrimonious spirit in our negotiations and relations with the Guikowar.

1. The irregular payment of the contingent by H. H. which led to the sequestration of certain portions of H. H. territory, yielding a revenue equal to the amount of the pay of the troops.

2. The sequestration in 1828 of a portion of H. H. territory, calculated in five years to pay the guaranteed debt, with six per cent. interest, whilst in 1832, it appeared that the debt was not likely to be paid in five more years; it being then between forty and fifty lakhs of rupees.

In both cases, the territory was managed from year to year, by natives appointed by the British Government; the Raja complaining that the management was bad, and that he was not allowed credit according to the amount levied from his country; and both parties agreeing that such a system of management must be injurious to the best interests of the people.

During the Earl of Clare's visit to Baroda, a settlement was effected on both these points; the bankers coming to an understanding with H. H. for the adjustment of the amount of the debt, and releasing the British Government from the guarantee and all further concern in their pecuniary transactions. But we are not quite free from future involvement on account of these bankers, for they have been promised protection from the Guikowar's persecutions on account of the part which they took in the late discussions regarding the loan. For the settlement of the first question, the regular payment of the contingent, the Guikowar lodged 10,00,000 of rupees in the Company's Treasury, to be applied to this purpose, whenever his regular monthly payments should fail; and agreed that the amount taken from this sum, on any such occasion, was to be replaced at the earliest period. After these satisfactory adjustments the portions of territory reserved to meet these demands were restored to H. H. The efficient maintenance of the contingent of Cavalry is declared by Lord Clare to be necessary to the preservation of tranquillity in Guzerat.

The third question is still unadjusted. It relates to the guarantee by Sir John Malcolm, whilst Governor of Bombay, of certain allowances in land and money to Wittul Rao, (extending to upwards of a lakh of rupees *per annum,)* the late Dewan of the Baroda Government, with remainder to his adopted son. The authority of the Guikowar's Government to this guarantee and to the adoption of a son by Wittul Rao, not having been obtained, that Government refuses to recognize either measure of Sir John Malcolm's. In the mean time, the money is paid by the Company, and the question referred to the decision of the Court of Directors. The guarantee was apparently given in return for services to us, extending most likely to measures injurious to the interests of his master, for the Guikowar considers him a traitor. It does not appear whether he is the same, or a descendant of the Dewan, whose office was rendered permanent in his own person, by a private stipulation with him in 1802, and whose heirs and relations were guaranteed by the same instrument in their just rights.

Our relations with the two states which come under this class by the terms of our treaties are of the very worst description, and differ from all others in this; that they are entitled to demand the assistance of our troops, to levy their just rights from their own

subjects, whilst we have not the right of interfering in their internal affairs. The formation of the contingents of troops in these two states, under British officers, may be traced to the obligation under which we are to afford this aid, for these contingents would be more readily applied to the purposes of internal government, than the subsidiary forces; whilst at the time it was probably not seen that their organization would go far to strengthen our position in India; as well by weakening the military power of the native state, as by giving us a body of troops calculated at all times, to support our interests in their territories, and to accompany our armies into other scenes of action.

It is curious enough that in the two states comprised under this class our pecuniary transactions and guarantees have been of a different nature from those with other states. From Oude, Gwalior, and Puttealah we have borrowed money; here we have lent, guaranteed, or appeared to guarantee, the loans made by others. Transactions of this nature with the Guikowar Government having been already described, it remains to notice a similar transaction at Hyderabad, in which our Government got involved, and about which a whole folio volume has been written and published; similar, except that in the one case, the loan contractors were mostly British subjects, and in the other the native subjects of the foreign state. It is only necessary to notice it here, because proceedings regarding it are still pending.

Mr. William Palmer, a son of the late Major-General Palmer, and a brother of Mr. John Palmer of Calcutta, sought employment in the Military Service of the Nizam, and after filling various situations rose to the command of something like a regular regiment of Cavalry. This regiment was defeated, together with other troops of the Nizam, by an Ex-Governor of Berar, Moyput Ram, against whom the subsidiary force was eventually employed. Mr. Palmer made a narrow escape, and from that time relinquished military employment in the Nizam's service, and established himself as a broker, banker, and merchant of Hyderabad. From his talents, acquirements, and adoption of native habits, and manners, Mr. Palmer, who is an East Indian by birth, but who has received a liberal education in England, was peculiarly calculated for the meridian of Hyderabad, and was employed on affairs of some delicacy by the minister Chundoo Lal, and by the Resident. He rose rapidly in his trading concerns, which if not in reality, had in appearance, the support of the British Government, from the house of business having been within the Residency grounds. Mr. Palmer was joined in business by Mr. Russell, an officer belonging to the Engineers on the Madras Presidency; and as this gentleman was a personal friend of the Resident's, he was entrusted for a time by that high authority with a large sum of money to be employed on his account. Eventually the first assistant to the Resident, Mr. Sotheby, and the Surgeon, Mr. Currie, joined the house; and latterly Sir William Rumbold, who had come to India in the suite of the Marquis of

Hastings, joined it likewise. It has been before said that Chundoo Lal needed two things, money and support with our Government. Here then was material for supplying both; they were not slow in proffering loans and support, and he was not wanting in rewarding them abundantly; Chundoo Lal's necessities had driven him to borrow from Messrs. Palmer and Co. a sum of money, it is believed, amounting to forty lakhs of rupees. Reform in the Nizam's administration was about the same time, 1820, pressed on the minister; and for the payment of arrears to troops, and advances to cultivators, and other good works, he pretended to want sixty lakhs of rupees, and they pretended to lend that sum. It was afterwards discovered, that to the amount of the former advances was added a bonus of eight lakhs of rupees; and to the sum thus produced, was added what was wanting to make up the sixty lakhs loan. The nominal interest was eighteen per cent. per annum, with half yearly settlements, but the real interest from these half yearly settlements, and through the bonus, was about twenty-five per cent. and this loan was negotiated under the sanction of the British Government in the year 1819, whilst money was in great abundance in India, and the merchants of Calcutta were lending that which they did not otherwise know how to apply, at nine per cent. to the Dutch Government at Java, on worse security than the splendid revenues of the Nizam's Government, encumbered only to this amount afforded. One of the first merchants of Calcutta told me that a loan to any amount might at the time have been negotiated for the Nizam's Government at six per cent., but that in Calcutta the transaction at Hyderabad was considered a sealed letter. It has been seen that in 1805, a similar loan was negotiated for the Baroda Government, at nine per cent., and latterly that Government only paid six. When the Marquis of Hastings sanctioned this usurious loan he did not however know of the bonus, for that part of the transaction was concealed from the Government.

Shortly after this transaction was closed, Sir Charles Metcalfe assumed the office of Resident. He soon saw that the payment of such interest was unnecessary, that it must be destructive to the Native Government, and he proposed to open a loan at the three presidencies for the payment of the debt at the market rate of interest. Such a monopoly was however not to be relinquished without a struggle, and the very same question which was lately overruled by the Earl of Clare, and the Bombay Government, when settling the Guikowar loan, was urged in their behalf, i. e. because it was stipulated that the loan should be paid off by a given time, would it not be unjust to pay it off sooner? An indemnity was proposed for any loss they might sustain, through the calculations they had made regarding repayment, at the enormous sacrifice to the Nizam's Government of six lakhs of rupees. But nothing could come up to their anticipated gains; else these six lakhs of rupees with the bonus of eight, all of which was clear gain, (for the particulars of the bonus affair were not then known,) would have been a splen-

did winding up of their pecuniary transactions at Hyderabad. The probability is that the members of the firm will not eventually wind up their affairs to such advantage, and that they must often have regretted that those terms were not accepted. The head of the British Government went along with the firm, and the proposal of the Resident for the benefit of the native state was never even acknowledged.

The same firm had an arrangement with the Nizam's Government, negociated through the Resident, by which it received with great profit to itself, but which was also productive of great benefit to the troops, the revenues of an extensive tract of country from the Nizam's collectors, and issued them regularly to the Nizam's contingent. This system went on for a time, but when the collectors failed to pay the estimated amount to the firm, it of course failed in its advances to the troops. About the same time the arrangement was disapproved of by the home authorities, and ordered to be discontinued. The departure of the Marquis of Hastings from India, coupled with the disapproval by the home authorities of this arrangement, naturally affected the influence of the firm at Hyderabad. Their funds to a large extent were locked up with the Native Government, and they soon found that with Native Governments, more than with most other creditors, the operations of paying and borrowing are considered very different things. The means of the firm to meet the demands of its numerous Native and European creditors, from whom it had been borrowing largely at twelve per cent. or even at higher rates, for the purpose of lending at still higher to the Nizam's Government, became impaired. The firm wished a portion of the loan to be paid, and it was impossible that the Nizam's Government should pay it. If paid at all, it must be paid through the aid of the British Government, whose guarantee, it was for a long time believed, had been given to the loan. After thinking of various expedients for the payment of the debt, which in 1823, amounted to nearly a crore of rupees, it was at last settled to redeem the seven lakhs of Peshkush payable yearly by the Company to the Nizam, which at its fair value yielded considerably beyond that amount. Messrs. Palmer and Co. accordingly received from the Resident's treasury nearly a crore of rupees in liquidation of the whole of their claims on the Nizam's Government, with the exception of the bonus, and the accumulation of interest thereon, and the stipends to the individual members of the firm, and their dependents, amounting to a large sum, on one occasion upwards of a lakh of rupees a year. These items are still claimed by the Trustees of the firm from the Nizam's Government.

Besides these transactions the firm had large dealings with needy noblemen of the court, and officers of the Government, and very few of those accounts have been closed. Bankers will very well understand, that it must always be difficult to close accounts, where the interest has been either 18 or 24 per cent. It is curious

enough that a law which was passed to save Native chiefs from the extortions of British subjects, and which was pronounced by the Attorney and Solicitor General of England, to render all transactions at Hyderabad which included an interest above 12 per cent. illegal; has since been declared by the twelve judges not to extend to the territory of a foreign state like Hyderabad, although British subjects were concerned in these transactions.

The difficulties in which we have been involved at Baroda and Hyderabad, as well as those which we formerly experienced in the Carnatic, may teach our Government to avoid such guarantees, or any concern in loans to native states. The termination of that of Hyderabad was peculiarly unfortunate. For the Nizam lost his Peshkush, and very few in that territory could understand that it did not go to the Company, or could separate the interests of Messrs. Palmer and Co. from those of the Hon'ble Company. The Hon'ble Company and the Palmer Company, the Residency ka kotee and the Palmer ka kotee, were almost synonymous terms with them.

3rd Class.—Treaties, offensive and defensive—states mostly tributary, acknowledging the supremacy of, and promising subordinate co-operation to, the British Government. But supreme rulers in their own territory.

1. Indore. We were brought into contact with this state, when the troops under General Wellesley advanced to Poona in 1802, to restore the Peishwa to his throne, forcing Holkar to yield his supremacy, and his army to quit its position there and to return to Malwa. When the Sister Mahratta states of Gwalior and Berar confederated in the following year, to resist the influence which the British Government had thus established over the head of the Mahratta empire, Holkar failed to join that confederacy.

Yet in 1804, he singly forced a collision with the British power, which is perhaps the most remarkable in the history of our Indian wars. The force from Guzerat under Colonel Murray, and that from Hindoostan under Colonel Monson, having failed to act with that concert which was expected, the latter was obliged, from the neighbourhood of Kotah, to retire before Holkar's army on Agra. It made good its retreat, with the loss of its ordnance, baggage, and considerable casualties in officers and men. The most untoward event in this disastrous retreat was the detection of a correspondence between some of the native officers of the force and the enemy, and the desertion of nearly two companies of the 1st battalion 14th regiment. Holkar advanced, took possession of Muttra and laid siege to Dehlee; and his Cavalry carried the war into the heart of the Doab, and into Rohilkund; a calamity, from which the British territories had been free since the days of Hyder in the Carnatic.

The Cavalry under Lord Lake and General Smith proved that even Mahratta horse could not in the long run escape the vigilance and the perseverance of regular Cavalry. It is said that a larger tract of country was traversed in the pursuit, as well by the Cavalry under Lord Lake, as by that under the command of General Smith, in a shorter space of time than in any performance yet on record by regular troops. His Infantry was overthrown and lost its ordnance at the battle of Deeg, but served to augment the garrison of Bhurtpore, and materially contributed to the disasters which attended the first siege of that fortress. After joining Scindia's army their united forces contemplated offering battle. When Lord Lake advanced to indulge them, Holkar is said to have observed to Scindia, "You may fight them if you like, I have had enough of it." He proceeded northward, and the position where the treaty of peace and amity was signed is not the least remarkable circumstance of that remarkable war; being on the banks of the Beyah (or Hyphasis) one of the rivers of the Punjab; and in the heart of the territory of a foreign state, where he had neither right to go, nor we to follow. He was here forced to cede a considerable portion of his territories, and permitted to return to Malwa. The treaty with Holkar is dated the 24th of December, 1805. Lord Wellesley had left India, Lord Cornwallis who assumed the Government in July died in October, and Sir George Barlow was then Governor General. A material change had taken place in the views and policy of the British Government; and on the 2nd of February, 1806, a declaratory article was added to the treaty of peace with Holkar, by which the British Government relinquished certain of the districts acquired by the former treaty; withdrew, without the consent of the Jeypore Raja, from the conditions on which it had entered with him; and left that state and Boondee, which had stood our friend, to the tender mercies of the Mahrattas.

This system of non-interference or withdrawal from interference in the affairs of Central India led to the strengthening of predatory forces under the command of Ameer Khan, a General of Holkar's, and others, which inflicted great miseries on the states of Rajpootana; which threatened the existence of the Berar Government, and compelled us to make a demonstration of our power in 1809, by advancing into Malwa from the Madras and Bengal Presidencies a military force of some strength under the command of Colonel Close. Ameer Khan withdrew his army towards Rajpootana; and the British Government not being yet prepared to take the lead in Central India, the force under Colonel Close was recalled. The field thus left open was occupied by those hordes of Pindarees, which a few years subsequently forced us, in our own defence, to take a more prominent part in the affairs of that country. In 1817, a negotiation of rather a doubtful character was entered on from Dehlee with Ameer Khan, and eventually an engagement was concluded with that chief, by which the British Government guaranteed to him and his heirs in perpetuity, the possessions which he held in

grant from his master Maha Raja Holkar, Holkar's Government joined the Mahratta confederacy of this year, and his army was put in march towards Poona. It encountered the divisions of Sir Thomas Hislop and Brigadier General Malcolm, and a battle was fought at Mehidpore, in which it was overthrown with the loss of its Artillery, and the dominions of Holkar were at the disposal of the British Government.

By the treaty of the 6th of January which followed, the territories of Holkar were taken under the protection of the British Government. He confirmed the engagement of the previous year which had been entered into with his General Ameer Khan, ceded certain tributes and territories, and agreed to maintain for co-operation with the British troops a body of not less than 3,000 horse, for whose regular payment a suitable arrangement "must be made." He ceded also to Guffoor Khan certain territory in perpetuity, from the revenues of which he is to maintain in constant readiness for service a body of 600 select horse, which quota is to be increased with the increasing revenue. Since the conclusion of this treaty, various negotiations have been entered into with the Indore Government, for the purpose of limiting the quantity of poppy cultivation in the fertile regions of Malwa, and of getting into our own hands all the opium produced in that country beyond the quantity required for home consumption; these measures, it was supposed, tending to keep up prices in China, and to protect our Benares and Patna monopolies. But being a struggle against nature (as described by a talented financial Secretary,) they have all failed, and the system has now been relinquished; a transit duty on exportation being substituted. It is supposed that opium can be produced much cheaper in our own provinces than in Malwa, and that an extension of cultivation there will drive the Malwa opium-growers out of the market; but in this struggle its value will in all probability be so reduced as to destroy monopoly prices.

The terms on which we stood with Tantiah Jogh, the minister of Holkar, are believed considerably to have facilitated our negotiation of opium treaties with this state, and with the other smaller states in Malwa. Tantiah Jogh, originally a Sahookar, joined to his occupation of minister those of banker and merchant, and was the principal in either department in Central India. Our prohibitory measures are generally believed to have facilitated his private speculations in opium, which he had greater power of conducting in secrecy than other traders, and opium seized was frequently found to be under his pass and to bear his mark. Tantiah Jogh died in 1826, leaving half a million sterling, and having transactions at most of the capitals of India. The arrangement which took place on the death of this minister, who was supported by us during the minority, is not far from the imputation of having been suggested and supported by our influence. The Maha Raja was then in his twentieth year. The infant grandson of the late minister was appointed titular Dewan, and a person called Raojee Trimbuck, who had been the late minister's confiden-

tial deputy, was appointed his representative in the executive charge of the Government. On the same day these personages received khelauts from the Resident, in testimony of his approbation of the Maha Raja's appointment of them.

2. Oudeepore or Mewar.—It is impossible to approach this subject without reverting to ages long gone by, when the illustrious house of Oudeepore, which belongs to the highest antiquity, and whose Prince is still considered king of the Hindoos, led the chivalry of Mewar against the encroachments of Mahomedan power; when it stood so nobly forward in the breach of its principal fortress, the far-famed Chittoor; when its cavalry swept the plains of Rajpootana in defence of its hundred lakes and islands, and of a country, which in natural and artificial beauty is not surpassed by any in India.

It is the pride of this house, that it never gave a daughter in marriage to the solicitations of the throne of Dehlee, when in the meridian of its power; and it is the reproach on the other houses of Rajpootana, that they yielded to that solicitation and made that sacrifice. It remained for later and more degenerate days to witness a still more distressing, though to the mind of a Rajpoot, a less degrading sacrifice, when the beautiful daughter of the late, and the sister of the present Maha Rana was privately put to death, Kishna Koomara Baee herself consenting to save the effusion of blood between the armies of Jeypore and Joudpore, whose sovereigns sought that valued prize; to save her native country from being overrun by the armies which would have advanced to the plains of Oudeepore, to contend in the usual vulgar fashion for that one thing which neither force can gain nor gold can buy, woman's love.

On the withdrawal of the British power in 1806, from the position, which even then belonged to it in Central India, in virtue of the control, which it exercised over the head of the Mahratta state at Poona, and from its possession of the throne of Dehlee, the ground was very unworthily occupied by the armies of Scindia and Holkar, by the organized band of plunderers under Ameer Khan, and by bodies of Pindarees, which were gradually organising themselves under their several leaders, Cheeto, Kureem Khan, Kader Buksh, &c. No state in Rajpootana suffered more from all the evils which such combinations could inflict than the fertile regions of Mewar; where from their abundant supply of water and forage, a tempting retreat was offered to mounted adventurers of every kind. At last the excesses of the Pindarees led the British Government to resolve on attacking them in the seat of their power; to assume the offensive, when the defensive system proved insufficient to check their enormities: and we were thus brought into more close connection with the states of Rajpootana. The first result of this advanced movement was the negotiation through Sir Charles Metcalfe, the Resident at Dehlee, of treaties with the several states of that region, which placed them under the protection of the British Government. That with Oudeepore is

dated the 13th January, 1818*, and by the end of the following month, the several bands of plunderers and Mahratta horse were expelled from that territory. In return for this protection, the Maha Rana ceded one-fourth of the revenues of his territories for the first five years, and after that term three-eighths in perpetuity. The Oudeepore state had lost in the various struggles in Rajpootana a large share of its dominions, and the British Government promised to effect the restoration of these in as far as this was possible, receiving three-eighths of the revenue of all territories thus restored. This has been done in some degree, but not to the extent the Maha Rana contemplated; and hence a never failing cause of complaint on his part, particularly with respect to the district of Neembahera, which is so near his capital: but as this is one of the places guaranteed to Ameer Khan, it is lost for ever to Oudeepore. The troops of Oudeepore are to be furnished, according to its means, to act in subordinate co-operation with the British forces. Under such protection, the Oudeepore country advanced rapidly in improvement. But the Maha Rana had the usual vices of extravagance and improvidence, and his finances very soon became involved. When remonstrated with, and recommended to be more prudent and circumspect in his transactions, he replied, "Does the British Government not know that these are qualities, which never belonged either to Rajas or to whores,

* Treaty with the Raja of Oudeepore.

Article I. There shall be perpetual friendship, alliance, and unity of interest between the two states from generation to generation, and the friends and enemies of one shall be the friends and enemies of both.

II. The British Government engages to protect the principality and territory of Oudeepore.

III. The Maharaja of Oudeepore will always act in subordinate co-operation with the British Government, and acknowledge its supremacy, and will not have any connexion with other chiefs or states.

IV. The Maharaja of Oudeepore will not enter into any negotiation with any chief or state without the knowledge and sanction of the British Government; but the usual amicable correspondence with friends and relations shall continue.

V. The Maharaja of Oudeepore will not commit aggressions upon any one; and if by accident a dispute arise with any one, it shall be submitted to the arbitration and award of the British Government.

VI. One-fourth of the revenues of Oudeepore shall be paid annually as tribute to the British Government for five years; and after that term, three-eighths in perpetuity. The Maharaja will not have connexion with any other power on account of tribute; and if any one advance claims of that nature, the British Government engages to reply to them.

VII. This article relates to the restoration of portions of his dominions which the Maharaja represents he had lost. The British Government engages to use its best exertions for their restoration when this can be done with propriety.

VIII. The troops of the state of Oudeepore shall be furnished according to its means, at the requisition of the British Government.

IX. The Maharaja of Oudeepore shall always be absolute ruler of his own country, and the British jurisdiction shall not be introduced into that principality.

who in these matters are always considered entitled to do as they like." His tribute fell in arrears, and in 1826, His Highness was in nearly as degraded a condition as that from which he had escaped only eight years before. The demand for a portion of his revenues rendered it the duty of the political agent at his court to institute inquiries into the amount levied from the several districts; and a banker living under our protection, to whom, as well as to us, the Maha Rana was indebted, had become a sort of receiver general of his revenues, and allowed him a daily pittance of 1,000 rupees for his expences. Measures were taken for fixing the amount of tribute at three lakhs *per annum*, which was below the average of his former payments. A portion of the arrear was struck off, and he was with our assistance relieved in some degree from his pecuniary embarrassments. The entire management of his country was placed in His Highness' own hands, and he has since paid the yearly tribute with greater regularity. Latterly, the management of the political relations with this, as with the other courts of Rajpootana, has been transferred to the Governor General's Agent at Ajmere, and the local agent has been withdrawn; an arrangement which, although at first distasteful to His Highness, cannot fail to be eventually highly beneficial, as tending to give union and system to our political relations generally, and to remove that support of individuals and that intermeddling with the internal affairs of the several states, so offensive to their princes, and which lead to those guarantees that never fail sooner or later to involve and embarrass the Government itself.

The tract of country called Mhairwara, belonging partly to Oudeepore, partly to Joudpore, and in virtue of its possession of Ajmere, partly to the British Government, was in 1820 and 21 brought under subjection by the employment of a British force. Like the Bheels, the Goands, the Ramoosees, and the Coles of other parts of India, the Mhairs are a predatory people over whom no Government had exercised effectual controul for a long period of years. With a view to their subjugation, and in the hope of improving their condition, it was resolved in 1823, to bring the whole tract under the management of a British officer, in its civil and military relations. A regiment, like the Bheel regiments of Kandeish and the Satpoora range, was formed of Mhairs; the expense of management was to be borne by the three powers, and the surplus revenue to be paid to Oudeepore and Joudpore in proportion to their several claims on this tract of country. The measure was distasteful, particularly to Oudeepore, but it has nevertheless been carried into complete effect, to the great improvement of the condition of the Mhair population and country.

The Maha Rana Bheem Singh, with whom our relations commenced in 1818, was then advanced in years, and in the course of his long life had witnessed greater changes and reverses of fortune than perhaps any of the former princes of his illustrious house. In

1826, he talked of the wonderful revolutions that had taken place in India, since the supremacy of his house had yielded to Mahommedan invaders, and their's again to the Mahrattas; but considered that none of these conquests were so unintelligible as that of the foreigners who came from the west in ships from a country before unknown. Seated in Durbar, in the halls of his ancestors, with his princely son (the present Maha Rana) on his right hand, and surrounded by the nobles and chiefs of his house, Maha Rana Bheem Singh discussed these subjects with a frankness and good humour which belong in a more remarkable degree to a Rajpoot than to any other native of India.

3. JEYPORE.—The first treaty is of offensive and defensive alliance, and is dated the 12th of December, 1803. The British Government is neither to interfere in internal affairs nor to demand tribute. The Jeypore Government binds itself to assist with the whole of its army, in repelling any attack made on the possessions of the Company in Hindoostan. The Company becomes guarantee for the security of the Jeypore country against external enemies, the Maha Raja paying for the aid that may be afforded. When Holkar, in 1805, advanced to Hindoostan, and laid siege to Dehlee, the Jeypore state was considered to have violated its engagements by not co-operating with us against him; yet in the following year the Raja's troops joined the Bombay army under Major-General Jones, was prepared to co-operate efficiently, and, from the aid which the Raja afforded, that officer was enabled to maintain a position of the greatest consequence to the success of the war. Lord Lake considered, that after accepting the assistance of the Jeypore state in the last instance, we were bound to overlook the breach of faith in the first. But Sir George Barlow, the Governor General, was of a different opinion, and dissolved the alliance with Jeypore; contrary to the wish and in defiance of the remonstrances of that state. Jeypore was therefore, like the other states of Rajpootana, left at the mercy of Scindia and Holkar.

The treaty of the 2nd of April, 1818, is the same in terms with that of Oudeepore. Except that Jeypore is bound to pay eight lakhs *per annum* of tribute, until its revenues shall exceed forty lakhs, when it is to pay five-sixteenths of the excess, in addition to the eight lakhs.

Jeypore is the state in Rajpootana, like Oude amongst the other states of India, in which we have interfered most largely, and with least benefit either to ourselves, the rulers, or the people of the country. So far as the interests of the British Government are concerned, we have had no object whatever in interfering, nor was it obligatory on us in the first instance in any way to interfere. We are not bound by treaty, nor have we by treaty the right to interfere, to preserve internal tranquillity. Our duty is to save the state from external aggression. But as we are bound, or have been considered to be bound, to uphold the present family, it is of course doubtful to what extent our non-interference, even in internal disputes or wars, can be carried.

Shortly after the death of the last Raja, the Mahjee or Queen Mother, succeeded to the Regency, during the minority of her son. The present Maha Raja Jey Singh is a posthumous child, and doubts have at various times been entertained, (as must always be the case, when by usage, wives and widows are secluded,) whether he is the son of the late Raja or even of the present Ranee. The claims of a boy, Man Singh, adopted in the lifetime of the late Raja, were however, by the principal chiefs of the state, set aside in favor of the present Raja. Latterly, there has been a struggle between a powerful Thakoor, Rawul Byree Saul, and a person of inferior station, named Sungee Jotah Ram, for the office of minister. The former supported by the British Government, on the supposition of his superior fitness; the latter, by the Queen Mother; and eventually he prevailed, although on several occasions it has been deemed necessary to call out troops in support of his rival, and our political agent has discontinued our relations with the court, because Jotah Ram was not excluded from the councils of the Regent Mother.

In 1826, when the young Raja attained his seventh year, it became a question with some of the principal Thakoors, whether, according to former usage, it was not necessary to remove him from the female apartments, and to place him under the guardianship of certain nobles, who should become a council of regency during the remaining years of the minority. Rawul Byree Saul was at the head of the chiefs who supported these views, and they were desired by the British Government to assemble at the capital, for the purpose of discussing these points. They assembled accordingly in Parliament at Jeypore; those opposed to the Queen Mother being considered under the protection of the British Government. Such an assemblage of chiefs, seventy-three in number, for a peaceable and legitimate object, was certainly one of the most interesting spectacles ever witnessed in Rajpootana, or perhaps in any other country. Each chief, who from his station in the state, was entitled to certain honors, was considered qualified to vote, and eventually the votes were in favor of the Queen Mother, to the exclusion of the council of Thakoors. The chiefs who had opposed her views returned defeated to their respective homes, requiring and receiving in some shape the guarantee of the British Government for their future safety, in consequence of the part they had taken against the Regent Mother.

This guarantee has unfortunately been appealed to too often in the subsequent disputes of the Thakoors with the head of their government, whatever the nature of these disputes. There is a sort of federal government in most of the states of Rajpootana, and this is more apparent in Jeypore than in any of the other states. It may be supposed, in a community of nobles, most of them living at a distance from court, having their own possessions and followers, held almost independent of the throne, that there must be a power of combining, and of regulating the measures of their government. When the regular army of the state becomes more

powerful than their united forces, they are necessarily controlled. But during a minority, or under a weak Government, which had not foreign support, their influence, it may be supposed, would prevail, and there is a power amongst them which has preserved their order against the encroachments of either the throne or the people. In the last season, a civil war raged in Jeypore, which arose from an attempt on the part of the Government to infringe the rights of this privileged class, and which terminated in a sort of compromise on the side of the court. Runtumboor, which is the oldest and principal fortress in the country, is held partly by the Raja, and partly by these nobles, each having the honor of defending a particular gate or portion of the works.

The guaranteed Thakoors are necessarily obnoxious persons in the eyes of the Jeypore Government, and Rawul Byree Saul, the chief of them, and the ex-minister, who is opposed to the Queen Mother and Jotah Ram, her minister and favorite, is of course the most obnoxious of all. The charge which has lately been got up against the Rawul, of instigating persons to murder the brother of the present minister, was apparently with the view of ascertaining how far the British Government would protect the Rawul. If that Government had not been prepared to uphold its guarantee, the Jeypore troops would have proceeded against him; but a declaration of its views was of course sufficient to stay further proceedings.

It is curious enough to witness the sense of honor displayed by other powers, all of whom evince some bitterness towards Jeypore, for having rendered up to the British Government, Vizier Ally, the deposed Nawab of Oude, and the atrocious murderer of Mr. Cherry, who had sought refuge from the punishment due to his crime in the Jeypore territory. That state, in submitting to a measure which amongst more civilized nations is in conformity with international law, has disgraced itself in the estimation of the people of India. In 1806, the Wukeels of Holkar observed to Sir John Malcolm, "The Raja of Jeypore will no doubt continue to enjoy the friendship of the English, as he had disgraced himself to please that nation by giving up to their vengeance the unfortunate Vizier Ally who had sought its protection;" and a year or two ago, when Maha Raja Man Singh of Joudpore was required to render up Appah Sahib, the Ex-Raja of Nagpore, who had sought refuge in his territory, and was told that the Jeypore Government had given up some of Appah Sahib's followers, apprehended in that territory, he observed, Jeypore has before "disgraced itself in that way, but that is no reason that Joudpore should do so likewise." The head of a common village on the Dehlee frontier, on being required to render up a plunderer, said, "Do you think I am a Raja of Jeypore that I should do this?"

The withdrawal of the local political agent from Jeypore, and the placing of our relations with that court, under the general superintendence of the agent in Rajpootana, cannot fail to have a

healing effect on those evils which have hitherto arisen chiefly from over-interference on the part of agents, generally in favor of individuals, and not in recommending or enforcing salutary measures. Such support of individuals naturally setting them in opposition to their own Government, and tending to divide and paralize the influence of any administration.

4. JOUDPORE or MARWAR.—Our first treaty with this state is dated the 6th of January, 1818. It is in substance the same as the other treaties with the Rajpoot states of this period. The tribute formerly paid to Scindia is henceforward to be paid to the British Government. The state is to furnish 1,500 horse for general service, whenever required, and when necessary, the whole disposable force of Joudpore.

Joudpore, from its remote position and from the sandy and desert nature of the country, might have been expected to escape from those evils which befel most of the states of Rajpootana, when the British Government withdrew from the exercise of a controlling power. But there was no country which the insidious policy of the Mahratta did not reach; the instrument of Holkar in this case being his general, Ameer Khan. The present Raja Man Singh succeeded his cousin in 1805, to whom a posthumous son, Dhokul Singh, was born. The infant received protection from the Raja of Ketree, a feudatory of Jeypore; and his pretensions to the throne were supported in 1806, by that state, by Beekaneer, by Ameer Khan, and certain Joudpore nobles. Their united forces defeated the army of Joudpore in a pitched battle, and took the capital; but the principal fortress stood a siege of eight months. In the meantime, the Raja won over Ameer Khan to desert the cause of the confederates. He proceeded to lay waste the Jeypore country, and compelled his late friends to raise the siege; and he murdered Sowae Singh and the other principal Thakoors who had supported the cause of the pretender, instigated thereto, it is supposed, by the Raja Man Singh himself. Dhokul Singh escaped, and was carried to the Dehlee territory. In 1814, Ameer Khan returned with his army to Marwar, and overran the country. In the same year, he put to death the Raja's ministers, when the Raja himself, terror-struck, abdicated and became a recluse. Ameer Khan with the son of the murdered minister managed the country for him till 1816, when he levied a heavy contribution and retired to Jeypore. The Raja's only son assumed the regency in 1817, but died at the end of eight months.

Such was the condition of Joudpore when the British alliance commenced with that state. The Raja was prevailed upon to resume his duties, but his conduct has since on many occasions been such as to give colour to the supposition entertained of his insanity at the time of his abdication. Yet after much personal communication with him in 1822, Mr. Wilder observed in his despatch to Government, "Raja Man Singh is undoubtedly a man of superior sense and understanding." There has been less communication

between the British representatives and the Joudpore state than perhaps any other state in Internal India, of equal magnitude.

In 1824, the conduct of the Raja towards certain of the chiefs of his country rendered it necessary to depute a British officer to mediate in the settlement of their differences. The chiefs were then considered to be in the wrong, and no settlement very satisfactory towards either party took place. In 1828, some of these feudal chiefs whose possessions had been attacked, and who had been banished from the Joudpore territory, called Dhokul Singh to their assistance; and after collecting a considerable body of men in the Jeypore territory, proceeded to invade Joudpore, where they were joined by other Thakoors and followers. The Regent Mother of Jeypore was supposed to favor the pretensions of Dhokul Singh, from a grudge she owes to the sister of the Joudpore Raja; who was, with herself, one of the wives of the late Jeypore Raja, but who left that country on the birth of a posthumous son by the rival Queen, carrying to Joudpore some scandal from the palace.

Maha Raja Man Singh urged on the British Government, through his agents at Dehlee and Ajmere, that the time had arrived when he was entitled to the aid of British troops to support him on his throne. That it was not an internal insurrection, but an invasion headed by a pretender, and supported by a foreign state. The decision of the British Government was, "If insurrection should be so general as to indicate the desire of chiefs and subjects for the downfal of the prince, there does not exist any reason for our forcing on the state of Joudpore a sovereign whose conduct has totally deprived him of the support and allegiance of his people. Against unjust usurpation, or against wanton, but too powerful rebellion, the princes of protected states may fairly perhaps call on us for assistance; but not against universal disaffection and insurrection, caused by their own injustice, incapacity, and misrule. Princes are expected to have the power of controlling their own subjects, and if they drive them into rebellion, they must take the consequences. There is no obligation on us to support them in such cases." Jeypore was considered to have acted in breach of engagements with us in allowing an armed confederacy to form against Joudpore, within its territory. That state cannot retaliate because of our supremacy. Thence its claim to conditional aid; the condition being the admission on the part of the sovereign and chiefs of our right to settle their differences on fair and equitable principles. Jeypore may be held responsible for the injury done to Joudpore.

Eventually Dhokul Singh was required by the British Government to withdraw from the confederacy, and the chiefs settled their differences amongst themselves in a manner satisfactory to all parties. In such a contest, when there is a pretender to the throne, it will generally be impossible for the British Government to stand *aloof;* for if it does not uphold its supremacy, other powers, who have interests on each side, will step in with their assist-

ance. In the present case, a body of Scindians was reported to be advancing to support the pretender, sent by the Ameers of Scind, and the Raja was said to have appealed to the support of Runjeet Singh.

In 1829, Appah Sahib, the Ex-Raja of Nagpore, returned from the Punjaub, and found an asylum in Beekaneer, from which he was expelled, very reluctantly, by its chief, on the urgent demand of the agent at Ajmere, to the resident at Dehlee, and through him to the Beekaneer Wukeels. He proceeded to the Joudpore territory, whose chief was required to seize and deliver him up as an enemy of the British Government, or to expel him on the side of Scind and prevent his proceeding southward. The great reluctance evinced by Maha Raja Man Singh to treat the Ex-Raja, who had sought an asylum in his territory, so uncivilly, induced the British Government to come to the resolution, that the Joudpore state should not be required to render up Appah Sahib; provided it became responsible for his safe custody and peaceable conduct whilst he remained in Joudpore. This mode of disposing of the question, the most advantageous after all to ourselves, was received in Rajpootana with much satisfaction, in proof of the moderation of Government in receding from its former demand; and of its delicacy and consideration for the honor and feeling of the Rajpoot state.

Maha Raja Man Singh has generally in his communications with the agents of our Government maintained a tone of superiority, or at all events not of that submission which has marked the conduct of the other chiefs of Rajpootana. On the Governor General's late visit to Ajmere, he did not, like the other chiefs, visit his lordship; he had allowed his tribute to fall two years into arrear; he is supposed to have opened some political correspondence with the autocrat of the north; to have afforded on the frontiers of his dominions an asylum to certain Nuggur Parkur and Kosa plunderers, who violated the frontiers of other states; he did not meet in good spirit the measures adopted for the adjustment of certain boundary disputes between his own and the territory of other states; and he did not readily supply the contingent of troops, which by treaty he is bound to bring forward on the demand of the British Government. This is a long catalogue of offences, but there is nothing very important in any of them, or which need be allowed to disturb our relations with Man Singh. He has since paid up his tribute, and supplied two contingents; one of 1,500 horse for Ajmere, to be employed in Sheickhawutee, or wherever else they may be required; the other of 500 horse and 1,000 foot, to be employed in the operations undertaken by the British Government, Scind and Jessulmere, against the Nuggur Parkur and other plunderers in that quarter.

There is no doubt that the contingent furnished by Joudpore for the purpose of assisting in the operations of the present year against the Kosas has failed in the performance of its duty; and the

probability is that it has acted treacherously. Neither circumstance need much surprise us, for Joudpore has been too long and too intimately connected with these plunderers to render it probable that we should have its cordial support in their subjugation, which brings our power nearer to the capital than could be agreeable to its haughty chief. It is like expecting the assistance of the Mahratta powers in the overthrow of the Pindarees.

5. KOTAH, is a junior branch of the Boondee House, and was separated from it about two centuries ago, but has risen in political importance superior to the parent state. Here as at Poona we found that sovereign powers had been confided to or usurped by the minister. It does not appear that the Prince was under personal restraint as at Poona, but the powers of government were not the less in the hands of Zalim Singh, who was alone known or heard of, and but for his own scruples our treaties would, as at Poona, have been negotiated in his name, instead of in that of the Maha Rao.

Raj Rana Zalim Singh was the most remarkable man that had of late years appeared in Rajpootana. Under his administration, the Kotah territory was respected by all parties, whether Mahomedan, Mahratta, or Rajpoot. Whilst the other portions of that region were devastated, and had nearly become deserts, Kotah was in the highest state of cultivation and prosperity, benefiting apparently by the misfortunes of its neighbours. This was owing in a great measure to the personal character of Zalim Singh, who was proverbial for justice and honor in his dealings with other men, when these qualities seemed to have disappeared from amongst the rest of the world. Zalim Singh's word was as the bond or the oath of others, and few negotiations during ten or twelve years, from 1805 to 1817, the period of anarchy in Rajpootana, were contracted between chiefs and states without his guarantee.

When the force under Colonel Monson advanced from Hindoostan to co-operate with that from Guzerat, under Colonel Murray, in defence of the Jeypore territory against the threatened invasion of Holkar, Zalim Singh received it at his capital with much cordiality, and afforded it supplies and assistance of every kind; but when it commenced its retrograde movement, he shut his gates, refused supplies, and was no longer our friend. He could not then afford to follow what seemed to be our falling fortunes, at the risk of bringing on the Kotah state the vengeance of Holkar, who was likely to rise on our downfal.

From this period, as has already been stated, the British Government withdrew from interference in the affairs of Rajpootana, until the end of 1817. On the 26th of December of that year, a treaty was concluded with Kotah, which is in substance the same as the other treaties belonging to this class. Kotah cedes to the British Government the tribute which it had before paid to the Peishwa, Scindia, Holkar, and Puwar. The treaty is concluded between "The East India Company on the one hand, and Maha

Rao, Omed Singh Buhadoor, the Raja of Kotah, and his heirs and successors, through Raj Rana Zalim Singh Buhadoor, the administrator of the affairs of that principality on the other." Sir Charles Metcalfe, by whom this treaty was negotiated, did not apparently take on himself the responsibility of rendering the administration perpetual in the family of the minister. But by a supplementary article, dated the 20th of February, 1818, "The contracting parties agree, that after Maha Rao Omed Singh, the Raja of Kotah, the principality shall descend to his eldest son, and heir-apparent, Maha Raja Kour Kishen Singh, and his heirs in regular succession and perpetuity. And that the entire administration of the affairs of the principality shall be vested in the Raj Rana Zalim Singh, and after him in his eldest son, Kour Madhoo Singh, and his heirs, in regular succession and perpetuity."

About the time this treaty was negotiated by Sir Charles Metcalfe, at Dehlee, Captain Tod was deputed to Kotah to give a direction to the resources of that state in our operations against the Pindarees, and for the purpose of settling points of minor importance. In the negotiations conducted by the agent directly with Zalim Singh, as well as in those conducted by the resident at Dehlee, he alone appeared. The Prince was so little known that the agent, like the resident, was prepared to make certain cessions of tribute and territory, in the name and on behalf of the minister; and if this had been done, the Governor General was in each case prepared to approve and confirm the measure.

It is perhaps difficult to account for the moderation which led a crafty and ambitious statesman, like Zalim Singh, to hang back at such a time from the responsibility of such a measure. We may be sure, however, that he was restrained from this direct usurpation of supreme power by the general voice of the princes and people of Rajpootana; who, even supported as Zalim Singh would have been by us in this first act of treachery, would have scouted the measure and branded his name with infamy; for although each prince and each peasant in this country is ready enough for his own benefit to adopt or to join in such measures, all are here more ready than in most other countries to condemn such acts in others. We have sufficient proof of the extent of this feeling in the manner in which Kishen Singh, the son of the then Maha Rao Omed Singh, was, only three years afterwards, supported by the people of Rajpootana, in his endeavour to regain his lost position, and to throw off the authority of Zalim Singh.

Five hundred Cavalry, a thousand Infantry, and four guns, was the force which Zalim Singh placed at Captain Tod's disposal, for operations against the Pindarees, and it does not appear that they rendered any service of importance. After the battle of Mehidpore, Zalim Singh was forward enough to seize upon such portions of Holkar's territory as lay contiguous to his own.

On the death of Maha Rao Omed Singh, under whom Zalim Singh had attained such power, and the accession of his son,

Kishen Singh, it soon became apparent, that the relations which had for nearly fifty years subsisted between these two authorities, and which were now guaranteed by the British Government, would not long remain undisturbed. In December, 1820, Kishen Singh left Kotah; visited Muttra, Bindrabund, and Dehlee, and deputed an agent to Calcutta, who entered on an intrigue with the principal native servants in the Political Secretary's Office, and made his master believe that he was well received there, and that Government was favorably disposed towards him. He further enlisted the Treasurer of the Dehlee Residency in his cause, and through his assistance raised large sums of money; the Maha Rao proceeded towards Rajpootana with 2,000 followers, disseminating the belief that the measures of the local agent were disapproved by the Government, and that he had the support of the latter. He called to his assistance the chiefs and servants of his family, and appealed to the princes of the neighbouring states to assist him in his views against Zalim Singh, and to regain the lost fortunes of his house. Having assembled about 6,000 men, he advanced from Jeypore into the Kotah territory, determined to risk a contest with our troops, which were called from Neemuch and Nusseerabad to oppose his views. On the 30th of September, 1821, the Maha Rao's force was defeated at Mangroll, his brother killed, and his principal adherents, including a brother of the Raj Rana's, Govurdhun Doss, put to flight.

After this defeat, the Maha Rao retired to the sanctuary or Nathdwara, in the Joudpore territory, whence he returned to Kotah; and on the 31st of December was restored to his pageant throne. A fixed allowance of one lakh and sixty-four thousand rupees per annum was set aside from the revenues of the state, for the support of the Maha Rao and his establishment; over which, as in his own palaces he was declared to be supreme. One hundred horse and 200 foot, under his own control, were appointed for his protection; and by a separate instrument, he recognized the perpetual administration of Zalim Singh, his heirs and successors, over the country, its revenues, the army, &c. The inadequacy of the Maha Rao's personal allowances is a never-failing cause of complaint, and it is generally admitted to be barely sufficient for his most ordinary wants. The revenue of the Boondee state is hardly 10,00,000 rupees a year, and the Durbar expences are upwards of 2,50,000. The revenues of Kotah, in 1823, were estimated by Colonel Caulfield at 40,00,000.

It was not supposed by Government that the Maha Rao and Raj Rana would ever be cordially reconciled to each other, or that the former could be satisfied with his condition; and it was contemplated to make a division of the Kotah territory; any share of which it was believed would be acceptable to the Prince, compared with his present condition, possessing the titular dignity only; whilst the family of the minister might prefer the enjoyment of princely rank at the head of a less considerable territory, to the advantages

of administering even such a state as Kotah, with the subordinate title of Manager.

The absence of a controlling power in our relations with Rajpootana was, from the distance of the seat of Government from those provinces, felt to be an evil; a separate political agent was appointed to Kotah, and general authority over all the agents and states of that region was conferred on Sir David Ochterlony.

The bad spirit which must be expected to continue between the legitimate Prince and his hereditary and guaranted minister was not lessened by late events. The Prince considered that the minister's conduct, or usurpation, as he called it, had involved the death of his beloved brother Pertu Singh, in the action at Mangroll; whilst the minister freely confessed that his apprehension, lest the conduct of the young Prince should not be the same as that of his respected father, was the inducement to him to secure his authority by an alliance with the British Government, under whose protection he felt secure and happy.

Raj Rana Zalim Singh died on the 15th of June, 1824. It was soon discovered that the son of the late minister, whose succession to the office and power of his father was guaranteed by the supplementary article of the treaty, had been kept in that state of tutelage and inactivity which in all countries and under all circumstances seems now to be the fate of the sons and relations of the native chiefs. His unfitness to conduct the affairs of government, compared with the talents displayed in all departments by his late father, soon became apparent. But supported by our power he took almost undisturbed possession of his supremacy in the Kotah principality. The only indications against him were on the part of some battalions, which showed a disposition to support and serve the Prince rather than the minister; and Maha Raja Bulwunt Singh, an uncle of the Rao Raja of Boondee, likewise encouraged and supported the pretensions of the Prince, levying men for this purpose. It was eventually necessary, in concert with the Kotah and Boondee authorities, to employ a detachment of our troops against Bulwunt Singh; he resisted, and was killed, with some loss on our side.

The reputation of Zalim Singh suffered in the estimation of our Government in the last years of his life, by a want of liberality towards the pecuniary necessities of the unfortunate chief, whose power had been permanently subverted through the connexion of the minister with us. There was also an apparent want of delicacy and respect on his part to the wants and dignity of his master, towards whom he professed attachment and loyalty. The necessity of constantly urging these things on his attention rendered him, too, somewhat sore and regardless of the admonitions of our political agents.

It must be recollected, that the chief of Kotah, who had been the friend of Zalim Singh, and under whose Government he had risen to such power, was dead; that he had been succeeded by a son between whom and Zalim Singh there had never been any cordiality;

that the minister declared that the fear of the future Raja's proving less manageable than his father, had led him to seek an alliance with the British Government; and that the young Prince had, in an appeal to arms, disputed the minister's right to deprive him of his inheritance. It appeared to Zalim Singh necessary to adopt one of two lines of conduct; either to conform rigidly to the terms of the several engagements with his Prince, or to resign the resources of the Kotah state to his will, and he rather pertinaciously adhered to the former.

An unfortunate interpretation had from the first been given to the supplementary article of the treaty, for although by that article it might be considered necessary to continue in perpetuity to the Raj Ranas of Kotah the administration of the affairs of the principality, it was surely unnecessary to hold the entire resources of that state at the minister's disposal, uncontrolled by his sovereign; and it would have been wiser and far more just to have limited the minister's expenditure to what was necessary to the effectual administration of affairs, under the control either of his sovereign or of the British Government, than to have assigned to the chief a bare subsistence, leaving the minister to squander or to hoard the surplus at his own pleasure.

It still continues to require the constant services of a political agent, and the interposition of the British Government, to preserve a balance of power between these conflicting authorities; and if our supremacy closed, it may be fairly assumed that the minister's power would not endure a single month, but that it would be assailed by almost all the princes and people of Rajpootana. It is possible that without our support the minister might continue to maintain his place at Kotah against his sovereign. The possession of power, and of the resources of the state, will secure the fidelity of a mercenary army. But a struggle would infallibly arise between that army, and whatever may remain of the hereditary nobility of Kotah, and the result would of course be doubtful. If the other princes of Rajpootana were allowed to take a part in such a contest, there can be no doubt that the sacred right of kings would then prevail.

Our support of this state of things is attended with considerable odium to ourselves; and if the system is found to work so badly, the Kotah ministers can hardly expect that obligations, incurred by us under circumstances so different, are to continue binding for ever.

They might be informed that when the treaty was negotiated, we concluded that future ministers would continue to carry along with them the good-will of the Prince and the favorable opinion of the people, as Zalim Singh had done; that failing to do this, our support of them must necessarily, after a given time, cease; that we should leave them to stand or to fall by their own resources, or that if they feared to be left in such a condition, we would lend our aid, to secure for them, such a territorial provision as might, in communication with the chief of Kotah, and the other chiefs of Rajpootana, be deemed an adequate remuneration for the position which they relinquished.

No one who has considered the solemn obligations involved in treaties, or the importance to nations of maintaining their terms inviolate, will lightly talk of dissolving them, except by mutual consent. But the best authorities on international law distinguish widely between treaties which are purely personal and those that are national; between those that are for the mutual benefit of nations, and those where the benefit originally was, or where it has through changes of circumstances become, on one side; and no treaty surely ever was more personal, or had the benefit more on one side, than that of the British Government with the minister of Kotah. In announcing to the Raj Rana an intention to modify the terms of our alliance with him, or altogether to recede from it; we do not save ourselves from any immediate responsibility from any fear of involvement in war or other consequences; nor do we resign the state to foreign conquest or aggression: considerations which could alone render it dishonorable in either party to retire from the obligations of international relations. But the period when it may be necessary to make such a declaration may still be distant; and under good management, may never arrive.

In December, 1825, an engagement was entered into with the Raj Rana; the object of which was to protect our Benares and Patna opium monopoly. The agent reported that the minister made no difficulty, whatever, in complying with the wishes of the British Government, although he was very candid and free in his observations upon the consequences, which, he said, could not fail to result from a policy destructive to the commerce of Central India. Yet he considered it his duty to obey. It has since appeared, that there were very strong objections taken both on the part of the Kotah and Boondee states to entering on this engagement, the one professing its willingness to do so, after the other should have complied: thus showing a combination to resist encroachment, which they had not formerly recourse to on more trying occasions. These objections were however overruled, and Kotah agreed to collect from its cultivators, and to deliver to our opium agent, at a fixed price, all the opium produced in its territory, and to prevent the exportation and importation of the drug. Persons guilty of clandestinely exporting or importing opium were to be held liable to punishment, agreeably to the opinion and advice of the political agent, and the opium to be liable to confiscation. The value of opium so confiscated to be divided in equal shares between the Kotah Government and the persons making the seizure. An allowance was also made to the Kotah Government for the loss it sustained in transit duty. Custom-house officers, or other servants, or subjects, of the Kotah state, intentionally or otherwise, allowing of the importation or exportation of opium, to be punished according to the advice of the political agent. One-third of the value of the opium was to be paid for at the time the poppy was sown, one-third at the time the juice was extracted, and one-third at the time of delivery. The Raj Rana declared these advances to be necessary,

that he might establish a claim on the people to the produce of their labour, at the prices fixed by the opium agent; which else would fall into the hands of merchants and bankers.

Kotah is the principal state in Rajpootana where opium is grown, and I have been thus particular in describing the nature of our engagements with that state, because it will show the nature of the system established throughout Rajpootana and Malwa. In those states, which were the principal thoroughfares towards the coast, such as Oudeepore, larger allowances were made for the loss of transit duties; and these were so much greater than had ever been derived from that source of revenue, whilst their profits on the confiscation of the drug were also considerable, that they favored and supported rather than otherwise our views. Scindiah, Jeypore, Kishengurh, and some other states considered these measures to be so injurious to their interests, and those of their subjects, that they resisted all our endeavours to draw them into our views, and gained great credit with the people generally, but with the mercantile community in particular, for so doing.

It is remarkable enough that in discussing and negotiating these measures, the Government of that day avoided the agency of the most distinguished of their servants who held the principal political authority, Sir David Ochterlony and Sir Charles Metcalfe, whose opinions were known to be adverse to the system; and went to work either through the medium of the opium agent, who had been established in Malwa and Rajpootana, or directly with the local agents at the several courts. Government must have known that their measures were both offensive and injurious to the chiefs and people of those regions, but they did not know the extent to which they were so. They did not know that they had raised up a cloud of spies, and opium-seizers, whose hand was in every man's house, and in every man's cart; that they were teaching the Governments of those countries to lend us their aid to forward views most opposed to the interests of their own subjects, whether agricultural or commercial, or the extent to which the odium of the whole system fell upon themselves.

It has often been a source of just complaint, that the Indian Governments do not receive from their officers that free and manly description of the evils which peculiar measures are calculated to produce, when it is known or suspected that such exposition would not be palatable; and in no case has this been more apparent than in the negotiation of our opium treaties in Malwa and Rajpootana, and in the adoption of measures necessary to support their stipulations, all of which were alike subversive to the power of the princes of those regions, and destructive to the best interests of their subjects. Government was not entirely ignorant of the injustice and evil tendency of those measures, but neither was it fully aware of the extent of the evil which they inflicted.

It was however soon discovered, that the system did not work well for us; that opium found its way to the foreign settlements of

Damaun and Diu, for exportation to the China market, in such quantities as injuriously to affect our monopoly prices there; and it was sought to negotiate new treaties with the several states, which should strike at the root of this evil by limiting production, for prices in Malwa and Rajpootana had continued so high as to serve as a premium. The Raj Rana of Kotah was the first who had courage to speak out, and Sir Charles Metcalfe being at the time on a tour through Rajpootana, he was not only listened to, but the voice of complaint was sure to reach Government in a shape that could not be resisted. Revenue to the extent of upwards of a million sterling was however considered to be involved in the discussion, and as that is a sum which no Government can readily afford to part with, this struggle against nature continued for some time longer. At last, opium-carriers armed to oppose opium-seizers, and a sort of civil war had in some places arisen, which was likely to become more extended. It was therefore found necessary to relinquish the system, and to endeavour to bolster up our internal agriculture and trade, by levying a protecting duty on the commerce of those states.

6. Boondee is the principal state from its antiquity in that portion of Rajpootana called Harowtee; Kotah being a branch state. The other three divisions of that great region are Doondar, of which Jeypore is the capital, and Ulwar, a branch state; Marwar, of which Joudpore is the capital, and Beekaneer, Kishengurh, and Sirohee are branch states; and Mewar, of which Oudeepore is the capital, and Banswarra, Purtabgurh, and Doongerpore are branch states. The Raja of Boondee had been of important assistance to Colonel Monson in his disastrous retreat before the army of Holkar, in 1804, and was believed in the subsequent operations of the Mahrattas in that quarter to have suffered the more on that account. We were not bound by any stipulations, like those with Jeypore, of the same period, to protect Boondee, which was left to its fate, without subjecting us, as in the other case, to the imputation of being guilty of a breach of faith.

The treaty with Boondee is of the 10th of February, 1818. The tribute amounting to 88,000 Rupees, which the state had formerly paid to Holkar, was remitted in return for former services; and some territorial possessions, which had passed from it, were recovered and gratuitously restored. The other articles of the treaty were conformable with those of other treaties of the same class.

Our friend Rao Raja Bishen Singh died on the 14th of July, 1821. He had conducted the affairs of his Government from the period of his alliance with us, in a manner perfectly satisfactory, and was succeeded in his possessions by the present Rao Raja Ram Singh, then a boy of eleven years of age.

On the Raja's death, a Council of Regency was established, consisting of four influential persons, servants of the late Rao Raja, named apparently by the political agent of the day, and approved

by the British Government; by whom however he was desired to avoid all direct interference in the internal affairs of Boondee.

Very soon after this arrragement was completed, the Mother of the young Raja informed the political agent, "that the system would not work; that four English Gentlemen might conduct state affairs in concert, but that four natives never could." An arrangement through which the banker of the political agent was substituted for the former banker of the state, was deemed particularly objectionable; and it was declared that most of the members of the Regency were leagued with the English; that as the political agent had assumed the entire executive authority in Mewar, and merely allowed the Rana sufficient for his daily expenses, so would he take upon himself the entire management of Boondee affairs, and allow them a daily stipend, by which means the reins of Government would fall from their hands.

The administration of affairs was therefore entrusted by the Queen Mother to an individual minister, Bora Sumboo Ram, and the agent's measure set aside, which was of easier accomplishment, as he resigned his office about the same time. Some measures of the Regent Mother, which character she now assumed, were considered objectionable; and she was informed by Government that unless œconomy, and the interests of the young Raja, were more attended to, it might become necessary to entrust the management of affairs to abler and better hands.

In January, 1823, the minister died, and the young Raja reported to the agent that he had made an election in his room. The political agent was much surprised at this exhibition of independent spirit. But after proceeding to Boondee, for the purpose of inquiring into the fitness of the person named, he found that there was no better man in the principality, and the arrangement was allowed to stand.

In April, 1823, the young Rao Raja, then in his twelfth year, espoused a daughter of Maha Raja Man Singh of Joudpore, who was in her twenty-fifth, a very unusual disparity in years amongst Rajpoots on the wrong side; but the alliance was considered highly advantageous to Boondee. The political agent had the support of a single minister very much at heart, and required the removal from the mother's councils of three persons of low station, who were supposed to be inimical to that officer, viz. an eunuch, a Budarun, and a barber, and the British Government authorized the agent to insist on their removal from the presence and councils of the Regent. They were accordingly removed; but others of similar character immediately took their place, and the perverse disposition of the Ranee was excited to constant opposition by a *Mootsudee* and a *Furash* of the palace. The Ranee continued to beg hard for the restoration of her former servants, and the agent to oppose their admission, even into the palace, in which he was supported by his Government. These are not singular instances of the exercise of the political power of our agents, and of our Govern-

ment to secure the removal of menials. At Jeypore we insisted on the removal of Roopa Budarun, and in Chota Nagpore, we insisted on the removal of a certain Dhae, probably the Rajah's wet nurse.

The affairs of the Boondee state continued however to prosper under the superintendance of the political agent, and the administration of an able minister, during the minority of the Rao Raja.

The Queen Mother was suspected during the whole period of the minority, of withholding from her son that description of education, and of denying him access to those friends and associates, which would have most tended to improve his mind and form his morals, in a manner conducive to his future fitness for the high station which it was his destiny to fill. She was even suspected of pandering to the vices of her son, and this, of course, for the purpose of prolonging the period of her own power.

The education of the young Raja was here, as at Jeypore and other places, considered by the chiefs of the state a national object. But it was on the part of the mothers, who claimed in each case to be the natural guardians, asserted that those chiefs only desired to exercise a controul over the state, in the name of the Raja, to serve their own interested purposes. At Boondee, as has already been stated, the young Raja was married to a sister of the Raja of Joudpore. She, as seems to be always the case in these Rajpoot states, was accompanied to the court of her lord, by certain attendants, who permanently took up their residence, to watch over her interests. In the case of a minority in particular, these persons may be supposed generally to exercise, or to desire to exercise, some influence in court affairs; and as few characters are more scorned in the eyes of natives, than even a brother *(Sala)* who follows, or attaches himself to the fortunes of a sister, these personages are not likely to be treated with much respect at the court where they reside. In the present instance, they resented the treatment of the young Princess by her still younger lord, and publicly declared that, but for the apprehension they entertained of exciting the displeasure of the British Government, they would revenge the wrongs and insults offered to their mistress. In 1827, they appealed to the political agent, to interfere, for the purpose of inducing the Queen Mother and the minister, (between whom, as usual, a criminal connexion was suspected,) to conduct the affairs of the *Zenana* in a manner more conformable with usage, and consonant to the dignity of the Prince and the character of the ladies of the palace. We shall see presently that this spirit produced more serious results. It is to be observed, that the females in these states are kept as rigidly secluded as under any Mahomedan Government, although they exercise far greater influence in state affairs. The line of eunuchs guarding the approach to the *Zenana* of Jeypore is greater than perhaps in any other court in India; and as might be expected, the state of morals under such guardianship is believed to be laxer than elsewhere.

From the nature of the international authority exercised by the British Government, these domestic affairs force themselves under our cognizance. Even the haughty Maha Raja Man Singh of Joudpore has been obliged to enter on stipulations with our agent, regarding the treatment of one of his wives, a sister of the late Raja of Jeypore, who too was married to a daughter of Man Singh. In 1820, Man Singh dismissed the Jeypore attendants on his wife, because of their meddling with state affairs. He told the agent, in 1824, that he would have stated certain grievances on this head against Jeypore, but that he thought it would be very unbefitting in him to refer a subject purely of a private and family nature to British arbitration. He consented, however, if the Jeypore Government would send agents of their own selection, that his wife's estates and other property should be immediately made over to them; that he would likewise depute an agent to Jeypore to superintend the possessions of his daughter; an arrangement by which mutual intercourse might at once be renewed, and their domestic differences amicably settled among themselves. He objected however to send his wife back to her family because the Raja of Jeypore was a child; and knowing nothing, the arrangements of the interior were not then properly observed.

In 1829, the Boondee Government urged on the political agent, with much pertinacity, the obligations under which the British Government was, in conformity with the 5th article of the treaty, to restore to it, a two-third share of the district of Patun, held by Scindia; the other third having before been recovered from Holkar, and restored to Boondee. By the 5th article of the treaty, it was stipulated, that Boondee should pay to the British Government the tribute and revenue formerly paid to Scindia, for which it became answerable to that state: and in a schedule to the treaty, 40,000 rupees was stated to be the tribute on account of the shares in question. But this amount of tribute was never claimed from Boondee, because the shares of Patun could not be recovered from Scindia; for, by the treaty it was only incumbent on us to recover for Boondee such portions of its territory as had been mortgaged to Scindia, on account of arrears of tribute or debt. Inquiries, after the negotiation of the treaty, proved, that Patun had been ceded to the Peishwa during the ministry of Nana Furnivese for certain services rendered to the then Raja of Boondee, in assisting to expel a pretender to the throne, who had the support of Jeypore. It had been afterwards ceded by the Peishwa to Scindia, on what account was immaterial, for it was obvious that we could not effect its restoration; the two-thirds of Patun are worth about 80,000 rupees, the tribute which Boondee would pay to us being only 40,000, its interest in the recovery of the purgunnah is sufficiently obvious. But beyond this it is an old family possession, whose magnificent temple was built by the Rajas of Boondee, and is the sanctuary of their household gods. It may be possible, through a money payment, or by an exchange of territory, for Boondee to

recover from Scindia this much valued possession. But she is not likely to enter cordially on either scheme, whilst there is a probability of effecting the object on more advantageous terms through our influence.

Boondee suffered less than Kotah through our opium arrangements. In 1829, the finances of the former principality were described by the political agent to be in the most prosperous condition, the treasury full, and every thing connected with the Rao Raja's pecuniary affairs in the most flourishing state. The revenues of the latter principality were described to be greatly impaired by the effects of our opium monopoly, the commerce of the country having been annihilated by our restrictive measures, "which condition following so immediately on the steps of a high state of prosperity, has occasioned great distress and universal discontent."

"On communicating to the authorities of Kotah and Boondee, the modification which the Right Hon'ble the Governor General in Council has directed me to make in our opium treaties, they expressed a deep sense of the boon which the Governor General has been pleased to bestow on the suffering inhabitants of Harowtee, and earnestly urged me to make their gratitude known to his lordship in council." In 1828, Maha Raja Bukhtowur Singh, a near relation of the Raja of Boondee, was killed in an affray with a body of opium smugglers.

The Raj Rana of Kotah desired to have a picture of his lordship, "that he might have the image of the benefactor constantly in his view, who rescued him from an impending ruin, and the principality of Kotah from misery, which no exertion of his could avert or assuage."

In May, 1830, a deputation, accompanied by 300 armed men, was sent from Joudpore, for the alleged purpose of securing some modification of the treatment experienced by the daughter of the Prince of that state, who was married to the chief of Boondee. It is curious enough, that the news-writer of the political agent stationed at Joudpore, on the 1st of May, gave intimation of the intention of the Prince of that state to put the Boondee minister to death, and that this notice had been republished in the newspapers at Dehlee, apparently without attracting notice from any one. The deputation encamped outside of the city of Boondee, and on the third day after its arrival, its virtuous minister was assassinated in the hall of his Prince, by a servant attached to the chiefs who had originally attended the young Princess to the court of her lord, and who were living in the city.

They fortified themselves in their house, and prepared for defence, and the deputation retired from before the city walls, when the guns of the hill fort, and others placed in position, opened on the residence of their countrymen. The officiating political agent heard the boom of the artillery at his residence at Kotah, and on learning the cause of the cannonade, galloped the following morning to assist our ally with his council, and found the young chief fully

resolved to avenge the insult offered to his honor. After the batteries were open for three or four days, and the water and supplies of the besieged had been cut off, the two leaders of the party and the supposed instigators of the assassination were apprehended in an attempt to escape, and publicly executed by the Rao Raja's order. Persons of inferior note gradually surrendered themselves, and were sent beyond the Boondee frontier. On the sixth day, Baboot Sing, a nobleman of the court of Joudpore, who had sworn a solemn oath to put to death the Bondee minister, who accompanied the deputation from Joudpore, but who had joined the city party, and who was supposed to be the instrument of the Joudpore Raja in this infamous transaction, was killed; and in the death of these three men, the assassination of the Boondee minister was considered to be sufficiently avenged. During the operations against the city party, the deputation evinced great impatience, and made several demonstrations of affording relief to their companions; other parties of Joudpore troops were also a pproaching, and but for the position of the British Government, and the conduct of its officiating agent, there can be no doubt that war between these states must have followed, and that as usual, the principalities of Rajpootana would have taken their respective sides in the contest. "The Rao Raja carried his measures through with a degree of firmness, which is uncommon in a youth under nineteen years of age; nor was his resolve sullied by any disposition to cruelty and recklessness of human life:—showing throughout the affair strong natural sense, and a firm and generous disposition." Nor was the conduct of the Raja's adviser, the officiating political agent, who was hardly his senior in years, less admirable.

In Raj Debae Kishen Ram, the Boondee principality lost a minister, by whom during his administration of six and a half years, the whole of the debt had been discharged; all the revenue was paid into the Raja's treasury to the last rupee; a regular system of finance was maintained; all the establishments had been placed on the most efficient footing; the military was regularly paid, contented, and attached; the revenue had been raised from three lakhs to nearly five lakhs, and a treasure in ready money of about two lakhs had been collected. He was succeeded in the ministry by his son.

From the time that Man Singh married his daughter to the Boondee Raja, he desired to establish a dominant influence in the affairs of that state. A force of 2,000 men accompanied the bride, and remained with her till her father's objects had been obtained; and after their departure, from 150 to 250 armed men composed her escort at the residence of her lord, overawing the minister and people; and it was the opposition of the minister to this influence which led to his assassination.

The political agent for the affairs of Joudpore did not believe that the Prince of that state was concerned in instigating the assassination of the Boondee minister; although he allowed that such a proceeding was quite in conformity with the character of Man

Singh, and noticed a belief prevalent in those parts, that the death of the minister had been planned by the Boondee Raja himself, on account of the intimacy which was believed to subsist between the minister and his mother, and because the minister was supposed to be favored by the British Government, from whom he had received a title. This opinion was sufficiently refuted by the officiating political agent at Boondee. The young chief of that place had never before taken any share in public life. He was not likely to conspire with a foreign prince and foreign people to compass the death of his own favorite minister; if he did so, he was not likely to take so vigorous a part against his fellow conspirators, nor when they fell into his hands, to put them to death.

In this transaction, as in almost every other in which we take a part in the affairs of foreign states, there remained a responsibility on us. If the daughter of the chief of Joudpore did not, as the senior wife of the Raja of Boondee, receive that treatment at the hands of her husband, or his servants, which was due to her station: and if our position prevented the father from enforcing on the allied state, the rights of his daughter, or from sending an army to bring her to her home, it was incumbent on us to take the place of the father in this domestic affair. The scruples of a native chief, who was not likely to discuss with our agents a question of this delicacy, were a further bar to the attempt to effect so delicate a purpose with advantage; for it could only have been on the father's appeal to us, that we could have interposed our authority with the chief of Boondee. The father did open a communication with our political agent at that court, but, apparently purposely abstained from the mention of his daughter. On the present occasion, our interference was supposed to be the less necessary, from the perfectly good disposition of the young Raja of Boondee towards his wife; and from her being for the first time in that interesting condition, which promised to bind faster the ties of affection between them.

Yet notwithstanding these appearances, the Rao Raja's suspicion, that his wife was concerned in instigating the murder of his minister, kept possession of his mind; and although a son and heir to the throne was born four months after the assassination of the minister, the Rao Raja only saw the infant on the night of its birth, and never his wife, until the beginning of 1832, when he was proceeding on a visit to the Governor General at Ajmere. Preparatory to his departure, the child, then sixteen months old, was brought into public, and received the homage of the chiefs of the state; a reconciliation having before taken place between the parents. The mother never trusted the child out of her own sight, nor allowed it to quit her own apartments, till after her reconciliation with the father.

It has been already mentioned, that an arrangement, which substituted the banker, supported by the political agent, for the banker of the state, in pecuniary transactions, was deemed at Boondee particularly objectionable. From the important part which this bank-

ing establishment has acted in the affairs of Rajpootana, it is necessary here to notice the nature of its transactions.

In January, 1830, the officiating political agent at Kotah, Mr. Trevelyan, reports, " There was one Saokar of superior resources to any of the others, and of far superior abilities. This was Bahadur Mul, who was originally the Boondee Gomashta of the Jeypore house of Dhurumsee Pudumsee. He is a person of great address, and of unbounded liberality when he has the accomplishment of any favorite object in view ; but it was the patronage of Major Tod that first gave him importance and general consideration. That gentleman procured for him, and his brother, Zorawar Mul, the situation of treasurer to the Oudeepore Rana ; and by keeping him in their debt, they got the entire revenues of the state under their control."

In 1822, the political agent, Lieutenant-Colonel Caulfeild, reports on the affairs of Boondee. " It now becomes my duty to advert to the branch of a very opulent house in Kotah, established at this place under Kessoo Ram, (the Gomashta of Seit Bahadur Mul,) who is in the habit of making advances to the Raj upon the following terms : First, receiving four per cent. on the sums required, as a kind of usurious bait, and one per cent. per mensem, and a draft for the amount of the loan upon a particular Pergunnah. When this draft becomes due, the banker receives part of the amount in cash and part in grain, according as it suits his own interest. The house has also the payment of the Infantry stationed at Boondee, in the same way as the firm of Ingle and Co. have of the Cavalry, and issue advances in like manner according to its pleasure, in money or grain, whichever affords the most ample means of defrauding to an unlimited extent a class of people who have no appeal from griping avarice."

" This banker likewise supplies the Toshakhana, and his accounts in this department are settled every six months, without any previous valuation of the articles provided ; the price being left entirely to the conscience of the contractors. The revenue of the Pergunnah of Gundolee is made over to the banker as an advance of payment on the part of Government." In 1823, the same officer reports a conversation which he had with the Boondee minister :

" Having been induced," continued the Dubae (the minister), " by your earnestness to declare so much, it is right that I should lay aside all reserve."

" He then stated that Seit Bahadur Mul had for a considerable length of time enjoyed undisputed influence in the affairs of Boondee ; that his annual profits were enormous, considering the comparatively small revenue of the state ; that the suppression of malversation to be beneficial must be effectual, and that he dreaded to come in contact with a person who by emissaries declared his influence to be uncontrolled. Ignorant therefore as he was of the actual footing on which I was with the Seit, he judged it the wisest plan to allow an apparent want of energy and decision to

attest his inaptitude for the duty confided to his trust. By the influence of such an opinion, added he, I hoped to effect my resignation without giving umbrage to the Rana."

In January, 1830, the officiating political agent observes: "Major Caulfeild then proceeds to detail the manner in which he endeavoured to obviate the impression, that it was his wish to support Buhadur Mul; and (Major Caulfeild) concludes by lamenting the facility with which the minds of these people receive impressions full of the most mischievous effects to the public interests and tranquillity, the British character, and their own peace; and the difficulty of coming to the knowledge of an evil of so much magnitude as the supposed influence of interested native agents and others of that class over the conduct of British officers employed in situations of high trust and confidence."

Mr. Trevelyan proceeds in his dispatch of 8th August, 1830: "Having made a large fortune out of the spoils of the Oudeepore Rana, and of the Rao Raja of Boondee, Buhadur Mul took advantage of the Raj Rana's difficulties, to play the same game at Kotah. Owing to his immense wealth, he was able to make advances as they were required with a degree of facility of which the rest of the bankers were quite incapable. The Raj Rana soon fell many lakhs of rupees into arrears, and Buhadur Mul's influence then became predominant. The assignments which had been made to some of the other Saokars were stopped; nearly the whole revenue of the state was paid in to Buhadur Mul's coffers, and all the current expences were furnished by him. But the main cause of the ascendancy which Buhadur Mul had gained over the Raj Rana was the impression he entertained, that Buhadur Mul possessed the support of the officers of the British Government. They had made him what he was, and the Raj Rana had always been accustomed to view him as a person who possessed their confidence. He was in constant attendance at the agency, and had often been employed as the medium of communication with it. It must be well known to you that this predicament, to which the native Governments of India are so liable, is one of the most miserable which can befal an independant state. The government falling into the hands of merchants and bankers becomes a matter of traffic and individual profit. If grain or any kind of stores or equipment were required, Buhadur Mul furnished them at an immense profit to himself. If orders for the pay of the troops and the rest of the establishments were taken to him to be cashed, he previously deducted a portion for himself, or gave the applicants a nominal equivalent in grain, which fetched a value in the market far below what was really due to them. If a civil officer was to be appointed, a large douceur must first be given to Buhadur Mul. The officers of the state were supported by him in every kind of malversation, upon an understanding that they were to take no notice of his own peculations; and last of all, to support this lucrative traffic, and this preponderating influence, he took care to keep the Raj Rana in arrears to himself by continual advances, and

by an accumulation of profit and interest. In short, the state of affairs had become as bad at Kotah, as it ever was at Oudeepore and Boondee. But this is not all. Having no interest in the state, except so far as he could turn it to his individual profit, Buhadur Mul prevailed upon the Raj Rana to have recourse to a measure, which though common in most other native states, had never been resorted to at Kotah, during the whole of the long administration of Zalim Singh, nor upon any former occasion by his successor the present administrator. The person who had charge of this department was a creature of his own, and Buhadur Mul himself fixed upon the people from whom the fines were to be levied, and settled their amount. The natural consequence of this was, that he received on his own account large sums of money in consideration of a lenient assessment, or to let off part of what had been already assessed; and when the Raj Rana, soon after my arrival at Kotah, came to take an account of what he had realized from their oppressive exactions, he was astonished at the smallness of the amount, and bitterly repented that he had ruined his reputation as a mild and considerate ruler, for so small a consideration. Buhadur Mul had given the Raj Rana to understand, that these exactions would enable him to pay off his debt. But the truth is, that the real power of the state was vested in Buhadur Mul, and the Raj Rana was only an instrument in his hands. The Raj Rana is of a kind, timid disposition, and he would never have had recourse to such atrocious proceedings, if he had not been under the control of an ascendant influence. This was the state of affairs at Kotah, in April, 1830. All the real objects of Government had been lost sight of, and it had been converted into a source of profit in the hands of a banker. The people were subject to the most grinding and oppressive exactions, and the evil was becoming every day more inveterate, as the Raj Rana became more involved with Buhadur Mul, and consequently more a cypher in his hands."

The Raj Rana, on being urged by the political agent to reduce his disbursements within the limits of his receipts, said that both receipts and disbursements were in the hands of Buhadur Mul, and whatever effort was made to reduce the one and increase the other, he always found that at the end of the year, from the accumulation of interest and profit which Buhadur Mul continued to heap upon him, he was more involved than ever.

If ever there was an occasion in which it was allowable for a political agent to interfere, to save the native state from the evils which our opium monopoly and our friend the banker had brought on it, the occasion had arrived at Kotah, and Mr. Trevelyan did interfere effectually. The revenue of a tract of country, which it was calculated would in five or six years pay off the debts of the state, was set aside for that purpose. All further dealings with Buhadur Mul ceased. The Raj Rana gave orders for the recal of the persons who had been deputed to collect the additional cess and fines, and that the measure should be discontinued.

There is not perhaps in the whole range of our political transactions in India, any thing more remarkable than the rise of a person from the condition of an agent of a banking establishment at Jeypore, to become, in the course of ten or twelve years, the instrument of governing three of the principal states in Rajpootana. In all of them his measures were nearly the same, attended with consequences equally baneful to the people and the reputation of our officers and Government. It is remarkable enough that in 1823, a banker was recommended on some account to the notice of the Raj Rana Zalim Singh, by the political agent at Kotah. That old and crafty politician immediately saw the danger of encouraging, at Kotah, an influence which had been so conspicuous at Oudeepore, received the banker badly, and hinted at expelling from his dominions a person who needed the introduction of a foreign party. The political agent, who did not understand the object of either the banker or the governor, was astonished at this uncourteous reception of the person who was the bearer of a letter from him to Zalim Singh, and made his ingratitude the subject of a dispatch to Government.

There is nothing that more requires discretion on the part of our political officers than their dealings with money-lenders, or the countenance or support of such characters at native courts. They never fail to take advantage of it, and to turn it to the worst of purposes. The monied interests of India do not in their fair dealings need our support; for they are generally sufficiently powerful, and exercise without it, for good or for evil, as great an influence over the Governments of India, as in any other part of the world.

Wherever in addition to its own natural influence, this predominant power has had the support of our Government or officers, whether in the Carnatic, at Hyderabad, Aurungabad, Baroda, or in Rajpootana, it has been exercised in a manner most injurious to the native Government and its subjects: and to the reputation of our Government and its officers. We cannot touch this influence without the danger of being defiled. We may support a bad minister, and have often done so for political advantages to ourselves. But we cannot support the usurious and grasping speculations of the loan contractors of India, without raising them into political influence, and without gaining the reputation of being ourselves governed by sordid and unworthy motives.

7. Ulwur and Machery.—This principality is generally understood to be composed of usurpations from Jeypore, conquests from Bhurtpore. and cessions from the British Government. Ulwur having been usurped from the former some fifty or sixty years ago; Machery conquered from the latter at a later period. These two possessions amount to about nine lakhs a year. Tijara and other pergunnahs were ceded to Ulwur by the British Government at the termination of the first Mahratta war, and yield a like sum.

Ahmed Buksh Khan, since better known as the chief of Ferozepore, joined the army of Lord Lake as the Wukeel of the Rao

Raja, on its first appearance in that quarter, "and is now by the bounty of the British Government the independent lord of a considerable territory." He has since exercised great influence in the affairs of Ulwur, as will hereafter appear.

The first and only treaty with Ulwur is dated the 14th of November, 1803. Although differing in some respects from those of a later period, it is not so much so as to exclude that state from taking its place amongst this class of treaties. It is offensive and defensive. The state is not subject to tribute: independent in its internal administration: and its troops are to aid those of the British Government.

Being in a comparatively inferior condition to either the principalities of Jeypore or Bhurtpore, the Rao Raja clung for support to the British Government, when the friendship of the former state became doubtful, and the latter was our enemy.

In 1812, the Rao Raja, in continuance of his former system of usurpation, got possession of two forts and the territory subordinate to them, belonging to Jeypore. He resisted through that and the following year all the persuasions of the resident at Dehlee to relinquish those possessions. He was told that his conduct was in violation of the terms of his engagements with us, and that it would be sure to bring down upon him the displeasure of the British Government. He had however so long remained in security, that he had forgotten the danger of involving himself with his neighbours, and thought the British Government would not arm against him in support of the interests of Jeypore. He was, too, supposed to have collected a treasure of nearly half a million stirling. It became a question whether in this state of affairs, we should withdraw from the terms of our alliance with the Rao Raja, and allow Jeypore to avenge its own wrongs, bringing on Ulwur all the evils of an invasion from the forces of that state, those of Ameer Khan, Mahommed Shah Khan, and other leaders of predatory bands, which swarmed in its neighbourhood; or whether we should ourselves assemble an army to punish the Rao Raja. In the latter case, it was proposed to direct the army on his capital, and if necessary, to subvert the Government. The latter measure was eventually adopted, and although the army was assembled at Rewaree, in the immediate neighbourhood of Ulwur, the Rao Raja allowed our military preparations to proceed, and the force to advance to within a march of his capital, before he agreed to the terms required of him, which were only the restoration of the places usurped from his neighbour, our ally, and the payment of our expences.

In 1815, the Rao Raja died, and a difference arose as to the succession; one party in the state supporting the pretensions of a nephew, and another those of an illegitimate son: eventually the parties came to a compromise by deciding, that the nephew should be raised to the dignity of Rao Raja, the son possessing the power and resources of the state. The nephew was then nine, and the

son eight years of age; and it is probable that their friends did not calculate on both ever attaining years of maturity, when so preposterous an arrangement could not last. Nawab Ahmed Buksh Khan was left the guardian of the illegitimate son, and produced some papers by which it appeared that a general superintendance over the affairs of the principality had been entrusted to him by his friend the Rao Raja.

In the exercise of these powers, Ahmed Buksh Khan rendered himself obnoxious to the nephew and his adherents, and his assassination having been attempted in 1824, when he was dangerously wounded, whilst on a visit to the resident at Dehlee, and living near his country residence at that city, and consequently within the British territory, suspicion immediately fixed on the Ulwur party.

The measure had here, as in some other places, been resorted to of requiring the removal from the Rao Raja's (the nephew's) presence and council of certain obnoxious persons, who were supposed to be evil counsellors; and as Ahmed Buksh Khan was the friend and guest of the resident, he was naturally enough supposed to influence this measure. It was these persons who were now charged with instigating his assassination.

The assassin having been apprehended, and there being sufficient evidence to implicate certain persons at the court of Ulwur of instigating the assassination, the Ulwur Government was required by the resident to send those persons for trial to Dehlee, which summons that Government continued to resist, and eventually the measure of the resident was deemed objectionable by his own Government.

It was not until after the fall of Bhurtpore and the advance of the army under the Commander-in-Chief towards Ulwur, that the suspected persons were sent to camp.

On the proceedings in a formal inquiry held by the resident at Dehlee, it was declared by Government, "that whilst sufficient evidence is not forthcoming to convict any of the accused, and to warrant our demanding their punishment, very strong suspicion of guilt continues to attach to the two principals, Mulla and Nund Lal, and their supposed accomplices, Jehoz and Khooshal." "The Governor General in Council trusts that Rao Raja Benne Singh will not for his own credit and that of his Government deem it fitting to employ hereafter, in any public capacity, persons who have rendered themselves justly obnoxious to the suspicion of so foul a crime as that of incitement to assassination."

A provision was forced on the Ulwur Government for the illegitimate son, and his heirs in perpetuity, but not to descend to adopted children, and failing heirs, to revert to the state, being an equivalent, half in territory and half in money, to the amount of four lakhs of rupees per annum, for a portion of those districts formerly granted to his father by the British Government.

The Rao Raja continued to employ the obnoxious persons in the highest offices of the state. In 1826, the resident at Dehlee

declined on this account to visit the Rao Raja of Ulwur, as he had done the other chiefs of Rajpootana, and in the following year the Governor General would not receive a deputation from that principality on that account.

The British Government was very unnecessarily drawn into this most unsatisfactory affair. It had nothing to do with the preposterous arrangement of 1815, although it is probable that the son's adherents made very undue use of the influence which they were unjustly believed to possess, to bring about that arrangement. It was impossible that the illegitimate son should have become Rao Raja, and it would have required more influence than the Mahommedan party at Ulwur should have expected to be able to exercise, to maintain him in the position of administrator, in opposition to the legitimate prince and the chiefs of the state. The power of this foreign party at Ulwur, throughout this proceeding, is therefore not a little remarkable. It was exercised for a period of years, and arose entirely from the influence which that party was supposed to possess at the Dehlee residency, or at the presidency, without its really having such influence, or without the authorities of our Government knowing that it professed to possess it. Yet that influence must have been very great, else the chiefs of Ulwur could have had no difficulty in setting aside the illegitimate son of the Rao Raja, who in reality was entitled to nothing beyond a subsistence. The attempt to assassinate his guardian friend, for the part which he aspired to exercise in the internal affairs of the state, was sufficiently infamous, and seems to belong to a former period, but the instigators of the attempt unfortunately escaped with impunity.

The Rao Raja, in the beginning of 1828, afforded such explanation with respect to the non-employment of the obnoxious persons, as induced the Governor General to renew with him the usual complimentary correspondence. Whilst residing at Dehlee the odious favorite of the Rao Raja, Mulla Khowas, was seized by the resident, and sent in March, 1828, a state prisoner to the Fort of Hansi, apparently more to put an end to the communication which he was holding by letter with his master, than for any other purpose. The measure was of course disapproved by Government, and his release ordered. He proceeded to Ulwur, and towards the end of the year, the chiefs of the state combined to put an end to the system of favoritism. Mulla lost his life, and that legitimate power was asserted for the correction of abuses in the Government, which, although more sanguinary in India than in most other countries, is not on that account the less efficacious.

In 1831, a negotiation was discovered between the courts of Ulwur and Jeypore, originating with the former, the object of which was to obtain a dress of investiture from the latter, in recognition of that fealty which it had formerly acknowledged, and for which it was prepared to pay a considerable sum of money. The thing, although in breach of engagements with us, was considered

unimportant. But it is remarkable, that a state, independent through its relations with us, of all others, should voluntarily do homage to a neighbour but little superior to itself.

An aggravated case of border dispute, between Ulwur and the territory of Ferozepore, in which the former failed to afford that redress to the latter which was decided by the British Government to be due to it, led to the imposing of a fine as indemnity : and to the threat of employing a detachment of British troops to enforce the decision, should redress be further withheld, which of course produced the desired effect.

8. BEEKANEER is a junior branch of the Joudpore house. Our first treaty with this small state is dated the 9th of March, 1818, and is the same in substance as the other treaties of this period, and region. It had ten years before applied for our assistance, when its territories were invaded by Joudpore and other states, as a punishment for the interference of its chief in the dispute between Joudpore and Oudeepore, in their contest for the hand of a daughter of the latter house. At that period its revenues were estimated at only five lakhs of rupees, but its military establishments, which are maintained chiefly by assignments on land, consisted of 2,000 horse, 8,000 foot, with thirty-five pieces of artillery.

No tribute had been paid by this state to the Mahrattas, nor was any required by us. Its position on the verge of the desert, and the nature of its soil and produce, were sufficient protection against the incursions of even Mahratta Cavalry ; for water is 2 or 300 feet below the surface. The principal obligations imposed on it were those of rendering secure the roads through its dominions for merchandize passing from Caubul and Khorasan to India, and the restoration of plundered property ; both of which obligations have been faithfully fulfilled.

Those incurred by the British Government, besides what were in common to all other states, were to reduce to subjection the Thakoors and other inhabitants of the principality, who had revolted and thrown off the Raja's authority, he paying the expense of the force thus employed. A detachment of troops was accordingly employed for this purpose, in the end of the same year, under the command of Brigadier Arnold, and the Raja's authority was established throughout his dominions. No opposition was offered to our troops, but some difficulty was experienced from the scarcity of water. It was soon found necessary to send back the Cavalry. The water which the inhabitants collect in reservoirs for the consumption of the year, was very soon exhausted by our troops, and they were left without their usual supply.

From the situation of Beekaneer, we seem to have been less led into discussions of any kind with that state, than with almost any other state under our protection. Boundary disputes between the officers of the British Government in the Hissar district, and those of our friend of Beekaneer, were the only cases into which we were led.

There had for some years been a disposition on the part of some of the subjects of Beekaneer to appeal to the political agent at Ajmere, against some exactions or intended exactions on the part of the Raja; and their appeal was in some degree attended to. At last, in 1827, the Raja invited the political agent to proceed to his capital, apparently for the purpose of inquiring into the nature of these demands; a compliance with which request was of course foreign to the nature of our policy at that period.

In 1828, a settlement of long existing boundary differences between the Beekaneer and the British territory was effected, after a long and patient investigation into the nature of the claims, by an officer deputed for the purpose from Dehlee, met by commissioners on the part of the Beekaneer Government. In the same year the Raja died, and was succeeded by his son Kour Ruttun Singh.

In consequence of some attack made by persons from Jessulmere on the Beekaneer territory, in revenge of former injuries, or supposed injuries sustained by the latter, through subjects or servants of the former, the Beekaneer Government, assisted by the chief of Pokurn, a feudatory of Joudpore, proceeded, in 1829, to invade the territory of Jessulmere, and carried its operations to the gates of his capital. This was in breach of treaty with the British Government, and their military operations were calculated to involve the peace of Rajpootana. Jessulmere prepared an army to resent the injury, and the armies of Joudpore and Jeypore assembled on their respective frontiers; whilst the belligerent powers were drawing reinforcements of men from Scind and Bahawulpore, and engaging the several states in their cause. The British Government, to stay further proceedings, required the Jessulmere state to make reparation for the injury done in the first instance to its neighbour, and Beekaneer to repair to Jessulmere the injury inflicted during the war. We were saved the necessity of entering on a mediation of their differences by the Maha Rana of Oudeepore, who was brother-in-law to both parties, and who undertook the office. It appeared, in the course of the discussion, that the Beekaneer Raja had intimated to the British authorities his intention to take into his own hands the punishment of the Jessulmere aggressions on his territory; and he afterwards stated, "Had I received a prohibitory reply, the troops had not been sent to Jessulmere, but now you write that it is contrary to treaty."

The seventh article of the treaty with Beekaneer stipulates:

"The British Government, on the application of the Maha Raja, will reduce to subjection the Thakoors and other inhabitants of his principality, who have revolted and thrown off his authority."

A misapprehension of the obligations thus incurred led the officiating resident at Dehlee, in the end of 1830, to order a brigade of our troops to support from Nusseerabad, the authority of the Maha Raja against some revolted Thakoors. The principal of them, Byre Saul, had found refuge in Bahawulpore. The resident required the Nawab to seize the offender and send him back to

Beekaneer. The latter of course objected; stating that it was altogether unusual between him and his neighbour of Beekaneer to expect from one another the surrender of fugitive criminals:—but that in consideration of the shocking atrocities attributed to Byre Saul, he had expelled that offender from his dominions. The chiefs of Jeypore, Joudpore, and Jessulmere were suspected of either aiding or designing to aid the Beekaneer rebels, and were required by the resident to desist from this course.

Some delay occurred in the march of the troops, at so late a period of the season, into so inhospitable a region; but considerable expenditure was involved in the resident's resolution, who was reminded that it had been laid down as a principle of action by the authorities in England, that the military aid of the British Government shall never be afforded to a native state in alliance with us, for the suppression of insurrections, or for internal purposes of any kind, except under the specific authority of the Government. On the present occasion, the Governor General saw no occasion for any British troops to move from either Nusseerabad or Neemuch.

The merits of the dispute between the prince of Beekaneer and his nobles was either not sufficiently understood or not reported. The officiating resident considered that the simple measure of preparing our troops to march, to espouse the cause of the former, was productive of good in driving the revolted nobles either to fly the country or to return to their allegiance.

On the visit of the Governor General to Rajpootana, Beekaneer, with other states, gave in a statement of its demands, either against us or others. But like those of the other states, it contained nothing requiring our interposition, further than the adjustment of boundary differences, and questions of trifling aggression, which, from the absence of any general controlling authority in Rajpootana, had too long remained unnoticed and unadjusted. These will readily yield to the exercise of judicious authority, by the political agent who has now been established at the central position of Ajmere: he will immediately know of the aggression of any one state on its neighbour, and possesses power either to prevent such aggressions, or to compel those guilty of them to afford timely redress. The conditions by which these states are bound to abstain from political relations with one another, may be supposed to render such differences of more frequent occurrence, and of more difficult adjustment to them and to us, than if they maintained their original relations uncontrolled. It should perhaps be the object of our Government to encourage the adjustment of such differences, either by themselves or through the arbitration of some friendly neighbouring state—there is no danger that such intercourse would lead to combination against us. There is at present no object for such combination, nor is there any united interest amongst them which would lead to it. When the time for it arrives we shall very soon discover that their treaties with us will be a very slender bar to the

fulfilment of their purposes, and that all the measures which we can adopt will be inffectual towards preventing their holding clandestine negotiation with one another.

In July, 1832, the political agent reported that the chief of Beekaneer had, during the past year, paid very little attention to the advice of the resident at Dehlee. That he had not deputed an agent to Ajmere, although he talked of complying with the Governor General's wishes for so doing, but on that point showed an evident reluctance. His dissatisfaction arose apparently from an objection taken by the British Government to his assuming a title which he had obtained through his Wukeel at Dehlee from the King, without having the sanction of the British Government for entering on the negotiation with His Majesty.

9. JESSULMERE.—Our first treaty with this state is dated the 12th of December, 1818. It had paid no tribute to the Mahrattas, from whose encroachment its desert position was its protection; nor did we require any. The treaty provides, that the posterity of the Maha Rawul shall succeed to the principality; and that in case of serious invasion, directed to the overthrow of the principality, or other danger of great magnitude, the British Government will exert its power for the protection of the state, provided that the cause of the quarrel be not ascribed to the Rawul. He is always to act in subordinate co-operation with the British Government, and with submission to its supremacy.

In 1820, Jessulmere was described by the political agent to be groaning under the oppression of the minister, Salim Singh Mehta, whose atrocities were unparalleled—the father and grand-father of the present prince had been put to death by him, and the city was depopulated through his cruelty and oppression. The commerce of the country beyond the Indus was described as being interrupted, because the caravans were plundered in the Jessulmere country, in the plunder of which the minister participated, the Maha Rawul being a mere puppet in the hands of the minister.

In 1821, the Maldotes, a tribe of desert plunderers, subject to Jessulmere, made an incursion into Beekaneer, to revenge which, the army of the latter state was sent to invade the territory of the former, and a civil war was likely to arise between the two countries; the Khosas, another tribe of professional plunderers subject chiefly to Joudpore, having been dismissed by that state and Jessulmere, joined and strengthened the Maldotes, who were accustomed to commit depredations in Bahawulpore, Joudpore, and Beekaneer.

Up to 1823, the Rawul continued to urge his claims to certain territory in the possession of other chiefs, and proposed a visit to Calcutta, for the purpose of urging those claims. He was then distinctly informed, that it was impossible consistently with the engagement subsisting with other states, to attend to his claims to territories in their possession.

In 1824, an attempt was made to assassinate the minister Salim Singh, who was so strongly persuaded that the assassin was insti-

gated by his sovereign, that he sent his family to the fort of Kishengurh, his Jageer. Both the Rawul and the Ranee failed to satisfy his mind that they were innocent of instigating the attempt on his life. But his apprehensions were only allayed by the intervention of some Charuns, who became security for the safety of himself and his family.

On the death of the minister, in the same year, his eldest son was appointed to the vacant office, in conjunction with a younger son, by a different mother, the favorite wife of the late minister. The eldest son discovering or pretending to discover a criminal connexion between the widow and her confidential servant, put both to death; on which account he was placed in confinement by his Prince. The chiefs of the state, and even the Prince's body-guard, were disposed to support the elder son of the late minister, whom they soon expected to see in place and power; they believed too that this hereditary succession would have the support of the British Government. In this state of things, the Rawul appealed to our authority, and an agent was deputed to Jessulmere. When it was discovered at court that we did not mean to interfere with the legitimate authority of the Prince, in the appointment or punishment of his minister, all parties returned to their allegiance, and the power of the Prince was then found to be sufficient for the ordinary administration of his affairs.

He was in his 23rd year, and assumed the personal administration. His measures were of that just and conciliatory nature as to render him popular with his people. This did not fail to excite the apprehension and counteraction of the nobles, who in this, as the other states of Rajpootana, are feudatory; and whose power depends on the weakness of their sovereign. That struggle accordingly arose between them which we have so often seen maintained for similar purposes in higher places.

In 1826, the Rawul represented, that he sustained a loss in his transit duties through our opium arrangements, and expected to be indemnified in the same manner as Oudeepore and Kotah had been. He was told however that the compensation paid to those states was in exchange for advantages yielded by them to us with detriment to themselves. That he had not ceded any advantages to us, nor deprived himself of any within his power; that our opium monopoly could have no result beyond the effect which arrangements in one country may often produce in another, by shutting up the channels of trade; and that our opium monopoly arrangements were not enforced in any state of Rajpootana, with the exception of those with which we have treaties on that subject.

The invasion of the territories of Jessulmere, in 1829, by the army of Beekaneer, in violation of the treaty with us, has already been described in the sketch on our political relations with that state

In 1832, the Rawul renewed his complaints of aggressions on the part of his neighbour of Beekaneer, and in handing up the representation to Government, the agent observed, that the Beekaneer chief

seemed entirely to have forgotten the obligation under which he was to abstain from plundering or molesting his neighbours, and to cause the restoration of plundered property.

10. KISHENGURH is a branch from the Joudpore principality. The treaty with Kishengurh is dated the 20th of March, 1818, and does not differ in any thing from other treaties of the same period. It pays no tribute to the British Government.

Maha Raja Kullian Singh of Kishengurh, whose eccentricities have often led to the belief that he is not of sane mind, left his capital in 1825, and came to Dehlee, apparently for the purpose of representing to the resident his fears lest the political authorities of the British Government should meddle with his internal administration. He was easily convinced that there was no such intention, and returned to his capital. He had at this time most probably some intention of making certain encroachments on the privileges of the chiefs of his country, for shortly after he sent troops to attack the possessions of two of the principal of them, proceeding at the time of the conflict himself to Dehlee. The chiefs were as usual believed to be supported in their opposition to their Prince by the Jeypore or Joudpore Rajas, or the feudatories of those states. The effects of the war were soon felt in the neighbouring district of Ajmere, where either or both parties committed depredations, and the Maha Raja was told that the British Government would look to him, for the conduct, not only of his own troops but the troops of his chiefs, he being alike answerable for all.

The Maha Raja returned from Dehlee with certain raw levies, assembled the other chiefs of the state, and made some marches towards the seat of war. But he soon found that it was not the interest of his nobles to assist him in his encroachments on those of their order; they accordingly deserted his cause, and endeavoured to take possession of his own capital for the avowed purpose of deposing him, and setting up his infant son. The Raja fled to Ajmere, referred his differences with his chiefs to the arbitration of the British Government, and offered the farm of his country for 12 years. Previously to entering on this contest himself, the Maha Raja had appealed to his brother-in-law of Boondee, as one of the rebellious chiefs had, to his relation the chief of Kotah, for aid, which was in violation of the terms of his treaty with the British Government.

The chiefs of Kishengurh also proceeded to Ajmere, and all parties were agreed to leave the adjustment of their differences to the Joudpore Raja, provided that his decision received the guarantee of the British Government, which was refused. The Jageerdars agreed on the restitution of their own rights to march against the two principal chiefs who had first taken up arms, if those chiefs refused to perform the usual duties which devolved on them from time immemorial. The principal objection of all the feudatories seemed to be the Raja's wish to effect a commutation of personal services for a money payment, which money payment they very well understood

would strengthen the Prince's means of arming against them, whilst it would have the effect of disarming themselves. The chiefs proceeded to take possession of the principal places of the Kishengurh state in the name of the son and heir-apparent without committing any excesses; but travellers and merchandise fared otherwise, and the communications through this principality were entirely cut off. It became evident that the Raja either had not the disposition or the means to settle these differences, and it was considered inexpedient that he should any longer remain at Ajmere in the immediate vicinity of his own disturbed country. On his failing to come to a settlement with his chiefs, he was to be informed that it was desirable that he should remove to a greater distance from the scene of contest, or on his failing to do so, the political agent at Ajmere was to cease to hold any further communication with him except on the terms of mediation before authorized.

After the chiefs of the Kishengurh principality had laid siege to the capital, and it was in danger of falling into their hands, the Prince thought it high time to come to terms with them; and the terms entered into by the parties are remarkable, as showing the position in which these Rajpoot feudatories stand towards their sovereign.

1. Whenever the Maha Raja shall restore us, as heretofore, to the forts and cities, we will desist from the siege of Kishengurh, and restore to the Maha Raja all places seized and now held by us.

2. Whenever we may be restored to our rights and privileges, as handed down to us, or settled by Mr. Cavendish, we will protect the principality from all internal and foreign enemies, in due obedience to the Maha Raja's orders.

3. Whatever crown villages, lands, &c. may be now held by us, or by all persons acting in concert with us, we agree to restore and cause to be restored to the Maha Raja.

11. To be obedient and faithful, and to serve whenever directed, as in times past, on receiving the usual additional pay.

13. No one to enter the city or fort of Kishengurh until permited by the Maha Raja, on condition that he neither destroys their houses nor possessions.

14. No one to interfere in the expenditure of the Maha Raja.

16. Binds them to carry into execution the orders of the Maha Raja when consulted, as heretofore, according to the customs of the Jeypore, Joudpore and Kishengurh courts.

1. The Maha Raja binds himself to permit the Jageerdars and Rajpoots to reside, as heretofore in the cities and forts, with the exception of the town and fort of Kishengurh.

2. The Maha Raja neither to resume, distrain, destroy, nor give away their houses and possessions.

3. The Maha Raja to discharge all his foreign troops, excepting nine hundred.

4. The Maha Raja to pardon all concerned in the late disturbances.

6. The Maha Raja to consult on state affairs, as heretofore, the four counsellors called *Misl*, as is the custom at the Jeypore, Joudpore, and Oudeepore courts.

Shortly after the settlement of these terms, the Raja left Kishengurh. He was urged to return to his own principality, and it was resolved, if he did not do so, to consider the authorities exercising the functions of Government at Kishengurh as the Regency, the principal of whom was understood to be the Ranee Mother of the Raja.

The Raja did return to Kishengurh, but never came to any cordial understanding with the chiefs of the state, and eventually in May, 1832, abdicated in favor of his son, and retired to the British territories, at a distance from Kishengurh, on the small allowance of thirty-six thousand rupees per annum.

11. Banswara.—In 1812, the Rawul of this principality sent an agent to Baroda with the draft of a treaty. He engaged to pay six annas per rupee, for the aid of the British Government, to expel from his territories the armies of Scindia, Holkar, and the Powar. The resident at Baroda referred the envoy to Dehlee for the negotiation of these terms. He was accordingly accredited to Dehlee by his master, and five years afterwards, on the same credentials, concluded a treaty there, which was afterwards ratified by his principal.

In November, 1818, the Rawul denied his obligations to abide by these terms, and although they were at the time declared to be binding on him, it was deemed best to negotiate a new treaty, which was accordingly done on the 25th of December, 1818.

He agrees to pay the tribute formerly levied by the Dhar Government from him, with arrears. He further agrees to pay whatever tribute the British Government may deem adequate to cover the expense, which it incurs in his protection, provided that does not exceed three-eighths of the revenue of the country. This treaty differs from most others of that period in this, that we agree to afford the Maha Rawul aid in bringing his connexions or relations who may prove disobedient under control.

In 1819, all demands for arrears of tribute on Banswara were limited to 35,000 rupees. The tribute of the first year was fixed at 7,000, the second at 20,000, the third at 25,000. The revenues of the state were described to be only one lakh; those of the nobles a like sum.

In 1825, the revenue had reached 300,000, and, as described by the political agent, would have been much greater, but for the vices and misconduct of the Rawul and his favorite minister, whose proceedings had been generally very unsatisfactory, "marked not only by much inattention to the admonitions of superior authority, but by neglect of the best interests of their country." The political agent found it difficult to say, whether Prince or minister was most unworthy. The tribute paid to us, in 1824, was 33,000 rupees; that fixed for 1825, 34,000; and for 1826, 35,000, which was the amount paid

to the Mahrattas in the days of Banswara's prosperity. No increase was to take place till 1832, when our six annas claim was to commence. This territory has enjoyed much internal tranquillity since the suppression in 1824 of the tribes of Bheels and other plunderers, who infested the country from the heights of Rangah. The tributary Thakoors are 33 in number, and their forces, with those of the state, 300 horse and 1000 foot.

In 1829, the political agent, Captain Spears, proceeded to Banswara, and whilst there, in pursuance of the orders of Government, discharged the police posts which had been established in that country. The Jumadar of these posts was found to have exercised the same sort of authority as persons similarly situated did lately in Chota Nagpore. He received a yearly salary of 250 rupees from the Raja, and held a village worth 250 or 300 rupees a year in Jageer, and is described by one of our ablest residents to have been in "a state little inferior to that of the ruler of Banswara." These advantages naturally terminated with his loss of office. He incessantly importuned Captain Spears to intercede with the Raja in his behalf, and Captain Spears' resolution not to interfere determined this wretch to poison that officer, in the hope, that his successor might be more compliant. Poison was accordingly administered by a Mahomedan servant of the Brahmin Jumadar, from the effects of which Captain Spears died. There was no doubt of their guilt, though the evidence was only circumstantial; and both were sentenced to transportation for life, but the principal unfortunately escaped on his way to Bombay.

In 1831, the tribute was again fixed for a period of five years, at 25,000 rupees, which is much less than the three-eighth share, to which the British Government is entitled, would give.

12. PURTABGURH is a junior branch of the Oudeepore house. It pays a tribute of 72,700 rupees. The treaty with this state differs from all others of the same class in the stipulation, by which the British Government agrees to aid the Raja in all his just demands on his own subjects, should he not be able to enforce them. It is dated the 5th of October, 1818.

Kour Deep Singh, the son of the Raja of Purtabgurh, to whom the administration of affairs in that principality had been entrusted by his father, having put certain persons who were obnoxious to him to death, his removal from office and banishment to a place called Deolah were insisted on by the British Government. The Prince showed great reluctance to comply with this sentence against his son, but found that there was no resisting the supreme mandate, and the Kour was banished accordingly,

After remaining there some months, the Kour returned to the capital in November, 1823. The Raja was then informed by the resident "that the very existence of Purtabgurh as a separate state, and the perpetuity of its continuance under your authority and that of your grand-son, depend upon how you act on the present occa-

sion. If you do not take a decided part, and put Kour Deep Singh under restraint, your state is at an end."

The father either had not the inclination or the power to send his son from the capital, in the manner prescribed by the political authority. A palankeen was considered a safer and a more suitable conveyance for a person under sentence of banishment than a horse. But the Kour would not condescend to go in a palankeen, and commenced his journey on foot. Some threatening appearances rendered it necessary to employ a detachment of British troops as his escort to the Fort of Kernora, where he was lodged, and left under a guard from the detachment which escorted him there.

The Raja of Purtabgurh, Sawunt Singh, had twenty years before abdicated in favor of Kour Deep Singh, as he stated, from an apprehension, in retaining power, his life was endangered, from the ambition and violence of his son. He now resumed authority, and desired that the claim of his son, as his successor, might be considered to be set aside in favor of his grand-son.

In 1826, the old Raja of Purtabgurh drew up a petition, praying that his son should be released from confinement, pledging himself and the other members of his family for the Kour's future good conduct, and offering on his own and their part to relinquish their claim to their possessions, if this pledge was not fulfilled. It was evident that the Kour was considered by the whole principality to be held in confinement by the British Government, and not in conformity with the wish of his Prince or the voice of the people. Kour Deep Singh died in confinement on the 21st of May, 1826, attended however in his last illness by the members of his family, and after his release had been determined on by the political authorities in Malwa.

In 1825, the political agent reported that " the territory of the Raja of Purtabgurh was in the enjoyment of uninterrupted and increasing prosperity, The Bheels and Meenas are settled or subdued."

In 1817 and 1818, the revenues, including the lands of Thakoors and Jageerdars, were 2,42,215 rupees; their increase was progressive, particularly after the confinement of Kour Deep Singh, until in 1825, they amounted to 500,000 rupees. The tributary Thakoors and Rajpoot chiefs amounted to 44, and their and the Raja's forces to 146 horse and 600 foot.

In 1829, the affairs of Purtabgurh had fallen into disorder, and from the infirm condition of the Raja, there was little prospect of improvement. The disorderly habits of the Bheels and other predatory tribes were calculated to disturb the tranquillity of neighbouring states, which would render it necessary for the political agent, in concert with the Raja, to adopt some measures for the correction of the evil.

The political agent apprehended 83 persons belonging to a gang of Thugs on their route from Guzerat to Hindoostan, who as usual,

had committed some atrocious murders, and this was one of the first effectual measures taken against those dreadful murderers. He also reported that two successful attempts had been made by parties of 3 or 400 armed men to smuggle opium. They were encountered by a detachment of the Jowra Contingent, and several lives were lost on the part of the smugglers, whilst several of the Contingent were wounded.

13. DONGERPORE.—The chief of this state claims to be a senior branch of the Oudeepore house. The treaty with it is dated the 11th of December, 1818. It is tributary to the British Government, the tribute to increase with increasing prosperity ; but never to exceed three-eighths of the actual revenue. We agree to afford the Maha Rawul aid in bringing his connexions under due control.

The political relations with the three small states of Dongerpore, Banswara, and Purtabgurh, the two former belonging to the district of Bangur, the latter to that of Kuntul, have generally been conducted by an agent residing at Neemuch, under the control of the resident in Malwa.

From some old records of the Government obtained in 1819, the revenues of this state in the time of Rawul Sheo Singh were shown to be 502,128, and the political agent indulged in the hope that in five years they would again reach that sum, although when he was writing, they amounted to only rupees 92,187. In 1820, it was necessary to afford this state the aid of our troops to expel certain mercenaries from its territory.

In the end of the same year, the chief called to his aid, a party of Arabs and other foreigners, to assist in the expulsion of a minister who had our support. It was supposed as usual that this minister "had lost the favor of his Prince by becoming the instrument of that reform and improvement in the administration which we desired to introduce." The Prince was described as weak and profligate; the minister was considered wise and virtuous, and was accordingly to be supported in the most decided manner; for this purpose, two detachments of our troops were put in motion.

In 1824, it was deemed necessary to make a requisition for the aid of British troops to coerce certain chiefs of this state, who had called the neighbouring Bheels to assist in asserting their rights or pretended rights on their own Government. This demonstration was, however, sufficient to bring the chiefs to terms; they returned to their allegiance, and the troops to their quarters.

A rebel chief of Eeder had, in 1822, found refuge in the territory of Dongerpore and protection from its minister. On this and other accounts, the minister was removed from office. In the end of 1824, the same Eeder rebel escaped from confinement at Baroda, and was followed up by a detachment of Bombay troops, The Rawul of Dongerpore had espoused the cause of the late and deposed minister, in opposition to the minister then in power, who had our support. He was aided in this by some of the principal chiefs of the state and joined by the Eeder rebel, and further aided by

certain chiefs of Oudeepore. The Bombay detachment followed up the rebel of Eeder to this capital, and was joined by our friend the minister. The Rawul's party was however too strong to be attacked and the minister not being prepared to carry matters to such extremities as would have accorded with the views of the officer commanding the troops, persuaded him that the life of the Rawul depended on his forbearance, for that, if attacked, the Rawul would be put to death by his own party. Eventually the Rawul, the ex-minister, and the chiefs evacuated Dongerpore, and joined the political agent on his summons; and that officer and the resident in Malwa resolved between themselves that this attempt of the chief of Dongerpore, to assert his own authority in opposition to the order of things that they had established, should be resented by requiring him to renounce all interference in the conduct of affairs. That an ample allowance should be made from the revenues of the state, to support his personal and household expenses, and his dignity as Raja. That a minister should be appointed to conduct the affairs of the state in the Rawul's name, but under our control; and that whatever remained of the revenues of the state, after supplying their demands, should with our tribute, be appropriated to the support of a local force to be provided by us.

Government was not, however, prepared to go along with their political authorities in these extreme measures; the right of enforcing them, in conformity with treaty, was questioned, as was the expediency of the measures themselves, particularly the relinquishment of our tribute for the maintenance of a force whose services were not calculated to be of utility to us.

The tribute of Dongerpore is exactly the same as that of Banswara, which has been elsewhere described. The tributary chiefs holding lands on military tenure are only eight in number, and their forces, with those of the state, amount to 278 horse and 853 foot.

The political agent in Bangur and Kuntul observed, in 1825, "as the progress of improvement must frequently be expedited or impeded by the competency of the native rulers, it would perhaps promote the general interests to allow to the subjects of those states, when a degree of inefficiency prevailed, but not to such an extent as to demand further interposition, a right to appeal to the British agent, not in extreme cases alone, but, in all instances in which they might be aggrieved. This would not only ameliorate the condition of the cultivator, but it would tend to the personal improvement of the native governor by supplying a stimulus to his exertions,"

So little at that time and place were the rights of native governors, as guaranteed to them by treaty, considered, and so little was the effect of foreign interference on the character of native or other rulers understood.

In 1827, Kour Dulput Singh, who had been adopted out of the Purtabgurh family, and who had thereby become heir-apparent to the throne, was with the sanction of the Rawul, appointed Regent.

In 1829, the Regent came forward with several propositions. To be relieved from a demand on account of a police corps entertained by us, and from which he said the Dongerpore state derived no benefit. The object of this corps was partly that of keeping open the road between Malwa and Guzerat, the advantage of which to the native state was too indirect to be very apparent; and as it had no voice in the measure, the whole amount levied from it on this account, has this year (1832) been refunded, amounting to rupees 45,150; further, to receive compensation for loss of transit duties sustained through our opium arrangements.

In 1830, the assistant political agent from Guzerat moved with a detachment of British troops to assist the Regent of Dongerpore in bringing to subjection the Bheels and other plunderers inhabiting those tracts, and the service was effected without much difficulty. The political agent at Serowe and the assistant political agent in Guzerat recommended that a body of Regular Infantry should be stationed at or in the neighbourhood of Dongerpore, which measure was rejected by Government.

It appears that the resources of this small state have rather deteriorated under the administration of the Regent, and that the condition of the people cannot be considered to have improved. The Regent, not feeling quite firm in his seat, was restrained through the federal chiefs from adopting certain measures, which he considered would be beneficial to the general interests of the principality. He found too that the Rawul might turn round and join those chiefs as he had before done. Under these circumstances, he applied in 1831, with the sanction of the Rawul, for such assistance from the British Government as should enable him to curb the undue influence of those chiefs, and reduce them to their former condition of servants to the state. He was of course told that the British Government looked to the ruler of each independent state for adopting such measures as might be necessary to maintain his own power, and for the preservation of general tranquillity.

14. KEROWLEE.—The chief of this small Rajpoot state is of a family which formerly reigned at Biana before that place was conquered by the Jauts.

The treaty with Kerowlee is dated the 9th of November, 1817. The tribute which it formerly paid to the Mahrattas was gratuitously remitted. When the British Government was involved in the Burmese war, and Bhurtpore prepared for defence under the usurpation of Doorjun Saul, there was no doubt that Kerowlee sent troops to the aid of Bhurtpore, and assembled troops for its own defence on the fall of that fortress. Kerowlee made strong professions of attachment, and it was not deemed necessary to take any serious notice of its proceedings. Beyond the adjustment of some border differences between the states of Kerowlee and Jeypore, there seems to have been hardly any communication with the Raja of this small principality since the negotiation of the treaty.

15. SEROWE.—From the position of this principality, being on the line of communication between Rajpootana and Guzerat, rather than from any importance which belongs to itself, a treaty was concluded with it and ratified on the 31st of October, 1823, and a political agent has until lately been stationed at its capital.

The first establishment of a political agent at Serowe was unpalatable, both to the Joudpore Government and certain Thakoors of that state, to whom it was either tributary, or who themselves exercised an influence in its affairs. The Serowe chief did not relish some of our measures, and only returned to his capital in the end of 1825.

The Rao of Serowe had been deposed by his chiefs and people, for tyranny and oppression, before the negotiation of our treaty, the right of inheritance being however reserved for the offspring of the deposed chief. His younger brother Rao Sheo Singh was then the ruler.

From the turbulent nature of the inhabitants of this part of the country, who are chiefly Bheels and Meenas, it has on several occasions been necessary to call for military aid from the Bombay Government to support the Rao's authority, and to preserve tranquillity; at last, confidence seems to have been restored, and merchandise passes freely from the ports of Guzerat by this route to Pali and the northern markets.

The revenues of Serowe hardly amount to half a lakh of rupees, and the objects for which an agent was stationed there having been attained, he was recalled in the middle of 1832, and our political relations with this small state were placed under the agent at Neemuch. As at Oudeepore and Jeypore, the measure of recalling the political agent was disagreeble to Serowe, the chief of which petitioned hard, not only to have an agent permanently stationed at his capital, but also a detachment of regular troops. The measure will, however, as at the other places, in all probability prove eventually beneficial, by throwing the chief more on his own resources, and giving a more wholesome and national tone to his administration.

16. BHURTPORE is the only Jaut principality of any magnitude in India, and is perhaps the only Government which bears a truly national character, where a great proportion of the people belong to the same tribe with the princes and nobles of the state. Dholpore, Baree, and Bulemgurh, are also small Jaut possessions. Hatras is, or was, a Jaut Zemindaree, and the chiefs of Puttialah and others of the Phoolkea family belonging to the protected Sikh states, are converted Jauts. The tribe of Jauts are said to have migrated from the province of Multan early in last century, and to have settled in the Dooab as cultivators, from which condition they rose rapidly to notice as conquerors and founders of principalities. Sooruj Mul, the first acknowledged Jaut Raja of Bhurtpore, was killed in an engagement with Nujuf Khan near Dehlee, in 1763.

The first treaty of Bhurtpore with the British Government is dated the 14th of November, 1803: it is of offensive and defensive alliance: through it the Bhurtpore state escaped from the payment of tribute, and gained considerable acquisitions of territory, amounting to twenty pergunnahs; yet in the following year, it allowed the forces of Holkar, then our enemy, to encamp under the guns of its fortress of Deeg, which guns opened on our army in the battle that ensued with the troops of Holkar in that position. The town of Deeg was carried by assault and the citadel evacuated, its garrison retiring to Bhurtpore.

The story of the disastrous siege of that fortress, which followed, need not be here repeated.

On the termination of the war with Bhurtpore, the treaty of offensive and defensive alliance was renewed; that Government agreeing to pay twenty lakhs of rupees as indemnity for the expences of the war, and the British Government retaining possession of its fortress of Deeg, and holding one of the Raja's sons as a hostage, until satisfied of his better disposition. Bhurtpore for its treachery also lost a portion of the territory which had been conquered from Scindia in the war of 1803, and conferred on it. The new treaty is dated the 17th of April, 1805.

During the whole series of years, in which the neighbouring states were involved in one scene of ruin, through the rapacity and excesses of the Mahrattas, Bhurtpore and Ulwur were alone saved by the terms of their alliance with the British Government, and never was so much good so badly requited as by the former state.

In 1818, the resident at Dehlee observes, "still the comparison which the Raja could not avoid making between the prosperity and security of his country under our safeguard, and the ruin and wretchedness of neighbouring territories excluded from the same advantage, has not sufficed to excite his attachment or allay his hostile suspicions.

"But the greatest indulgence shewn to the Raja may be said to be, his having been allowed with impunity to exclude from his court British agents of every description, and successfully to resist the desire evinced to establish one near his person for purposes peculiarly friendly.

"His conduct in this particular, considering the relative situation of the parties, I suppose to be unexampled, either in Europe or Asia; yet it has not diminished the spirit of kindness and forbearance, with which the state of Bhurtpore has uniformly been treated.

"The only notice taken of the Raja's unfriendly conduct, on that occasion, consisted in directing the resident at Dehlee to exclude the Raja's agent from Dehlee, and in conformity to this order, there has not been any accredited agent from Bhurtpore stationed at Dehlee from that time."

Boundary disputes, and the question of granting protection to refugees from one state within the territories of another, continued

the only questions of any importance under discussion between the British and the Bhurtpore Government. In the former case, the Bhurtpore Government sent, in 1823, a battalion with some guns, to attack a village belonging to Nawab Ahmed Buksh Khan of Ferozepore, instead of submitting the question in dispute to the arbitration of the British Government, as bound by treaty to do.

Old Runjeet Singh, who was opposed to us in the defence of Bhurtpore, left four sons, and was succeeded by the eldest, Rundeer Singh, who died without issue. The succession was then claimed by Doorjun Saul, the son of Luchman Singh, the third son of old Runjeet, on the ground that he had been adopted by the late Raja Rundeer Singh, to the exclusion of his own brother Buldeo Singh.

Buldeo Singh, the second son, however, took his seat on the Musnud, on the 26th of February, 1824, in succession to his brother, without opposition, received the congratulations of the chiefs and ministers of the state, and a dress of investiture with a letter from the Governor General through the hands of a British officer, who was deputed by the resident of Dehlee, to be present at the ceremony.

In August, 1824, Maha Raja Buldeo Singh addressed a letter to Government, requesting for Bulwunt Singh, whom in one part of his letter he called his son and in another his nephew, a dress of investiture from the British Government, recognizing Bulwunt Singh as heir-apparent to the principality. Before authorizing that measure, Government called on the resident on the 1st of October, to report on the relationship in which Bulwunt Singh stood to the Raja, and the claims of the other members of the family to the succession.

In the end of 1824, the Bhurtpore Government required us to render up a lady, who had made her escape from the Raja's family, who was represented to be of infamous character, and who had found refuge within our territory. It was agreed to render up the lady to the Bhurtpore Government, "as her character and proceedings had been of a nature, which affected injuriously the Raja's honor, according to the native feelings and usages. The stipulation required in return will be a pledge that the Ranee's personal safety shall be secured, and that she shall experience no unnecessarily harsh and severe restraint or deprivation."

On the 26th of January, 1825, the resident at Dehlee reported to Government, that, in obedience to its commands, he was marching from Jeypore to Bhurtpore, to comply with the wishes of the chief of that principality, by acknowledging his son Bulwunt Singh as the heir-apparent. On the 16th of March, he forwarded letters from the young Raja, announcing the death of his father, and reported, at the same time, that attempts had been made to disturb the succession, but with what effect was not then known. The resident learnt on the same day, through a letter, from the judge and magistrate of Agra, that Doorjun Saul had, from the place of his confinement on the outside of the town, won over the principal portion of the

troops, blown open the gates of the fortress, and got possession of the person of his cousin, the young Raja, and the treasure of the state. Doorjun Saul stated his intention to be to displace Ram Ruttun, the brother of Ranee Imrut Kour, the widow of the late Raja, (who had adopted and was not the mother of his son Bulwunt Singh,) who was exercising the powers of Regent in the name of his sister in a manner distasteful to himself and the other chiefs of the state. Ram Ruttun was a foreigner, and Doorjun Saul declared that no foreigner ever had exercised or could in conformity with the usuages of the Bhurtpore principality, exercise jurisdiction there.

On the 18th, the resident required the officers commanding the neighbouring divisions of the army to put such portion of the troops as could be spared in march towards Bhurtpore, to support the succession of the Prince, whose title we had formally acknowledged.

On receiving intimation of the resident's measure of calling out troops to support the succession without its authority, and whilst engaged in a foreign war, the measure was disapproved by Government, and the troops were ordered back to their respective stations. Government did not acknowledge any obligation under which we were to support the succession of Bulwunt Singh to his father's throne. The recognition of the heir-apparent, during the life time of the reigning Raja, at his earnest solicitation, was not considered as binding on us to maintain him in the event of a disputed succession, as it might be in opposition to the wishes of the chiefs and people.

Doorjun Saul threw off the mask, and assumed the style and title, with the exercise of the authority, of the sovereign of Bhurtpore. A civil war very soon arose between him and his brother, Mehadoo Singh, who had co-operated with him in the first instance, in gaining possession of Bhurtpore, but who now took separate possession of Deeg, which he professed to hold on behalf of the young Raja whose subject he declared himself.

In the mean time, Doorjun Saul sought to strengthen his position by forming alliance with the chiefs of Lahore, Jeypore, Ulwur, &c.

It was eventually deemed necessary, that the British Government should arm in defence of the rights of Maha Raja Bulwunt Singh. Bhurtpore was carried by assault on the 18th of January, 1826, the rightful Prince restored to his throne, and the usurper sent a state prisoner to Allahabad.

Ranee Imrut Kour, the principal widow of the late Raja, and the ostensible mother of his son, [for the real mother was another and an inferior person,] was allowed to be the proper Regent during the minority. Two of the principal officers of the Bhurtpore state, Dewan Jowahir Lal and Foujdar Chooramun, were placed at the head of the ministry. After his first interview with the Regent, the political agent reports, " After a short pause, she informed me that she wished to continue Foujdar Chooramun in his present

office. She appeared unwilling to proceed, but named after another pause, and not without what appeared to be considerable reluctance, Dewan Jowahir Lal as his associate. She then proposed Govind Ram, Chooramun's nephew, as first Dewan, and expressed a strong desire to invest Lala Janee Buyjnauth, with the general superintendence of the whole affairs of the country. This high office he appeared anxious to decline, and requested he might be left out of the arrangement. In a private interview, the Regent informed the political agent, that she had many great objections to the character of Dewan Jowahir Lal, and did not like to continue him in his present employment under the Government. She spoke of his character during the entire period of our past disturbances, and assured me it was such as to disqualify him for any confidential employment under the state. She reverted to Lala Janee Buyjnauth, as a person whose long and faithful attachment to the family entitled him to some mark of consideration; she did not, however, name any particular office for him, but contented herself with speaking of him as qualified for any. Her obvious wish was to place him over them all.

The necessity for selecting Chooramun and Jowahir Lal was unfortunate, from the position in which they stood, both with respect to us, and in the estimation of the public. They were naturally suspected by us from having betrayed their own Prince, and joined the ranks of the usurper; and they were unpopular from a belief which, however unfounded, very generally prevailed, and which has never been removed, that during the siege they held clandestine communication with the resident, who reported, on the 10th of February, 1826.

"Since the fall of the fortress, a false notion, that it had been effected with the connivance of those persons, has obtained credence to an astonishing degree, and strange to say they have been robbed, plundered, and maltreated in our own camp, as traitors to Doorjun Saul, or more perhaps, with reference to the popular feeling, as traitors to the cause of all the existing states of India, which was absurdly supposed to depend on the defence of Bhurtpore."

It was therefore peculiarly unfortunate that such persons should have been selected for such offices under our superintendence, but this was a necessary evil, because there were none other of equal rank, or indeed of any rank, which fitted them for these offices; and it was still more unfortunate that it should, at the request of the Regent and ministers, have been necessary to appoint a British agent to reside at the court during the minority, who was almost certain to mix himself up with their affairs, to destroy the semblance of a native administration, and to paralyze their operations, without himself having the power or the means of governing according to our fashion.

It must always be a question, whether, in cases like this, it were not the better policy to withdraw and leave the native administration to its own resources. This would of course be disagreeable to

the party which hopes to benefit through our interference and support. But a more wholesome form of government would arise, after a few, perhaps bloodless, struggles, without our interposition, and we should at all events have the merit of leaving matters to find their own level, and the satisfaction of escaping from a situation which never fails to bring on us the odium of all the evil, without gaining us credit for any of the good that may be done. It is true that the whole structure of the Bhurtpore Government, had been destroyed in the revolution which had placed Doorjun Saul on the throne; and in the operations which followed, to restore the rightful heir, the treasures which had not been dissipated by the usurper had fallen in the shape of prize to our army; yet under all these disadvantages, it must be doubtful, whether the system of native administration which would have arisen on our withdrawal, would not have worked better for them, and certainly with less trouble to us, than any which it was possible to form under foreign domination and with divided councils.

We shall accordingly see, if it be worth while to pursue minutely the inquiry, that this Jaut administration, which for years had been the most united and efficient of any Government in India, and whose territories would bear a comparison with the best governed in the British possessions, fell to a mere state of dependence on our will and our support. It is true that in this, as in most other cases, where we either are, or think that we are, called on to interfere, some crisis has arisen, when the good of former administrations has passed away, and the Government has fallen into the hands of Regent mothers, and their worthless favorites during minorities, whilst it is uncertain, but for the measures of our adoption, whether still greater evils than those resulting from them would not have arisen.

On the fall of Bhurtpore, Goberdhun was resumed by the British Government. It had been granted in life Jageer to Kour Luchman Singh, the third son of Maha Raja Runjeet Singh, who was the hostage with the British camp at one time after the conclusion of the second treaty, but had not been resumed on his death.

Two battalions of Infantry, with Artillery and some Cavalry, were required for service in the Bhurtpore territory, until a national force and government could be organized, and these were granted on the condition of that state paying for the same.

A change of some importance very soon took place in the ministry, a nephew of the Foujdar's having been brought in to supersede the former Dewan—a change which promised to be beneficial as uniting the ministry, if an united ministry be in itself considered good. It was in less than three months, however, from the first formation of the ministry evident that it would not work.

The regent desired to bring more prominently forward her favorite Buyjnauth, whilst the political agent supported the administration, and "conceived it a duty on my part to discourage every

attempt to supersede the legitimate authority of the ministers. I made it a rule to summon them, whenever I had any communication of importance to make to the Bhurtpore Government, that seemed to require discussion." The agent soon found that the regency had the power of shutting the mouths of the ministers, whenever they did attend, by appointing some third person to be present at the conference; and that the ministers still felt themselves sufficiently the servants of the Bhurtpore state to hesitate to enter on any discussion with him which would be disagreeable to the Regent. In any discussions between the Regent and the agent, the ministers were likewise excluded.

"On these occasions, I usually desired Janee Buyjnauth to send for them, principally to convince the Ranee that I would not acknowledge her favorite as their substitute, and that those persons only who had been formally nominated by the Ranee, and approved of by you [the resident at Dehlee] and the British Government, would be recognised by me as the responsible ministers of the state."

"I took occasion in an interview I had with the Ranee a few days afterwards, to express to her my sentiments on it, [a note had been written, but not sent, on the subject of the inefficiency of the administration.] As Janee Buyjnauth was present at the time I addressed myself particularly to him, and in a style that could not possibly be misunderstood, either by him or by the Ranee; I called his attention first to the mystery that was thrown over every transaction connected with the management of public affairs, and secondly to the studious efforts made to keep me unacquainted with every thing that was going on. Why, I asked, was information cautiously concealed from me regarding the state of the country? Why was I not made acquainted with the arrangements that had been made with the zemindars for the present year, and a statement of the revenue of the country furnished me? He was aware, I observed, of the large demands we had against the Bhurtpore state, on account of the expenses incurred on the Raja's restoration—it was therefore my duty to ascertain what arrangements were in progress to meet those demands. The Bhurtpore Government requested that an agent might be stationed at the court, to give them the countenance and support of the British Government, and to aid them with his advice; but an agent could not give advice on matters respecting which he was denied all information, and he certainly would neither countenance nor support a course of proceeding so objectionable, nor any proceedings carried on by concealed agents, instead of the responsible ministers of the state. He ought to remember, I said, that the Ranee as Regent could not possibly, from the situation she was placed in, be accurately acquainted with the state of the country, or the real conduct of the public officers in any part of it. She must look to others for information, and who were so competent to afford her information as the old experienced responsible ministers of the state." I added, that I wished

it "to be distinctly understood, that so long as the British Government took any part in the guidance of affairs here, the ministers only could be regarded as the efficient and responsible Government of the country. I then alluded to his own apparent efforts to displace the old ministers, and assured him that whatever change might possibly take place in the present arrangements, he never could be acknowledged as Dewan or revenue minister; his ignorance of the duties rendered him entirely unqualified for such an office. I did not deny, I said, that the claims he had established on the Government, by his attachment to the Raja and his family, were considerable, (provided they were such as he had himself described;) but I recommended him to exert the influence he was thereby supposed to possess, rather in improving than destroying the efficiency of the administration, and convince the world, that his attachment to the Raja's Government was founded on principle, and not on personal advantage." The political agent goes on to say, after recounting all the measures of the Regent, for displacing the members of the first administration and raising her favorite Janee Buyjnath and Govind Ram to office, and enumerating all the evils arising from their conduct of affairs. "I am persuaded therefore, taking into consideration the age of the Raja, (seven years,) and the confused condition of affairs at this court, that no plan or arrangement that it may become necessary to adopt, for the introduction of an improved system of administration in this Government, can ever be rendered respectable, or in any way really efficient, without placing Janee Buyjnath and the ministers (whoever they may be) under the immediate guidance and control of the British agent, and vesting him with power to exercise a direct interference in the internal affairs of the state."

A mutiny, or a strike for want, or increase of pay, in a battalion of the new levies brought the question of the fitness of the present state of things more prominently forward, and on the 28th of May, the resident at Dehlee wrote to the political agent:

"It seems to be requisite to take steps immediately to amend the faulty and mischievous system of administration which the Ranee has hitherto followed. For this purpose, it only seems necessary to revert to the plan of Government originally designed, which the Ranee and Janee Buyjnath have contrived to set aside.

"This was that the country should be governed by the old ministers of the state, on their own responsibility, under the nominal Regency of the Ranee, but with suitable limitations to her authority.

"The experiment, which has been tried, of admitting the unlimited exercise of power on her part, has served to prove the impracticability of its continuance without utter ruin to the principality.

"I therefore authorize you, pending the receipt of orders from the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council, to carry into effect the arrangement described in the following paragraphs:

"The administration of the Government to be vested in responsible ministers.

"Dewan Jawahir Lal to be placed at the head of the Dewanee or Revenue Department.

"Foujdar Chooramun and Govind Ram to have charge of the Foujdaree Department. The latter to aid the former on account of his illness and consequent inability.

"I mention these three persons, because they are those who were originally nominated, and because they are the only persons that I know of that can be employed in the highest offices. But, if there be better, let them be chosen. Every proper mark of respect to be paid to the Ranee, and her reasonable wishes to be attended to by the ministers; but the responsibility, and consequently the powers of Government, to rest entirely with the ministers.

"You will be pleased to maintain a cordial intercourse with the ministers, leaving the administration entirely in their hands, and offering your advice whenever it may be necessary."

During these discussions, Janee Buyjnath had the advice of Mr. Wright, an Englishman, who was formerly concerned in some commercial speculations with Buyjnath, and who was believed to have violated an Act of Parliament by lending money to the native state without the sanction of the British Government. This gentleman was eventually required to quit the Bhurtpore territory.

As the Regent declined to take a part in this form of administration, the following provision was made:

"That the most efficient administration that can be selected be formed out of the old officers of the Bhurtpore state.

"That the administration so appointed have the Government of the country in their hands. That they report their proceedings to the Ranee, if she be disposed to play her part as Regent, with limited authority, and that they attend to her wishes, when they may be consistent with the welfare of the state; or in the event of her declining to co-operate with them, that their proceedings be carried on under the countenance of the British agent, and in communication with him. His advice and influence to be interposed in either case, whenever necessary to check measures oppressive to the people, or tending to sacrifice the interests of the state to the cupidity of individuals, but no interference to take place on his part with any other other object.

"The system of administration is to be that heretofore established at Bhurtpore, without any innovation on the part of the agent, or any introduction on his part of British rules of Government, in order that the state may be made over to the Raja on his arrival at maturity, governed by its own laws, and such as it was in the hands of his ancestors."

This sketch of administration was drawn out by the resident at Dehlee, and sanctioned by Government; it was submitted to the Regent, who having either in reality or in semblance cordially approved of it, the measure was carried into effect at Bhurtpore.

The Regent did not however long remain satisfied with such limited powers; she intrigued against the ministers, called the chiefs of the state to aid her in opposing them, and eventually locked herself up for many days in the palace, keeping possession of the young Raja, and threatening to destroy herself and him, if any opposition was offered to her, or attempt made to remove him. At last, on the 4th of September, 1826, Ranee Imrut Kour was displaced from the exercise of the functions of Regent, and the ministers formed into a council of Regency, with the entire administration of the Government in all departments.

One of the first measures of the new administration was to request the aid of British troops to assist in coercing certain Zemindars of the Bhurtpore country into payment of revenue. The resident at Dehlee did not approve of this mode of employing our troops, but Government was of opinion that in the condition, to which the military power of the state was reduced, it might be expedient to grant this aid, provided it were clearly shewn that the Zemindars of Bhurtpore withheld the just dues of Government, and that the ministry had not the power of enforcing them.

On the 6th of March, 1827, the agent reported the death of Foujdar Chooramun, and added that he had appointed Foujdar Govind Ram to supply his place, pending a reference to the Right Honorable the Governor General. In July, 1830, the principal minister of the Bhurtpore Government, Jawahir Lal, died. "He had been the principal revenue minister for upwards of twenty-five years: it was his thorough knowledge of these affairs, combined with a degree of temper, patience, and forbearance, which have seldom, perhaps never, been surpassed, that enabled him to discharge the duties of his high office, so much to the general satisfaction of the country.

"The highly respectable character of Foujdar Govind Ram, and his alliance with the Raja's family, gave him importance in the eyes of the natives, and will enable him, I hope, with the aid of his son, and of some able and experienced native officers in his employ, to superintend the administration of this Government during the Raja's minority; which cannot exceed two or three years.

"My instructions as political agent at this court were to leave the administration entirely in the hands of the ministers, and to offer my advice when it appeared necessary. I have acted up strictly to these instructions all along, and shall continue to do so, being satisfied they are founded on principles of strict justice and expediency. This system I hope to see continued, and it will be continued, if the plan of administration now in force be approved, and the appointment of Govind Ram as Regent minister be sanctioned by the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council."

Since the death of Jawahir Lal, and the appointment of Govind Ram to be his successor, the condition of the Bhurtpore Government had deteriorated. The new minister was too old and weak to leave any hope of an amendment in the state of affairs; and at

length, on the 10th of June, 1831, a native of Bhurtpore, but not a Jaut, Bholanath, was raised by the British Government to the office of Dewan, the son of the late Dewan being continued in the inferior department of Foujdar.

The debt incurred by Bhurtpore to the British Government for the expence of the campaign, by which the Raja was restored to his throne, was 25,49,000 rupees. The expence of the troops maintained in that territory, for the service of the Bhurtpore Government, and the expence of agency, amounting to upwards of a lakh of rupees per annum, were justly chargeable to that Government. The debt was by agreement to have been liquidated in six years, but it appears that up to the middle of 1831, only 14,70,969 rupees were paid; so that Bhurtpore is still considerably indebted to the British Government.

The following are the observations of the Hon'ble the Court of Directors on the subject of this debt:

"A considerable share of the expences of the war against Bhurtpore may be justly charged to the Raja's Government; but as the charge is of the nature of a compensation, not a penalty, and will fall not only upon the active adherents of the usurper Doorjun Saul, but upon the people in general of the Bhurtpore state, it will be your duty, more especially now that you have been forced to interfere in the administration of its affairs, to be careful that the amount demanded shall not exceed what the Raja's Government has the means to pay, and that no extortion be practised upon the Thakoors, or over-assessment upon the ryuts, under the pretence of liquidating the debt."

17. Bhopal.—It is curious to witness this small Mahomedan principality maintaining its independence since the days of Aurungzebe, surrounded by the Mahratta and other Hindoo powers of Central India, composed of elements so different from its own, and so full of enmity towards the chief of the country, and the soldiers of which his small army was principally composed.

The Afghaun colony of Bhopal, even in the days of its founder, Dost Mahomed Khan, seems to have been of sufficient importance to be courted both by the throne of Dehlee and Nizam-ool Moolk, the Soobadar of the Dekhan, in their civil war of 1720.

The state of Bhopal, was the only power in Central India that afforded friendly aid to the force under General Goddard, which crossed, fifty-four years ago, from the Bengal to the Bombay provinces; and like the state of Boondee in later days, it was believed to have suffered on account of its good offices towards us. In the long period which intervened between 1778 and 1809, when the next British army, under Colonel Close, appeared on that theatre, the chiefs of Bhopal had been frequently leagued with Pindaries, or any other plunderers, or people who were likely to aid them in resisting the encroachments of the superior Mahratta powers. This connexion with the Pindaries and Ameer Khan was nearly bringing on the Bhopal Government the vengeance of the British, when

the first demonstration of our power was made in those regions in 1809. Wuzeer Mahomed, the then able and energetic chief, successfully excused himself, however, on the plea of necessity for affording refuge to these plunderers, and petitioned hard as he had before done, and continued for the next seven years to do, to be taken under British protection. We were not however until a very late period prepared to enter so largely into the politics of Central India, as a compliance with Wuzeer Mahomed's wishes would have rendered necessary.

The siege of Bhopal, which followed in 1813-14, by divisions of Scindia's and the Nagpore army, amounting to 50 or 60,000 men, is one of the most remarkable in later days; and the conduct of the chief, whose garrison at the commencement of the siege did not exceed 8 or 10,000 men, is the theme of praise and the admiration of the Mahomedans of India. The division of the Nagpore army was commanded by a Mahomedan, and there were of course great numbers of that tribe in the united army. Their sympathy was naturally awakened by the situation of their Pathan brethren of Bhopal; and it is probably as much owing to this circumstance as to Wuzeer Mahomed's masterly conduct in the defence of his position, during a siege of nine months' duration, that the fortunes of the house of Bhopal were saved from destruction. It was of course this unfriended condition of the small principality of Bhopal, which led it to look to the rising influence of the British Government from 1788, till the establishment of its paramount power in 1817 and 1818.

There appears good reason to believe, that it was the friendly interposition of our residents at the courts of Gwalior and Nagpore, which saved the Bhopal principality from destruction, when the disciplined brigades of Jean Baptiste prepared in 1814, for offensive operations against that state. The able chief who had so successfully conducted the affairs of Bhopal for nine years, through a period of almost unequalled difficulty, died early in 1816, little more than a year before Central India was rescued from its long period of anarchy and deep desolation by the effectual exhibition of British power. He was succeeded by his son, Nuzzer Mahomed, who although not the eldest was on every account the fittest, or the only son fit, to administer the affairs of such a state at such a time. It is in periods like these when the necessity and justice of that rule of succession must be acknowledged, which, amongst Mahomedans, decrees the reins of power to the hands which shall be declared the fittest to guide them for the benefit of the state. And however necessary the introduction of our laws of primogeniture in their strictest sense, as applicable to succession to thrones may be, to preserve that universal tranquillity, which it is the great object and merit of our supremacy to have secured to India, it must nevertheless be allowed that to the individual states of that country, we could hardly have introduced any one measure more generally depressing or destructive to the best energies of both sovereigns

and states. Nuzzer Mahomed had to the age of thirty-five been bred under the eye of his gallant and patriotic father, in a school which taught him to defend in the field the interests of his country, and the still more important and rarer lesson that institutions so dearly bought and so safely won were not lightly to be risked in more peaceable times. It is only scenes such as this chief had witnessed, or an education under freer institutions than now belong, or perhaps ever can belong to India, that can teach to princes the advantages of governing in the hearts of their people, or that can reconcile interests which, under more ordinary circumstances, will generally appear in conflict. Sir John Malcolm, from whose history of Central India, this brief sketch of Bhopal is chiefly taken, (and to whose writings we are so much indebted for what we know of the political history of our own times, particularly in that region,) observes of this worthy successor of Wuzeer Mahomed, "His whole soul was absorbed, during the last two years, in plans for improving his country. He investigated every account himself, heard every complaint; and while all speak of his kindness, benevolence, and justice, his memory is unstained by the reproach of a single act of tyranny." When shall we see a prince of this character rise up under the present Zenana system of education, and our laws of primogeniture, to emulate the virtues of Nuzzer Mahomed? He succeeded his father in February, 1816, and had governed Bhopal only three years and five months, when he was accidentally killed by a pistol discharged by the hands of a child, his brother-in-law, whilst playing in his inner apartments with his infant daughter.

Our treaty with Bhopal is dated 26th of February, 1818. It was negotiated by Captain Stewart, and is of subsequent date to the treaties with the Rajpoot states of Kotah, Joudpore, Oudeepore, &c. negotiated by Sir Charles Metcalfe at Dehlee, with whom originated the "subordinate co-operation, and acknowledged supremacy," which is the leading features in all this class of treaties. Bhopal stipulates to furnish a contingent of six hundred horse, and four hundred infantry, for the service of the British Government, when required; and when necessary, the whole disposable forces are to join the British army. To mark its sense of former fidelity, and to enable the state to maintain this contingent, the British Government granted in perpetuity to Bhopal five districts of great value, which were taken from the Peishwa, and which comprise 867 villages. In 1790, the revenues of Bhopal were estimated at ten lakhs of rupees. From this period to the date of the treaty they had fluctuated, and were sometimes so low as one lakh; latterly they extended again to ten lakhs, and Sir John Malcolm indulges in the expectation of their soon exceeding thirty. Six thousand rupees per annum were settled by the Nawab on Kunder Rao, and on his descendants, under the guarantee of the British Government, for services rendered about the time of the negotiation of the treaty. In 1820, the military force of Bhopal consisted of 2,000

Cavalry and 5,000 Infantry, of which 1,000 were Affghans from Cabul and Peshawur. The ordnance, garrison and field, amounted to 180 pieces. The revenues were by the political agent estimated at only nine lakhs. But the full revenue, including Jageers, under good management, was supposed to be forty.

In 1821, an attempt was made to disturb the succession, as established on the death of Nuzzer Mahomed, his nephew being his infant successor. A relation of the family, Jumal Mahomed Khan, conceived the design of securing the succession of his own son, through a marriage with the daughter of Nuzzer Mahomed, and it was only on finding that a British force was prepared to march to uphold the original measure, that this was relinquished.

The political agent had recourse to a measure of very doubtful justice in threatening the widow of the late Nawab, who was supposed to favor the design of disturbing the succession, with the probability of this scheme being met on the part of the British Government by a claim "of a fourth or such other portion of the revenue as may be determined, in the same manner as with the states of Oudeepore, Jeypore, &c." whilst the treaty should have been a sufficient assurance to them, that such a measure could not be seriously entertained.

Referring to the conduct of Jumal Mahomed Khan, who seized on a portion of the Bhopal territory, in furtherance of his design, the political agent observes with great naïveté to the court: "For it is obvious that if the chiefs of Bhopal, who have no claims upon the state commence dividing its possessions among themselves, there no longer remains any consideration to prevent the Company's Government, to whose interposition the principality owes its existence, from demanding remuneration for its expenditure proportionate to the benefit derived from its protection."

During the minority of the Prince, the form of administration is somewhat remarkable. The widow of the late Nawab was considered the head of the administration; the other influential persons being a Mahomedan, a Hindoo and a Christian. Of the last, Sir John Malcolm observes, "Shazad Musseah, or Belthazar Bourbona, with whom I am well acquainted, is an able man and a brave soldier, is the descendant of a Frenchman called Bourbon, who had come to India in the time of the Emperor Akbar."

The small districts of Burseah and Shajawulpore, yielding in 1821-22 a revenue of rupees 2,22,977, were so satisfactorily managed by the political agent, that it was resolved to retain possession of them, and to extend to them a further revenue settlement for five years.

The Pathan Government of the principality of Bhopal, is more of a popular form than any other Mahomedan Government in India; the principles which govern the Affghan councils of central Asia, having infused themselves into this small colony planted in the very heart of India. Two of the members of the reigning family were therefore, during the minority, joined to the former administration

Shazad Musseah being apparently still the leading minister, it was the object of a family coalescenee to remove this person from the administration, but he was supported by the Regent Begum, "who had firmness enough to resist the importunities of her family on this point, and discernment to appreciate the qualities of an able and most loyal servant." The political agent was authorized to "exert his influence, though with the least possible degree of direct and ostensible interference, to preserve concord and harmony, and to uphold the just ascendancy of Shazad Musseah in the councils of the Bhopal Government."

In 1824, the important object was here attained of organizing the Bhopal contingent, placing it under the command of an European officer, with whom the distribution of its regular monthly pay and the promotion of its several ranks were to rest, and without which important points it is of course impossible to extend to troops such a degree of discipline, as would render them available for operations with our forces, or which would enable us to rest secure in their fidelity to our cause. To secure these important objects it was here, as at Hyderabad, necessary to relinquish a portion of the contingent of Cavalry stipulated by treaty, in order to secure the discipline and services of the remainder. The complement was now fixed at 300 Cavalry, 673 Infantry, with two six-pounders manned by 20 golandaz. The political agent, Mr. Maddock, and the resident, Sir David Ochterlony, were both sensible of the vital importance of securing the services of such a body of troops in this position; but Government sanctioned the measure without apparently responding to the sentiments of either party on this point. It may be observed, that our Government was about this time assuming a position which directed its attention more to civil than military considerations. It enters justly and warmly into the measures of the political agent, for relieving the small districts of Burseah and Shajawulpore from the evils of over assessment, but responds coldly to that of assuming an important military position. In the days of a Wellesley or a Hastings, the former measure would have gained their high approbation, the latter their highest. Such too in a later period of Lord Amherst's administration, when our protracted struggle with the Burmese, and the absence of a large portion of our army from India, brought us into collision with Bhurtpore, and had nearly done so with Ulwur, Kerowlee, Jeypore, and other states of Central India, would have been the predominating tone. In handing up to Government the propositions of the political agent, Sir David Ochterlony observes on the former: "I have replied that I would forward it for the consideration of Government, but did not wish to say more than that it appeared to me, from Mr. Maddock's experience and established character, that the concurrence of Government in his suggestions, might with much confidence be anticipated." On the latter "I take the liberty to state my opinion, that Mr. Maddock's proposed arrangements, respecting the Bhopal contingent, are of the most beneficial and efficacious

nature, securing to us a limited but truly efficient force in a situation where their services may be eminently useful, and at the same time reducing the expence to the state in a manner at once just and judicious." The political agent had the merit of giving due importance to either measure, and of discussing both subjects in able and luminous despatches.

In 1827, a contest arose between the Begum, widow of Nuzzur Mahomed, and the young Nawab Mooneer Mahomed Khan. By an arrangement framed in 1819, by the Begum and the chiefs, and formally recognized by the British Government, Mooneer Mahomed Khan, the nephew, was declared the successor of the late Nawab, and betrothed to his only daughter. The Regency continued in the hands of the mother during the minority, as has already been described. When the Nawab arrived at a period of life to assert his own authority, the Begum was naturally very reluctant to render up that which she had so long exercised, and came forward with the declaration, that as she had adopted the Nawab he had only a right to exercise during her life time such authority as she chose to delegate to him. She declared him to be impotent and therefore disqualified to become the husband of her daughter, and that on this account the betrothal was virtually cancelled. He levied troops, and endeavoured to gain over those of the state for the purpose of asserting his rights. She attacked his positions with the troops of the state, the chiefs being mostly with her, and was likely to prevail against him.

At this period of the contest the British Government came forward with the declaration, that it considered the authority of the Begum to terminate on the Nawab's attaining his majority, that her objections to his union with her daughter originated as much in personal hostility, and an anxiety to retain the sovereign authority in her own hands, as in a belief that the charge of impotency was well founded. The lady had not attained a marriageable age, and the Nawab agreed that if he did not give sufficient proofs of his virility, she should be married to his younger brother, who would be adopted as heir to the principality. It still remained for consideration, whether it was incumbent on the British Government to espouse the cause of the Nawab, or whether from the peculiar constitution of the Bhopal family, the aristocracy of the state, who put him up, had not also the power of declaring him disqualified to govern, if dissatisfied with his conduct, character, and qualifications. "On the whole, the Governor General in Council is disposed to authorize you, if the knowledge of the sentiments of the British Government, as to the right of the Nawab, fail to produce tranquil submission to his rule, and if you consider the general voice to be decidedly against the Nawab, to intimate to the chiefs of Bhopal, and principal members and relations of the ruling family, that the British Government is anxious they should settle the existing dispute amongst themselves, and determine according to their own view of the laws and usages

of the state, and its real interests, in whose hands the Government of the country shall hereafter be vested. After making a declaration to the above effect, the duty of your assistant and yourself will be to stand aloof for a time, and to observe accurately and report continually the progress of events. Your chief care will naturally be to prevent the spread of disturbances, should such unhappily arise, into neighbouring districts, either under British rule or entitled to our protection. If the dispute should be protracted, and entail consequences threatening serious danger to the internal tranquillity and prosperity of our own dominions, or those of our allies, the British Government would then be compelled to interpose effectually on the principle of self-defence, and adopt such measures for the suppression of disorder, and the establishment of an efficient Government in Bhopal, as circumstances, and its own notions of right and justice might permit or dictate. It may be proper to state explicitly in conclusion, that the contingent which the state of Bhopal is bound by treaty to furnish for the service of the British Government in lieu of tribute, would not of course be available for the aid of either side, and must stand perfectly neutral, should any contest for the Government ensue."

Before the order of Government reached Bhopal, the Nawab's party had been subdued by the Begum's. It was the opinion of the chiefs of the state that the Begum was supreme head, and that he would not be justified in attempting to establish his authority by the subversion of hers. He would not submit to the tests required of his virility, and finally relinquished his claim to the hand of the young Princess, with that of his succession to the throne, in favor of a younger brother. The chiefs of the state did not arm to oppose the Nawab's pretensions to power, but to save the Begum and her daughter from a forced matrimonial connexion, which throughout the contest was more an object with the impotent Nawab than the possession of a throne. It appeared on further inquiry, that according to the usages of the family, the chiefs having declared the Begum and her daughter the rightful heirs of the late Nawab, their allegiance to them was not abrogated by her adoption, with their consent, of her husband's nephew; and that she was considered not as regent, but as absolute sovereign in her own right. The Nawab himself had never aspired to any thing further than the administration of affairs under her control.

Hakeem Shazad Mussiah, who had retired from office to his Jageer at Itechawur, died on the 1st of January, 1829. On hearing of his illness, the Begum and the minister proceeded there to visit him, and it was supposed in the hope of inducing him to return to office. The position and character of this Christian minister of a state situated like Bhopal are very remarkable. "In his youth he was the friend of the distinguished ruler of Bhopal, Nuzzer Mahomed Khan, became his companion in arms, and distinguished himself as an enterprising and succesful leader. When virtually

at the head of the administration, he displayed more rectitude of intention and firmness of conduct in his public capacity, and more integrity and disinterestedness in what regarded his private fortune, than can be often found united in the same individual. Such qualities necessarily commanded the respect and confidence of the court, and combined with the expenditure of a large portion of his private income, in unostentatious acts of charity and munificence, secured for him the affections of the people.

"The general knowledge of the Hukeem was superior to any native prince or gentleman with whom I am acquainted, while the candid and unreserved manner in which he expressed himself on all subjects, unlike the habit of other Asiatics, rendered his conversation such as could not fail to be pleasing to an English gentleman, and must have procured for him the regard and esteem of every one who was thrown so much as I have been into his society."*

The sanguine anticipations of increasing revenue and resources, indulged by the authorities first employed in Bhopal, after the tranquillization of Central India, have been here, as every where else, disappointed. The revenues which in 1819 were nine lakhs, and then estimated to ascend in five years to twenty, did not increase in those five years, and are now (1832) not more than eight. We have apparently discovered that it is not easy to increase the revenues of an inland country whose produce is chiefly grain, and that until some other and more valuable sources of agriculture and trade are ingrafted on those of India, or until the markets of Europe are freely opened to that country, we must expect not an increase but a defalcation in the present amount of land revenue, which is perhaps less than the average of the last twenty years. The enhanced value of money, as compared with that of produce, and the probability that its comparative value must be yet more enhanced, will very materially affect all the calculations, the income, and the expenditure of a principality like Bhopal. The revenue affairs of the Bhopal Government have hitherto been wisely and prudently managed, the farming system which prevails so extensively in Scindia's neighbouring districts, never having been adopted in Bhopal.

The Begum seems now as reluctant to celebrate the marriage of the young Nawab, who is in his fourteenth year, with her daughter, and to admit of his assuming that place in the state which belongs to him, or to establish that system of education and instruction, which are necessary to his future respectability, as she was in the case of his brother.

18. Cutch.—The first notice of this principality may commence in 1802, when an overture was made through the horse merchant Soonderjee, who in those days was a person of more influence in the affairs of Scind and Cutch than his occupation would indicate, to obtain the aid of our troops to expel the Scindians from the fort

* Mr Maddock's Report to Government.

of Vusta-bunder, of which they had, six months before, possessed themselves; and to assist in the conquest of Scind. The chief of Cutch being an imbecile, a civil war was raging in that country between the ex-minister, the notorious Futteh Mahomed, and Huns Raj, the minister then in power, and it was probably as much to assist in this war as in the expulsion of the Scindians that these overtures were made to us. The Raja was at his capital Booj, whilst Futteh Mahomed was besieged by the minister in the fort of Anjar, the former having 3 or 4,000, the latter 10,000 men.

It was considered, both by the Court of Directors and the Supreme Government, in the then unsettled state of Cutch, inexpedient to enter on any other terms with that state than those of amity and friendship.

Overtures were again made in 1806 for assistance to release the Raja from the thraldom, in which he was held by Futteh Mahomed, and they were answered in the same spirit.

As our relations with the Guickwar extended into Kattywar, we were brought more closely into contact with Cutch, and in 1809, overtures commenced on our part, and an agent was deputed to Booj, who contracted certain relations with the Wuzeer Futteh Mahomed and the Dewan Huns Raj, to the effect that no troops of theirs should cross to the east side of the Gulf and Run lying between Cutch and Guzerat, nor should any claim or interference on their part be therein maintained. But as the Maha Rao of Cutch had various claims on the countries thus situated, it was agreed that they should be adjusted by arbitrators; one on the part of the Company, one on the part of the Maha Rao, and one on behalf of those on whom the claims were made.

Huns Raj further proposed, that an agent should be stationed at Mundavee, on the part of the British Government, for whose expense he offered to assign 18,000 rupees a year; that Mundavee should be placed under his own charge, until his master the Maha Rao should be competent to assume the direction of affairs; and that British aid should be lent for the defence of Mundavee, if threatened, the cost of which he was ready to pay; which propositions were entertained, and Huns Raj and his heirs guaranteed in possession of Mundavee.

The proceedings in Cutch, and the presence of a detachment of troops in Kattywar, under Colonel Walker, the resident at Baroda, caused some anxiety on the part of the Ameers of Scind, and led them to call for explanation on the subject from the Bombay Government. The Ameers had been before told through a letter from the Governor General, that we would not tolerate any project of hostility on their part towards Cutch.

On the death of the Dewan Huns Raj, and the accession of his son Shew Raj to the office, a civil war again arose between the Wuzeer and Dewan, and on the strength of the engagement before described, the latter claimed the aid of two battalions of our troops for the protection of Mundavee; the Cutch territory then apparently

being divided between the rival ministers. He showed however his distrust of us sufficiently by wishing to stipulate that our troops should not be admitted into the fort of Mundavee, but that when the Wuzeer was subdued and their arrears paid, they should return within our own frontier, for which he required security.

The imbecile chief of Cutch was the head of the brotherhood of Jey Raja Rajpoots; certain members of the family were attached respectively to the Wuzeer Futteh Mahomed and the Dewan Shew Raj. By the measures adopted in 1809, we had espoused the cause of the latter, and yet informed the former that we had taken no measure injurious to his interests, or of which we had any right to complain. For since we could tell him that we had no intention of acquiring territory, or of aggrandizing ourselves, it was thought he could have no just cause of complaint, because we guaranteed the possessions of his rival, sent an agent to reside with him, and were prepared to send troops to support him. He showed that soreness which might have been expected at our interference to this extent in the affairs of Cutch, and produced letters from the imbecile Raja, objecting to, and refusing to recognize the part, which we had taken. The other members of the Jey Raja brotherhood showed the same jealousy of the position which we had assumed, and it was evident that we were about to support the weaker party, which in reality had no rights in Mundavee, in opposition to the stronger, in whose hands was the Raja, and with whom were the principal members of his family and the majority of the people of the country; neither had we in reality any interest in this contest of rival ministers, for it should rather have been our object to have raised up an united and substantial administration in Cutch, which might have been able to defend itself against the Ameers of Scind, and which would have had the power of putting down, and might have been held responsible for, any aggressions committed on the frontiers of our ally, the Guickwar, which we were bound to protect. Yet in spite of these considerations, the Bombay Government was prepared to put forth a military force to support the phantom power which it had set up at Mundavee. The Supreme Government more wisely considered that our engagements with the father, whose office in its nature was not hereditary, did not bind us to the same terms with the son, unless they had been renewed, particularly as the first measure of that son was to demur at receiving our agent, to show jealousy in receiving our troops into his fort, and to require security for the withdrawal of them, when the services for which they were lent should be completed. The Bombay Government was therefore in August, 1810, directed to stay further military preparations and to recal its agent from Mundavee. But before the injunctions of the Supreme Government reached Bombay or indeed before the instructions of the Bombay Government reached its agent in Cutch, he had already called troops from Kattywar to Mundavee, to support the Hindoo against the Mahomedan minister. The presence of our troops hastened the settlement of their differences.

The Hindoo very soon became desirous of avoiding the expense of maintaining them, and the Mahomedan more disposed to attend to the claims of the other. Their differences were referred to arbitration, and long before the award was given, both parties required the withdrawal of the two battalions. Futteh Mahomed, however, resisted an overture, which was made to him, to connect himself more closely with us.

The obligations which we had incurred to secure to the Cutch Government its just claims from the territory of Kattywar, lying between Cutch and Guzerat, and which was chiefly tributary to our ally the Guickwar, rendered it necessary, in 1812, to equip a force of some strength under the command of Sir Lionel Smith, to operate against one of those tributary chieftains, the Rana of Naonuggur, who refused to abide by the terms of our and the Guickwar's settlement of the Cutch claims on him, and it was in consequence necessary to coerce him into obedience.

From this period up to 1815, the territories of our allies in Kattywar had been constantly subject to the incursions of the people of Wagur, who, in breach of the engagements of the Cutch Government with us, had crossed the Run to commit depredations in that province. The loss sustained thereby, with the expense incurred for the repression of the evil, was at the end of this year estimated at twenty lakhs of rupees.

The Government of Cutch having failed to afford, either redress for the past, or indemnity for the future, a force was at the close of the year assembled, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel East, in Kattywar, to compel that Government to adopt those measures which negotiation had failed to produce. On its advance by the direct route towards the capital, the water was found to have been poisoned, bags of wheat and arsenic having been discovered in the tanks; it was therefore necessary to turn towards Anjar, which town surrendered shortly after the batteries were opened against it, and on the force advancing from that place towards Booj, Wukeels were dispatched by the Rao to camp to adjust terms with the agent who accompanied the force.

The first question to be adjusted was the conflicting claims of Ladooba and Burmuljee to the *guddee;* and the election was left to the principal Jey Raja chiefs, forming the federal brotherhood of the Rao of Cutch. They were unanimous in favor of the latter, declaring him to be the legitimate son of the late Rao, whilst the former it was insinuated, was spurious.

A treaty of amity and friendship was concluded at Booj, on the 14th of January, 1816, which was delivered to the agent by the Rao in full Durbar, with the expression of a hope that its provisions would ever continue binding on both parts. They were principally indemnity to the subjects of the Peishwa and Guickwar, for losses sustained by them, through the irruptions of the people of Cutch into Kattywar; and to us for the expences of the war, and promised security for the future, both from land aggressions and piracy.

The British Government agreed to aid with a force to arrange affairs in the disturbed Talook of Wagur, and the Rao ceded in perpetuity the fort and district of Anjar, engaged to pay the annual sum of two lakhs of cowries, and to receive at his capital, a representative of the British Government. The Supreme Government, considered the amount of indemnity for the expenses of the war, *i. e.* eight lakhs of rupees, and the annual tribute, calculated to impoverish the principality of Cutch to a degree which would destroy its substantive power, and both were by a supplementary article to the treaty remitted. The revenues of Cutch were, in 1809, stated to be only 10,00,000 rupees. This measure, with the restoration of the Jey Raja Rao of Cutch, after the suspension of his authority for twenty years, was represented to have diffused great joy throughout the country, and to place our relations on the most propitious footing.

Yet scarcely were these terms concluded, when the Rao of Cutch begun to evince a disposition hostile to us. He murdered the unfortunate Ladooba, who had been his rival in his claims to the throne, began to levy troops for the purpose of attacking Anjar, and attacked one of the Wagur chiefs, whose possessions were under our guarantee; to show others, as he openly avowed, the punishment which awaited those who depended for protection on the British Government.

The conduct of the Rao left little doubt that he was deranged in intellect, either through inheritance from his father, or from the inordinate use of spirits; and it became necessary to assemble a military force under the command of Sir William Grant Keir, to act against him.

A new treaty was concluded with the Jey Raja brotherhood, on the 13th of October, 1819. The Rao was agrêcably to their desire deposed, placed as a state prisoner in Booj, and his infant son was raised to the *guddee* under the name and title of Maha Raja Mirza Rao Dessuljee. A Regency was framed during the minority, of whom the British resident, at the particular desire of the brotherhood, formed one of the six members. A British force was left for the protection of Cutch, the expense of which that Government binds itself to pay, to be reduced or entirely withdrawn at the option of the British Government. The Jey Raja chiefs, and generally all Rajpoot chiefs, in Cutch and Wagur, are guaranteed in the full enjoyment of their possessions. All agree to abolish the practice of female infanticide.

In 1822, the town and district of Anjar were restored to the Rao for a money payment of 88,000 rupees a year.

From that period up to the present time, the irruptions of plunderers from the neighbouring district of Nuggur Parkur, either an integral part of the dominions, or a country tributary to Scind, has been loudly complained of as an evil requiring redress. The Khosas, or inhabitants of the country to the north east of Parkur, have also found a resting place there, and it has been supposed that

the depredations of the former people were countenanced by the Ameers of Scind, and those of the latter by the Raja of Joudpore. The obligations, under which we are to protect the frontiers of our allies of Baroda and Cutch, from foreign aggression, have at length forced us to arm against these depredators, and to act against them in the seat of their power; and our operations are seconded by the troops of the above-mentioned allies, by those of Scind, Joudpore and Jessulmere.

The inability of the principality of Cutch to meet the demands which are due to us by treaty has led to constant remissions on our part. At length, the Court of Directors, in a letter dated the 1st of February, 1832, inform the Bombay Government, that the demands on Cutch, on account of the cession of Anjar, are considered to be much above what that pergunnah can ever yield, and as they are consequently a charge upon the other resources of the state, they should be permanently relinquished. The Bombay Government accordingly resolve, on the 4th of September, 1832, that the amount of arrears, seven lakhs of cowries, two lakhs of rupees, should be struck off, and that the equivalent for Anjar, 88,000 rupees per annum, should be remitted. The subsidy hereafter payable being 2,00,000 rupees per annum, that this amount shall diminish in proportion as we may diminish the troops in Cutch; and if they should be diminished so as to fall below the amount of the Anjar compensation, or altogether withdrawn, then in either case, that amount only shall be demandable, This is a great boon conferred on our ally of Cutch, and the young Rao will now enter on the administration of a country comparatively unshackled in its resources; an object of no little importance to ourselves on a frontier situated like Cutch.

The resident states in a memorandum on the financial condition of Cutch, in November, 1831, that the state loses upwards of two lakhs of cowries *per annum*, by what he considers our dictatorial and perhaps unauthorized prohibition as to the opium trade. It does not appear what our measures are on this head, but they may be considered similar in their object and nature to those relinquished in Malwa and Rajpootana; and it is curious enough to find our Patna and Benares opium monopoly leading to similar measures in countries so remote in position.

Our first relations with Cutch, in connection with those in Kattywar, commenced under the political superintendence of that most virtuous and enlightened of the Company's servants, the late Brigadier-General Walker, the Governor of St. Helena. How far his measures for the suppression of female infanticide, which prevails in a greater degree amongst the Jey Rajas than any other tribe of Rajpoots, have had any effect, is still doubtful, and how far that unnatural system will yield to negotiation yet remains to be seen. As the influence of our administration pervades the councils of Cutch, and as civilization dawns in that hitherto more than usually benighted land, measures of such atrocity must, like the Suttee, be

supposed to come within the influenece of our power; and the present Government will not be inattentive to the call of humanity in the one case, any more than in the other.

The net revenues of Cutch in 1829-30 were 27,00,000 cowries, exclusive of 4,38,000 "voluntary contributions," on the occasion of the Rao's marriage. The expenditure, 32,35,000, including the marriage expences, amounting to 9,20,000 cowries.

19. DHAR.—This small but ancient principality, on whose Rajpoot family, a Mahratta stock seems to have been grafted, maintained its position, surrounded by enemies, with almost as great difficulty as the Afghan house of Bhopal, until admitted by the British Government to the condition of a protected state. The treaty with it is dated the 13th of March, 1819. For the protection afforded, it ceded the tribute which it was entitled to levy from the Rajpoot states of Banswara and Dongerpore. Certain districts, which it had lost in the troubles of the last thirty years, were recovered and restored; and the tribute of Ali Mohun was secured to it.

By an additional engagement, concluded on the 18th of December, 1821, Dhar ceded to the British Government the district of Bairseah and the tribute of Ali Mohun for a money payment of 1,10,000 rupees.

The Powar of Dhar, although reduced in circumstances, was considered by the resident at Indore equal in rank to Scindia, Holkar, the Guickwar, or any other of the principal chiefs of the late Mahratta Empire; and the marriage of the young chief of Dhar with the grand-daughter of Scindia, in 1822, was an occasion of great rejoicing at Gwalior.

In 1826, opium treaties were concluded with Dhar, similar to those already described, also with the neighbouring state of Dewas. The measure was also in progress with the other states of Malwa; for it was determined that it should pervade all our operations in those parts. The political agent reported, in 1825, on "the good disposition of the young Raja of Dhar, the efficiency of the management of Bapoo Rugonath, and the strong interest, which the Regent Bae takes, in all that concerns the interests of her adopted son. The Powars of Dewas, who with those of Dhar feel they owe much to the British Government, always evince the same good feeling, and seem to value the safety, tranquillity, and comfort they now enjoy under our control."

In 1831, the district of Bairseah was given up to the Dhar Government, it having been discovered that, in receiving that district, in 1821, we made a very improvident bargain, the collections being less than the amount paid for it by 50 or 60,000 rupees a year.

The late insurrection amongst the Bheels of the Dhar principality was through the instigation of Oochet Rao Powar; this person is the reputed son of Morar Rao, the son of Moheput Rao; whose

father Raja Jeswunt Rao Powar was killed at the battle of Paneeput. Oochet Rao had for a series of years been treated by the Dhar authorities in a way very unsuitable to his pretended relationship to the family, and at last appealed to the Bheel population, who, partly to assert his rights and partly to gratify their own restless disposition, broke out into open rebellion, descended into the plains, and inflicted on the peaceable community all those evils which they so well know how to produce.

In virtue of the fifth article of the treaty, the Dhar Government appealed to our assistance, which was granted, and through our means peace was restored. But when the Dhar authorities discovered that the exercise of power on our part would also entitle us to influence their future treatment of Oochet Rao, they would when tranquillity was restored, have willingly escaped from this interference, and professed their ability to restrain their own Bheel subjects, if we would only save them from aggressions on the part of the Bheel subjects of foreign states.

Our relations with the Powars of Dewas are similar to those with the Powars of Dhar, the treaty with them being dated the 12th of December, 1818.

20. Dholpore Baree.—Rana Keerut Singh is of the Jaut tribe; the father of this chief seems to have conquered Gwalior about 1761, but lost it again to Madhajee Scindia, in 1784.

The draft of articles of agreement made and concluded at Fort William in Bengal with Raja Lukendur Behadur, Rana of Gohud, on the 2nd of December, 1779, is a document of some curiosity, negociated in the infancy of our art of treaty-making, and of our acquaintance with the political affairs of Upper India. Whenever a war might take place between the contracting parties and the Mahrattas, and the Maha Raja should require an English force for the defence of his country, or the acquisition of territory, it was to be granted to remain with him, "as long as he shall require it, and return when he shall dismiss it," at the rate of 20,000 rupees a month for each battalion of Sepoys with its Artillery. The revenue of the territory acquired by the united forces, whether by war or by treaty, except the fifty-six Mahals which constitute the Maha Raja's Jageer, and which are now in the possession of the Mahrattas, to be divided between the parties in the proportion of nine annas to the Company and seven to the Raja. The Raja was to prescribe the nature of the service to be performed, the officer commanding the English troops to regulate the mode of performing it. Whenever peace shall be concluded between the Company and the Mahratta state, the Maha Raja shall be included as a party in the treaty which shall be made for that purpose; and his present possessions, together with the fort of Gwalior, which of old belongs to the family of the Maha Raja, if it shall be then in his possession, and such countries as he shall have acquired in the course of the war, and which it shall then be stipulated to leave in his hands, shall be guaranteed to him by treaty.

"No English factory shall be etablished in the dominions of the Maha Raja. No persons of any denomination shall be sent into his dominions on the part of the English Company, or with the license of the Governor General in Council, without his previous consent. Neither shall his ryuts be pressed for any military service, nor any authority exercised over them but his own."

By the next treaty, dated the 17th of January, 1804, we agreed to establish Maha Raja Keerut Singh in the sovereignty of his hereditary countries of Gohud and the undermentioned districts, to be possessed by him his heirs and successors, free from all deductions, under the guarantee of the Honorable Company:—Gwalior, Khas, Autra, &c. altogether forty places,

The Maha Raja subsidized three battalions, and agreed to pay for them nine lakhs of rupees annually. It became however in the mean time a question, whether by the terms of the treaty of the 30th of December, 1803, with Scindia, these territories were ours to grant, and as under the pacific administrations of the Marquis Cornwallis and Sir George Barlow, it was not the policy to make this a question of arms, a second treaty was concluded with the Rana, on the 19th of December, 1805, by which the "Maha Raj Rana hereby agrees to relinquish the possession of the country and fort of Gohud and of the other districts guaranteed to him by the former treaty, to the officers of the British Government, to be disposed of as may appear expedient to the Honorable Company." "The Honorable Company, from the consideration that the failure in the stipulations of the former treaty on the part of the Maha Raj Rana has arisen from inability and want of means, is inclined to grant to the Maha Raj Rana an adequate provision, and hereby agrees that the districts of Dholpore Barce and Raj Kera shall be delivered over to the Maha Raj Rana in sovereignty to him, his heirs and successors."

The Maha Raj Rana thus received a provision of four or five lakhs of rupees *per annum*, instead of a principality with a subsidiary force for his protection. But for the treaty of 17th January, 1804, even this was far more than he had any right to expect from us; and if through that treaty he gained nothing, neither did he lose any thing. The policy of the Marquis Wellesley would certainly have led him to carry through the arrangement by which Gwalior and Gohud were ceded to this chief; and with the measures which would have followed for the pacification of India, had the noble Marquis remained at the head of its administration, the Maha Raj Rana of Gohud would not have had much difficulty in conducting the affairs of his new principality. Gwalior would then have become in all probability our principal military station in those parts. Raj Rana Keerut Singh is still alive, but must be near his ninetieth year. In 1826, he was full of hope that the approaching death of Dowlut Rao Scindia would turn to his advantage, and then talked of recovering Gwalior and Gohud; but the changes which have since taken place must have satisfied him that the day for obtaining such acquisitions has long since passed away.

21. Rewah.—When on the extension of the British power into Bogelkund and Bundlekund, through the treaty of Bassein, it became desirable to enter into relations of amity and friendship with the Rewah state, and advances for that purpose were made in 1803, those advances were rejected by the Rajah.

The irruption of a body of Pindaries into the Mirzapore district, in March, 1812, through the Rewah country, proved to us that it was necessary to strengthen our frontier in that direction. Kurreem Khan, the leader of the Pindaries, had an interview with the Rewah Raja in his progress towards the British territory; and as he respected the Rewah country, the impression necessarily was that the Pindaries either were supported by the Raja, or that he had not the power of opposing them.

A treaty was accordingly negotiated on the 5th of October, 1812, through which the Raja's supremacy was acknowledged, and his possessions secured under the guarantee of the British Government, to whose mediation he submitted all relations with foreign states; mutual delivery of enemies and rebels was agreed to, and co-operation in military affairs.

When, however, it was intended to establish a military post within the Raja's territory, he objected to that measure, endeavoured to starve out the troops, objected to and opposed our opening a communication through his country by post, expelled our news-writer, and showed an unfriendly disposition in the whole of his measures towards our political agent and troops.

A force (the usual remedy) was accordingly sent into Rewah, to compel the Raja to adhere to the terms stipulated in the treaty, and on the 2nd of June, 1813, a second treaty was negotiated.

The Raja bound himself to engage in no correspondence of a political nature with any foreign state; to receive a news-writer or other agent; to permit the establishment of Dâks through his country, &c. Shortly after the negotiation of this treaty, the Raja abdicated in favor of his son, apparently in the hope of evading the fulfilment of these conditions. The son was required to execute an instrument binding himself to abide by the terms of the treaties negotiated with his father, and after considerable evasion he consented.

After a suspension of hostilities, for the purpose of negotiating the above treaty, had been agreed on, a small detachment of sepoys were treacherously attacked by the troops of Rewah. The aggressors in this affair were surrounded in the fortified post of Entouree, which was gallantly defended, and carried by assault by a detachment under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, on the 4th of December, 1813. This example seemed necessary, and was the first military operation conducted in those parts, the cost of which the Raja was made to bear.

On the 11th of March, 1814, a third treaty was negotiated with Rewah: some lands which by the terms of the former treaty were forfeited to the British Government by subjects of Rewah, were

transferred on certain conditions to that state, whose Government bound itself not to levy on certain of its subjects any portion of the penalty imposed upon itself. Some of its chiefs were guaranteed from the consequence which they apprehended as likely to arise from having taken part with us in the contest against their own Government.

In 1823, the Jageerdar of Simerea, one of the guaranteed chiefs, and a relation of the Raja's appealed to the British Government against his chief, who had sent a military force into his Jageer to enforce his demands for; 1st, arrears of tribute, amounting by his showing to rupees 1,50,250; 2nd, an outstanding balance of rupees 1,95,843, claimed from the Jageerdar during the period of his administering the affairs of Rewah; and 3rdly, to enforce a settlement regarding some disputed villages. The Raja was required to stay military operations, and to submit his differences with the Jageerdar to the arbitration of the British Government. And eventually, it was settled, that the demand for tribute for a period antecedent to the guarantee could not be recognised; that the claim arising from unadjusted accounts was met by a counterclaim on the part of the Jageerdar; that the demand for arrears of tribute from the period of the negotiation of the treaty was cancelled by the conduct of the Raja in sending an armed force into the Jageer of Simerea: and that the demand for tribute should for the future be limited to 2,500 rupees per annum.

It was evident that that change which is produced every where by the British Government forming relations with a native state was already working between the Raja and his feudatories. The measure of guaranteeing any of those, dependant chiefs necessarily at once produces that change, for they then look to the protection of the British Government, and the tie that before bound all together is severed. But there is another although less perceptible manner in which this change in their relative positions is sure to be worked. The original tenure, by which most of the subordinate chiefs under the native states of India hold their possessions, is that of supplying troops for the service of the state. The safety of the dominions depend on their acting in concert with the chief, who is as forward to court the favorable opinion and support of his feudatories as they are proud to receive his countenance, and to defend his and their own rights. When guaranteed from external danger by a foreign power, this dependence of the prince upon the support of his chiefs and people is necessarily in a great degree destroyed. His resources are gradually concentrated and improved, and he begins to look around him for the chief amongst them who is most likely "to make a bonny rebel." If our authority is appealed to, we generally have not the right to mediate between them; and if we attempt it without this right, we are sure sooner or later to do harm to him whose cause it is our object to support. It is to be feared, that this check on bad Government, which, although immeasurably inferior to that of representatives elected by the people

themselves, is still far superior to a pure despotism, will gradually disappear from amongst the native states most nearly connected with or supported by us. Those of Rajpootana are the finest examples of this description of Government, and unless the feudatory chiefs of those independent states watch narrowly over their own interests, and maintain a union amongst themselves, sufficient to protect their order against the usurpations of the throne, there is every probability that they will in the progress of time fall before its insidious encroachments and superior power.

In 1828, the Simerea Jageerdar came forward with an application to have the third and fourth articles of the third treaty by which he was guaranteed in his possessions expunged. It did not appear what inducement the Raja held out to him to make this proposition. But there was no difficulty in complying with a request "which relieved us from an inconvenient obligation, and conferred a benefit on the state of Rewah." It was afterwards discovered that the guarantee of the Jageerdar of Simerea extended only to his own lifetime, and that he had allowed the stipulated tribute to run considerably into arrears. The minister of Rewah too, whom he had considered principally inimical to him, was dead; and on those accounts he was induced to forego the guarantee of the British Government. Scarcely had he taken this imprudent step when he was expelled from his possessions by an armed force sent from Rewah, and his nephew installed in his room—his appeal to our protection was then of course of no avail.

The tone of Rewah has generally been considered hostile throughout the period of its connection with the British Government, and when the Raja of Ocheyrah was proceeding as a state prisoner through those territories in the end of 1831, under charge of two companies of Infantry, the Rewah Government was supposed to have collected a force of 1,400 men on the route by which he was proceeding, either with the view of effecting his rescue or of opposing his further progress. On account of these threatening appearances, the officer commanding the detachment applied for re-inforcements, and reported his intention of taking post in the fort of Myheer; but eventually the detachment proceeded to its destination unopposed.

The revenues of Rewah are estimated at twenty lakhs *per annum*; its standing army not to exceed 4,000 men. But it can on a very short notice assemble a militia force of from 10 to 15,000.

22. DUTTEAH.—The chief of this principality came under the authority of the British Government through the cessions in Bundlekund negotiated with the Peishwa in the treaty of Bassein. A treaty was subsequently negotiated with Dutteah, and is dated the 15th March, 1804. The Rao Raja submits to the arbitration of the British Government in matters of dispute with his neighbours, promises to join the British forces with his troops, and to act in subordinate co-operation. The ancient territories of his house are guaranteed; also protection against foreign aggression. By the

treaty of Poona of 13th June, 1817, the Peishwa ceded to the British Government certain lands belonging to his Vinchorekur Jageerdar. These were through a treaty dated the 31st of July, 1818, transferred to the Dutteah Raja in reward for the zeal, fidelity, and attachment which he had uniformly manifested to the British Government since the date of his former treaty. The Wukeel of the former Jageerdar received an assignment of ten thousand rupees per annum on these lands. The Raja engaged to give no asylum to criminals or defaulters of the British Government, and the remaining articles of the treaty are conformable with those of the former treaty.

The revenues of Dutteah are estimated at 12,00,000; and the state maintains 1,000 horse, and 4,000 foot.

23. Jansee.—The Soobadar of this place came under the cognizance of the British Government, through the treaty of Bassein; he being a tributary of the Peishwa. The treaty concluded with him is dated 6th February, 1804. He professes entire submission and sincere attachment; submits to arbitration in disputed matters, promises to join the British army with his forces, and to act in co-operation, and to pay to the British Government the tribute he had heretofore paid to the Peishwa.

From the treaty of Poona of the 13th of June, 1817, wherein the Peishwa ceded to the British Government the whole of his territories and tributes in Bundlekund, our relations with the Soobadar of Jansee became still more intimate. In its instructions to the political agent of 29th July, 1817, Government observed, adverting to the "respectable character, fidelity, and attachment of the late Soobadar, Sheo Rao Bhow, and to the general conduct of that principality since his decease, the Governor General considers the family to be entitled to every practicable indulgence. His Lordship has accordingly resolved to declare the territory of Jansee to be hereditary in the family of the late Sheo Rao Bhow, to perpetuate with his family the treaty concluded with the late Bhow, and to relinquish all claim to tribute, on condition of the chief furnishing at all times, when required by the British Government, a small body of good horse."

By a paper of "instructions" left by the late Soobadar, his daughter-in-law and the mother of his grand-son and heir was excluded from all interference in public affairs; and the administration continued to be conducted by a manager of the Soobadar's appointment, until 1822, when the manager died. Rao Beekajee Nana was then named by the political agent to be the administrator during the minority of the young Soobadar, and the nomination was confirmed by Government.

It appeared in 1826, that this manager had not only failed to improve the resources of the state during the four years of his administration, but that he had squandered all the accumulations of the former minister. The political agent was therefore desirous of introducing certain other persons, whom he named, to a share

in the administration, but this was resisted by the young Soobadar, who was then in his nineteenth year, and who wished to leave things as they were until he should be considered to have attained his majority.

Notwithstanding the injunctions of the late Soobadar, it appeared, that his daughter-in-law and the mother of the young Prince had, as might have been expected, occupied a prominent part in the administration during the whole period of the minority.

The revenues of Jansee are twelve lakhs a year, and the state maintains 700 horse and 3,000 Infantry.

24. TEHREE.—The Raja of Tehree seems to have maintained his independence when most of the other chiefs of Bundlekund came under the authority of the Peishwa.

A treaty of friendship and defensive alliance was negotiated with this state on the 25th of December, 1812, which does not materially differ from other treaties of this class.

The revenues of Tehree are twelve lakhs, and it maintains 1,200 Cavalry and 4,000 Infantry.

The other principal states besides Rewah, Dutteah, Jansee, and Tehree, under the Bundlekund and Saugor political agencies, are Jaloun, Sumptur, Pannah, Chutterpore, Ocheyrah, &c.

The revenues of the whole, including those already described, have been lately estimated at one crore and seven lakhs of rupees per annum; their military force at 7,000 Cavalry and 30,000 Infantry.

In 1830, the Raja of Ocheyrah, a state yielding about a lakh and a half of yearly revenue, was accused of instigating the assassination of his brother, who had a Jageer independent of his authority. The brother was intercepted and put to death by a party of the Ocheyrah troops when proceeding unprepared for such an attack, and attended only by a few unarmed followers, with his young bride from her father's house to his own. The Ocheyrah state is bound, like all the states in Internal India, to abstain from acts of aggression on its neighbours; and this barbarous proceeding came accordingly under the cognizance of the British Government.

It afforded a fine opportunity for establishing a new principle in the trial of the Ocheyrah Raja, of which the Governor General took advantage. Native chiefs, as assessors, were invited to assist the political agent in finding a verdict and deciding on the degree of punishment, and the Raja was found guilty by his peers, sentenced to be deposed, and to perpetual imprisonment within the British territories.

25. SAWUNTWAREE.—This state seems to have had its origin since the time of Sewajee. The first "agreement" of the British Government with it was negotiated through the Envoy of Goa on the 3rd of October, 1812. Its object was to save us from piracy, to which British commerce had long been subject.

Its chief who was styled Bhonsla, ceded the fort of Vingorla with the port and limit thereof, and agreed to deliver up all armed vessels.

Negotiation having failed, a force under the command of Sir William Grant Keir moved to the frontier of this state, early in 1819, to enforce the following demands—1st, the surrender of the offenders whose names are annexed into the hands of the British Government; 2nd, the repayment of the amount of property plundered; 3rd, the removal from all command under the Sawuntwaree Government of Lambaja Sawunt, and Babna Gopaul, the principal instigators in the outrages complained of; 4th, the surrender of the forts of Raree and Newtee, to be held for three years as pledges of good behaviour. The surrender of Waree was easily obtained, but Raree was invested. A Portuguese force from Goa had been before the place twenty-nine days, and had employed in the siege twenty-five pieces of ordnance, of which ten were of the largest calibre. The British batteries were opened on the 13th of February, and on the evening of the same day, the general defences were considered sufficiently impaired to admit of the outworks being assaulted, and they were carried accordingly. The principal portion of the garrison evacuated the place during the same night, and the remainder surrendered on the following morning. A treaty followed these operations, and is dated the 17th of February, 1819. It does not differ in any material point from other treaties of this period, except that subjects of Sawuntwaree committing crimes within, or plundering the British territories, are to be tried by the laws of that country. Certain districts and forts were ceded to the British Government, together with the line of sea-coast connecting its territory with that of the Portuguese. By another treaty of the same date, in the following year, the districts, with the exception of the line of sea-coast, were retroceded to Sawuntwaree, in proof that the British Government demanded the cession of those places only to put a stop to the depredations of the people of Sawuntwaree within its territory.

These measures failed, however, to produce what we desired, protection within our own border from the depredations of the people of Sawuntwaree; and it was found necessary to give the assistance of our Government to form in that principality an administration sufficiently powerful to subdue some of its turbulent chiefs, who impeded the efficient working of the machine.

In 1822, the Raja, though then in his 19th or 20th year, was debarred from all authority in the state by the Ranees, who, with the assistance of an influential minister, wished here, as elsewhere, to keep the administration of affairs in their own hands, whilst the most influential person in the principality, named Chundroba, favored the Raja's pretensions, and would have assisted him to break through the thraldom in which he was kept, had he not feared to lose thereby a substantial pension, which he held under the guarantee of our Government.

The weakness and disorganization of the Government of this petty state have again in the present year compelled the British Government to an armed interference in its internal affairs, and

the forts of Mahdogurh and Narraingurh, and the town of Waree are now occupied by British troops.

4th Class.—Guarantee and protection, subordinate co-operation; but supremacy in their own territory.

1. Ameer Khan.—From a low station in Rohilkund, Ameer Khan rose to an inferior command in the service of the gallant Nawab of Bhopal, and from that station entered the service of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, with whose fortunes those of this great predatory leader are blended, until they returned with the wreck of their army from the Punjab in the early part of 1806.

It is unnecessary to follow this chief through his great career of crime, in the eleven years which intervened between that period and the "engagement" into which he entered with the British Government, in 1817. Amongst other events of his checquered life, his demonstrations against the Nagpore territory, in 1809, which at one time promised to subvert that Government led to the advance of the British army under Colonel Close to his capital of Seronje.

The "engagement" with Ameer Khan is dated November, 1817. It guarantees to the Nawab and his heirs in perpetuity the possession of the places which he held in grant from Maha Raja Holkar; the principal of which were Tonk, Seronje, and Neembahera—Rampore was afterwards granted to him by the British Government; and in all, they are understood to yield fifteen lakhs a year.

Since that period Ameer Khan has settled down into a quiet and respectable administration of his country, having incurred in the estimation of his followers, and his tribe, considerable odium for overlooking their interests in his engagements with us; and still more by forsaking the cause in which Holkar and the other Mahratta principalities were then engaged, before the fate of that cause had been decided by the battles of Poona, Mahedpore, and Nagpore.

In the eventual adjustment of the territory to be settled on Nawab Ameer Khan, he laid claim to the Jageer which Guffoor Khan, his agent with Holkar's army, had secured to himself from that chief; amounting to five lakhs of rupees *per annum*, and which by the treaty with Holkar had been guaranteed to him in the same manner as the Nawab's possesions were guaranteed to himself; his claim to Guffoor Khan's possessions was therefore of course disallowed.

In 1821, the Nawab was considered to show a bad disposition, in first harbouring, and afterwards aiding in the escape of, Goverdun Doss, the son of the Raj Rana of Kotah, who had joined the party of the Maha Rao in opposing his own father and our troops.

In 1825, the Nawab made a proposal, to farm for a period of twenty years, the whole of his possessions to the British Government, the object of which was not apparent if there was indeed any object, or he had any such intention.

In 1827, the Nawab took a strong objection to the measures of our opium agent at Sehore; to the seizure of some opium passing from one of his districts, where it was produced, to his residence at Tonk, and to the conduct of the persons employed by us to seize and purchase opium. It was not considered necessary, however, by Government to restore this opium, but it was proposed to make him compensation for any defalcation of revenue which he might sustain through our opium arrangements.

In 1827, the Nawab revived the discussion of his claim to the possession of the late Guffoor Khan, which he pretended were assignments made by himself to that chief, for the support of troops, and proposed to make a suitable allowance for Guffoor Khan's son. The decision of Government on this question remained unaltered, Guffoor Khan and his heirs being considered guaranteed by the treaty of Mundesoor in his possessions.

The son and heir to the possessions of Nawab Ameer Khan is a disciple of the late Seyud Ahmed, and will be the only independent chief in India professing those doctrines. Seyud Ahmed was a native of the same part of the country as Ameer Khan, and was originally in the Nawab's service. When he entered on his northern crusade against the infidels of India, he left his family under the Nawab's care at Tonk, which however remained a secret until after the Seyud's first important defeat by the army of Runjeet Singh in the neighbourhood of Peshawur.

In discussing the important events of his life at Dehlee, in 1827, Ameer Khan considered that he was fairly entitled to a *chout* on the territories which we conquered from the Peishwa and the Bhonsla; arguing that but for the expedition under his command to Nagpore, in 1809, and the fear which the Nagpore Raja entertained of him, that chief would never have subsidized a force of ours; and that but for Holkar's expedition to Poona in 1802, in which he acted so conspicuous a part, we should never have had a subsidiary force there; and that without these subsidiary forces, we should never have gained such important acquisitions of territory.

2. Protected Sikh States.—These states came under British protection when Maha Raja Runjeet Singh was induced, through the negociations with him, in 1809, terminating in the treaty of the 25th of April of that year, to retire behind the Sutleje, maintaining on its left bank only sufficient troops for the internal duties of his territories there, and renouncing all authority over the Sikh states so situated.

We have no treaties with any of the states—they were received under British protection without any stipulations on either side, and have since continued the most favored of the states of India, enjoying perfect security against foreign invasion, and arbitration in their international affairs, without paying tribute to the power by whom they are protected, and which seeks to avoid all concern with their internal administration. There are about 150 Sirdars and proprietors in this tract of country, of whom 135 are Sikhs and

the rest Mahomedans. The revenue of the whole is estimated at 55 lakhs of rupees, and it is supposed that these chiefs can without any difficulty support an army of 5,000 horse and 20,000 Infantry.

Putteala is the largest state, its revenues being nearly 20,00,000 a year,

Keytul is the next in importance, its revenues being about 4,00,000. Jeend and Naba are of nearly equal magnitude, their revenues being about 2,50,000 rupees each.

The others are of inferior importance, three or four of them yielding a lakh a year, and the others under that sum.

The only questions of any importance that occur in these states, requiring our mediation, are the aggressions of one state towards another, for they maintained for many years their original predatory habits, which were hardly inferior to those of the Mahrattas and Pindarces ; the settlement of boundary disputes, and those relating to succession.

In Putteala Kour Ajeet Singh contended for a series of years against his brother's possession of the entire principality. After the death of their father he retired to Dehlee to prosecute his claim, which was for a half share of the territory ; professing that if we did not interfere, he could through an appeal to the justice of the neighbouring Sikh states, particularly to that of Maha Raja Runjeet Singh, force from his brother the share which he claimed. It does not of course suit our purpose, which is the maintenance of universal tranquillity, to admit of the armed interference of one state in the adjustment of disputed questions in another. But as we prohibit this, it is our duty to bring those questions to a speedy and final decision. After Kour Ajeet Singh had remained absent from Putteala for seven years, an inquiry was held in November, 1826, into his pretensions. But he failed to establish any one instance in which a division of territory had taken place in the tribe to which he belonged (the Phoolkeas,) in what could be considered a *Reeasut* or Government. And it was obvious, if the laws or usages of inheritance in property of this nature were different amongst the Sikhs from those which prevail in the other Hindoo states of India, whether Rajpoot, Mahratta, or any other, that Sikhs could not long maintain a national Government. It was therefore decided that Kour Ajeet Singh was not entitled to share in the possessions of Putteala. Dropping this pretension there was little difficulty in securing a suitable provision for him, for Maha Raja Kurm Singh was perfectly well disposed towards his brother, and an adjustment of their differences according to his new pretensions was effected without our interference.

In the Naba chiefship Raja Jeswunt Singh, who had married a young wife, influenced by her, desired to set aside his elder son Kour Runjeet Singh, in favor of her offspring. This has of late years been the principal object of the Naba chief. He had, as is usual in such cases, originally made a separate provision for his elder son, from which he latterly displaced him, and under the

pretence that an attempt had, through his instigation, been made on his own life, the son was placed in confinement. From this situation however he effected his escape, and sought employment in the Panjab. The British Government steadily refused to sanction any change in the established rules of succession, and Kour Runjeet Singh would in the service of the Maha Raja have quietly awaited the death of his father, but he has himself lately died in exile.

These are the questions which disturb the harmony of these petty states; in other respects they are more happily circumstanced than most of the principalities under our protection. Situated on the frontier which separates Hindoostan from the nations of the north and west, on the great commercial tract between these countries, they must benefit from the operations of all, whilst their position affords a ready outlet for their productions, whether agricultural or commercial. They will too participate largely in any benefits that may arise from the opening of the Indus and Sutleje to the commerce of Western India; although their position on the Jumna must afford a ready enough means of transport for their commodities to the plains of Bengal.

5th Class.—Amity and friendship.

1. GWALIOR.—The first treaty of the British Government with Scindia is dated the 13th of October, 1781, and was negotiated with Madhajee Scindia, the son of Ranajee, the founder of this family. The Mahrattas had lost their possessions in Hindoostan and Malwa with the battle of Paniput, in 1760, but their tide of conquest soon again rolled northward, and before his death we find this chief at the head of a powerful army, organised under French officers, the principal of whom was general De Boigne, the actual ruler of the greater portion of Hindoostan and Rajpootana. He was recognised as an independent Prince by the treaty of Salbye, negotiated by the British Government with the Mahratta Empire, in 1782. He died at Poona, whither it is supposed he marched with no friendly intentions towards the British Government, during the first siege of Seringapatam. He was succeeded by his grand-nephew Dowlut Rao Scindia, who was then in his fourteenth year, and on whom devolved the control of a regular army, sufficient, had there been no British army in that field, to govern the destinies of India. Dowlut Rao Scindia's first great effort against the British Government was to resist the position which it had assumed, when through the treaty of Bassien of December, 1802, it brought the Peishwa back to Poona, and restored him to the throne from which he had been driven by Scindia's rival, Holkar, who through the fortune of war obtained for a moment the ascendancy at that capital.

Scindia in confederation with the Bhonsla, Holkar, and it is even supposed with the Peishwa himself, advanced towards Poona; but the defeat of the united armies of Scindia and the Bhonsla at the battles of Assye and Worgaom by the Duke of Wellington; and

the defeat of Scindia's army in Hindoostan by the forces under Lord Lake, at the battles of Dehlee and Luswaree, with the loss of the fortresses of Ahmednuggur, Asseergurh, Gawilgurh, Alligurh, Agra, and Gwalior, led to the treaty of Sirjee Anjungaum, negotiated on the 30th of December, 1803. This treaty is of friendship and alliance. By the results of the war, the Maha Raja must have lost more than half his dominions: that which remained to him being confined almost to Malwa, extending to Boorhanpore, on the one hand, and Gwalior on the other, with the isolated positions of Powengurh and Dhond in Guzerat. To save certain of the chiefs of the state from loss, whose Jageers were situated within the territory ceded by this treaty, the British Government agreed to indemnify these chiefs for such losses, provided their claims did not in all exceed seventeen lakhs of rupees per annum. It was agreed to restore certain family possessions of Scindia in the Dekhan, which had been conquered in the course of the war; and these are the towns and villages which, since the conquest of the Peishwa's country, intermix with those of the Company, and over which, Scindia's exercising sovereign rights, gives us so much trouble. By the treaty it became optional with Scindia to claim the services of a subsidiary force, without incurring any expence on that account, to the extent of six battalions of Infantry with ordnance attached. But he never required the services of this force. In the mean time, a treaty was negotiated with the neighbouring Rana of Gohud, dated 17th January, 1804, by the second article of which, "The Honorable the East India Company hereby agree to establish Maha Raj Rana Keerut Singh, in the sovereignty of his hereditary countries of Gohud and the undermentioned districts, to be possessed by him, his heirs, and successors, free from all deductions, under the guarantee of the Honorable Company, viz. Gwalior Khas, &c."

On the 16th of December, 1803, a treaty was concluded with the farmer of Scindia's possessions of Gwalior, Gohud, &c. through which he was to render up certain portions of Scindia's possessions, which had belonged to the Rana of Gohud, on condition of our guaranteeing to himself in sovereignty the remaining territories held under his management. But this farmer (Umbajee Rao Jugliah) either could not or did not fulfil his agreement, and it was found necessary to conquer this as the other portions of Scindia's territory. By the treaty of the 30th of December, 1803, with Scindia, it was doubtful whether he had ceded the territories of Gwalior and Gohud, which we had thus disposed of. Scindia argued that he had not, and even the highest authorities of the British Government were divided on the question. He was averse to the resident at his court quitting, pending the discussion that took place on this subject. He knew, as Sir Charles Metcalfe has remarked, that the withdrawal of the former resident was the signal for the former war; and when the resident, in preparing to depart, sent forward his baggage, Scindia sent some troops to plunder it. The resident was therefore considered to be a prisoner

in Scindia's camp. The Governor General required his release, and Scindia replied, "that the acting resident was agreeably to usage delayed until a successor arrived in his camp."

In the mean time the Marquis Cornwallis who had assumed the reins of Government, died, and Sir George Barlow became Governor General. In accordance with the pacific views of the then Government, a new and definitive treaty was concluded with Scindia on the 22nd of November, 1805, by which Gwalior and Gohud were given up to him, and H. H. was to receive for himself personally four lakhs of rupees per annum; whilst his wife and daughter received Jageers, the former of two lakhs and the latter one lakh; he relinquishing in return for these benefits all claim to the seventeen lakhs of rupees *per annum* granted to his chiefs by the former treaty, also the districts of Dholpore Baree and Raj Kerah, and all claims to tribute on the countries north of the Chumbul to the limit of Kotah, to which place that river became the boundary.

The disposition of Scindia towards the British Government is believed to have continued favorable till 1813 or 14, when the Peishwa's negotiations with him commenced. On the 26th of March, 1815, the resident at Gwalior reported that an embassy had arrived from Holkar's court, and in July, 1818, the officiating resident submitted to Government a copy of a treaty of 1815, between those states, which he considered had for its object the re-union of the Mahratta powers under the Peishwa. The first article is "in the same manner in which you and I formerly agreed in obeying the orders of Shreemunt, and in serving him with fidelity, so we shall now with sincerity devote ourselves to such service as may be agreeable to Shreemunt."

Sixth article.—"The Bhonsla is our friend; let us act so as to secure his friendship as formerly. By friendship each will accomplish his wishes." The treaty is in the usual native fashion. The propositions are stated by Holkar, and the assent of Scindia given on the same paper. In the period that followed, to the commencement of the Pindaree war, his assistance for the suppression of those plunderers located chiefly in his territories, and who thence ravaged most of the countries of India, was either not cordially afforded, or failed signally of success. Negotiations between H. H. and the Goorkas having a hostile tendency towards the British were detected, and it was not until two divisions of the British army, destined for operations against the Pindarees, the one amounting to 12,500 men, at the head of which was the Governor General; the other to 7,000, were within one march of his frontier, and moving directly on his capital, that the treaty of the 9th of November, 1817, was signed.

By this treaty Dowlut Rao Scindia agreed to co-operate with the British Government for the subversion of the Pindarees and all other freebooters. Five divisions of H. H. Cavalry, amounting to 1000 each, were to be attached to divisions of the British forces, and each to be under the controul of a British officer. For the more efficient

payment of these troops, H. H. agreed to relinquish for three years the sums which he received from the British Government, and for two years the tribute which he levied from the Rajpoot states; any surplus of either amount, in excess to the pay of the troops to be afterwards accounted for. British garrisons were also to be admitted into the forts of Asseergurh and Hindia during the war. The eighth article of the treaty of 22nd November, 1805, was abrogated, and the British Government was declared to be at liberty to enter into engagements with all the substantive Rajpoot states on the left of the Chumbul. In the event of its forming engagements with those states it bound itself to pay to Scindia the tribute which he might be entitled to levy from them.

There was, as might have been expected, great dilatoriness on the part of Scindia's officers in preparing the Contingent for the field, and it was not until the 27th of February, that the superintendant was able to move with about 2000 Cavalry from Gwalior, such as he certainly would not willingly have marched through Coventry with. Some of them were described as little else than grass-cutters mounted on their tatoos, some of the men without arms, and the horses without saddles.

That portion of the treaty of Gwalior which stipulated that British garrisons should be admitted into the fortress of Asseergurh, and the fort of Hindia, was violated by the commandant of the former place, who fired on the British troops. A garrison was admitted into the latter, and it was restored when the Pindarees were subdued. Scindia continued to profess that the commander of Asseergurh, Jeswunt Rao Lar, Scindia's maternal uncle, would not on his orders deliver up the fortress to the British Government, and that he had not the means of compelling him to do so. It therefore became necessary to prepare an army for its reduction. On the fall of the place some original letters from Scindia to the commander of the fortress were found in a casket of his. They were presented to Scindia, and he confessed that they were in his own hand-writing. He had thus at the very time when he had publicly made over to us the right to occupy the fortress, privately commanded Jeswunt Rao Lar to support the Peishwa, and consequently to resist us. "The Maha Raja entered into a long apology for his conduct, which turned chiefly on the ties by which he had felt himself bound to Bajee Rao, and the pressure which had been brought to bear upon him to obtain some proof of his attachment to that chief." Although Scindia had shown his allegiance to the head of the Mahratta empire, by causing the commander of his fortress to receive the Peishwa favorably, there was no proof that Jeswunt Rao Lar was afterwards acting in obedience to Scindia, in opposing us when the place was besieged, and Scindia solemnly protested the contrary; yet the probability of course is, that without the authority of the sovereign, the servant would not have resisted. Towards the middle of 1818, the final exchange of territory took place with Scindia. The British Government receiving

Ajmere, Islamnagur, &c. and ceding to Scindia places of equal value. On the 1st of March, 1819, Scindia's Contingent had been reduced to about 2000 horse, at a monthly expence of rupees 1,20,000. This amount exceeded however the funds set aside by the terms of the treaty of Gwalior for the payment of the Contingent, and for the excess, which had been disbursed by the British Government, H. H. was indebted. It was therefore agreed on the 6th of February, 1820, that the Contingent should be so reduced as to bring the cost within the amount originally assigned for its payment, and that for the debt incurred on account of it the revenue of certain territory intermixed with that of the Company should be assigned.

The questions which continued under discussion with the Gwalior court for some time referred principally to territorial cessions in the Dekhan and Malwa, having for their objects the improvement or better defining of our respective frontiers, and the facilitating our system of police in our own territory. Scindia clung with a pertinacity to his Dekhan possessions, for which our Government did not sometimes see any adequate reason. Neither money payments, nor cessions elsewhere would induce him to forego his connexion with those isolated possessions, some of which were hereditary in the house of Scindia, distinct from the exercise of those sovereign powers which elsewhere belonged to him, and to which Mahrattas and other Hindoo inhabitants of India cling with a pertinacity which Scotchmen better than others will understand. Maun Singh Rao Patunker, who held possession of Scindia's districts in Guzerat, had for some time shown a disposition to resist the orders of the court, and to disregard its summons of recal. The aid of the British Government was required by Scindia to effect this purpose, principally on the ground that his recal was determined on at our instance, for that chief in the exercise of his administration of Powungurh had invaded, or was considered by the Baroda Government, and the resident at that court, to have invaded, the territories of our ally. He was connected with Scindia, his son being married to H. H. daughter, and the son was supposed to be detained by the father after the period when according to Hindoo customs he ought to cohabit with his wife; his absence was therefore considered in some respect to be dishonorable to that lady. Scindia, whilst he desired to make us the instrument of reducing his disloyal subject, showed a disposition to exclude us from the right of exercising any authority in regulating the eventual adjustment of their differences. A correspondence was opened with Patunker by the residents at Gwalior and Baroda, and as it was considered by those officers that it would be necessary to arm for his reduction, preparations were accordingly made to detach a force against him from the Bombay presidency. It was represented by Scindia, that this note of preparation would be the signal for the plunder by himself and his Arab and Mekrane mercenaries of the districts under his charge; and it was deemed necessary in May, 1824, to push forward the Contingent under British officers to save

those districts from such consequences; to take possession of the open country; to block up Patunker in the fortress of Powungurh, if he should retire to it; and in conjunction with a body of the Guickwar Contingent Horse, to force that chief to submit to the terms of the Gwalior court, without the necessity of calling into operation a British force. The Contingent was found sufficient to bring the refractory chief to the terms prescribed by the court of Gwalior without the necessity of calling for the assistance of British troops; although advantage was taken of some corps passing from Baroda to the relief of others at Mhow for the purpose of intimidation. It was a question of considerable difficulty on what conditions, or for what reason, our troops should be sent to aid Scindia in a measure of so purely an internal character, as that of coercing a servant of his own. We were under no obligation to afford such assistance, nor did it appear that before the promise of such assistance was given any exertion had been made on the part of Scindia's Government to assert its own power or to fulfil its duty. The question of evil to ourselves or our allies from any distracted state of our or their possessions during this internal struggle had not arisen, nor was Scindia called on to declare his inability to perform his sovereign duties, or to abide by the consequences of his failure to do so. The assistance was asked and granted, and with the important principle of international Government which it involved was mixed up the view of conciliating Scindia into an acquiescence with certain objects of ours, in obtaining the cession of territories in Nimawar and the Dekhan. Another question which caused great anxiety at the court of Gwalior was the seizure by the Raja of Colapore of the Jageer of Hindoo Rao, the brother of the Baeza Baee, Scindia's favorite wife. This Jageer, consisting of 69½ villages, was held under a grant from the King of Dehlee, but lying within the Colapore territory, was attached by that chief under circumstances very offensive to Hindoo Rao, obliging his mother and the other female members of his family residing there to fly from his oppressions, and to seek protection in the Nepanee territory. Scindia required our mediation in this matter with the chief of Colapore to an extent which we did not feel ourselves justified in granting, and hence great disappointment on his part. Scindia observed, "that an utter stranger, a Mussulman, would not have treated females with the indignity and barbarity that the Colapore Raja had treated those of his own tribe and nearly allied to himself." The Colapore Raja required Hindoo Rao to attend at his court as a suppliant for the restoration of his Jageer of Kungal. But after the treatment which the members of his family had experienced, this concession on his part, it was considered, would be derogatory to his character.

Some surprise was expressed by Government at Scindia's having about this time addressed Doorjun Saul, the Bhurtpore usurper, by the style and title appertaining to the chief of that house. There was no doubt as to the fact, which however Scindia endeavoured

to explain away as arising from inadvertency in addressing him on some trivial occasion.

After a protracted illness, Dowlut Rao Scindia died on the 21st of March, 1827, in his 48th year. He had no son, and had not adopted one. The only indication that he gave relative to the future management of affairs was in a conference with his friend the resident, when he said, "A man's wife, if she has any sense or understanding, is the person entitled to manage his affairs after his death." "But your Highness has two wives, I observed." "True," he replied, "but I suppose you know that one of them is entirely out of the question in a case of this kind. I admit," he continued, that according to usage *(serishta)*, she is the person. But to assume a charge of this kind, a woman must have sense, knowledge of the world, and experience in business; all of which she has not. She is entirely unsuited for any thing of the kind; in fact, she is fit only to sit quietly in her house, and to eat her food and nothing more." The following account of the closing scene of Dowlut Rao Scindia's life is given from Major Stewart's letter of the 22nd of March, as well because the occurrences of the time are beautifully and feelingly described, as because it is an unusual position for an English Gentleman to be placed in; and that it shows the advantage of having such a man, at such a place, at such a time.

"About nine o'clock yesterday morning a horseman came at full speed from the Maha Raja's camp to the residency, with a message from Hindoo Rao, stating that the Maha Raja had expressed an anxious wish to see me, and begging that I would as soon as possible proceed to the palace. Conceiving that the Maha Raja must be in his last moments, I instantly mounted a horse, and accompanied by Captain Dyke alone, I reached the palace in a very short time after I had received this message. I found an anxious crowd outside, and all the chiefs and people of respectability assembled in the different apartments of the palace. As soon as I met Hindoo Rao, I anxiously inquired after the Maha Raja. Hindoo Rao said that he was very ill, and that I should see him immediately, &c. &c. During this conversation, messages were carried backwards and forwards, from the interior apartments, where the Maha Raja was, and it was at last announced that H. H. was ready to receive me. I proceeded to his apartment, accompanied by Hindoo Rao, Raojee Khosjee Walla, Atmaram Pundit, and perhaps there were one or two more. Captain Dyke also accompanied me. H. H. lay or rather reclined on a couch supported by pillows, and a number of female servants were in attendance around him. Behind a purdah close to him was the Baeza Baee, Rookma Baee and Bala Baee, and their attendants. I was much shocked to observe the sad change that had taken place in the Maha Raja's appearance: his arms and upper part of his body had become quite emaciated, his belly and lower extremities were greatly swelled. I went up to him, took his hand in mine, and leant over him, so as to hear what he might say. He remained silent for some time, apparently

unable to speak. At last he said in a distinct and audible voice, so as to be heard by every one present, and even I believe behind the purdah, I wish you to do whatever you think proper, (*"Jo toom moonasib jano so kuró."*) I replied that every thing should be arranged according to His Highness's wishes, and I added some words of consolation, and said, I trusted by the blessing of God he would yet recover. He appeared affected, and said, 'By the sight of you, and your friendship,' (*Ap ke dekhne se, our ap ke mohubet se,*) but he could not finish the sentence. A long pause now ensued, and I at last said, "Is there any thing else that your Highness would wish to say to me." He replied, I have a great deal to say to you, (*"bhoutera sa kuhna hy."*) But after waiting a considerable time he could add no more. I then proposed to retire into another room for a short time, and to return, when His Highness might revive a little and be able to speak. This was agreed to by all present. When I was about to retire, I heard the voice of the Baeza Baee suggesting that Dr. Panton should be sent for. I asked the Maha Raja if it was his wish that that Gentleman should be called, when His Highness made a faint sign of assent.

"I have been thus particular in giving the expressions used by the Maha Raja on this occasion, as they were probably the last words he uttered. I had not retired above an hour to an upper apartment, when the screams of females announced that the Maha Raja's life had fled.

"It would be difficult for me to give any adequate notion of the scene that ensued; the cries of women and the lamentations of men, the uproar, and the tumult, were beyond all description.

"With reference to what I have stated in the last paragraph of my letter of the 20th instant, I immediately determined to remain at the palace till the Maha Raja's body should be carried to the funeral pile, and a request to that effect was also made to me by Hindoo Rao, and the other principal persons present. It was very satisfactory to me to find that though there was a great appearance of grief, there were none of the appearances that indicated an intended Suttee. When a woman intends to ascend the funeral pile of her husband, her grief assumes a more sublime character: she sheds no tears, she makes no lamentation, she lays aside her veil, and no longer conceals herself from the sight of men. There were none of these signs. When therefore I was informed that the Baeza Baee had declared she would follow the Maha Raja, I was certain that it would not be difficult to restrain her. For this purpose however I was called on to speak to the lady, with only a thin piece of cloth held up by two females between us.

"It is not necessary to detail all that was said on this occasion. I terminated the discussion by assuming the authority which the Maha Raja's dying declaration had, I said, given me, and I desired that she would withdraw to her own apartments. She was at last dragged away by her female attendants. Shortly after, a memorandum consisting of seven articles was brought to the resident, purporting

to be the Maha Raja's last will, but not bearing his signature, the principal of which were, The Maha Raja's declared intention to adopt a son. The appointment of Hindoo Rao to be the superintendant, and another person to be the Mookhtar. In case of the birth of a son, he is to be heir to the possessions; 'and it is added, that the adopted son shall be obedient to the orders of the Maha Raja and the Baeza Baee as long as they live.' For the fulfilment of all these intentions he appeals to the support of the British Government.

"It was a singular and a melancholy sight to see the Maha Raja dressed in his last apparel, adorned with jewels and pearls, seated in his palankeen with his face uncovered, as if still alive, accompanied by all his state-elephants and led horses, set out on this last procession. He was accompanied to the funeral pile by almost every man in camp, and the tears of the multitude showed, that however deficient in many of the qualities of a good prince, he was neither a cruel nor a tyrannical sovereign. The Maha Raja was by no means deficient in understanding, to which indeed he owed the salvation of his state amid the wreck of the Mahratta Empire. In conversation the comparisons and illustrations he used were frequently very striking and happy. His temper was mild and gentle in the extreme, though his courage was never doubted. Whatever may have been the vices and crimes of his youth, (and these I believe are more to be ascribed to evil counsellors than to himself,) his latter years have been unmarked by any gross violation of morality. Apathy and indolence were his besetting faults, which through life prevented him from ever executing the duties of a sovereign with efficiency. On the whole, when it is considered that he was raised to a sovereignty at that time the most extensive in India, at the early age of 14, and that he was brought up from childhood amid the scenes of treachery and rapacity that characterise a Mahratta camp, it is easy to find an excuse for many of the errors and vices of his reign. If in any part of this dispatch I have transgressed the rules of official correspondence, I trust the occasion will plead my excuse. I should be insensible indeed if I could with feelings unmoved report the death of a chief whom I have long known, and with whom I may of late be said to have been on terms of intimacy. Nor is it the least affecting circumstance attending his death, that the last act of his life showed his unbounded confidence in the justice and generosity of the British Government."

It appeared on further inquiry that the document produced as the Maha Raja's last will was hardly finished at the moment of his death, that it was prepared quite publicly, although the Baeza Baee afterwards denied having any knowledge of or share in the transaction, and that it had been intended by those who prepared it, and into whose hands the powers of the state now fell, to be presented by the Maha Raja to the resident as a testamentary document at their last interview.

On Scindia's death, the Baeza Baee virtually assumed the sovereignty of the state, professedly in the capacity of Regent; her brother Hindoo Rao acting under her orders. From her talents and character, it was supposed that she was not likely to leave much authority in the hands of even her own brother. The resident at that time foresaw that the struggle which has commenced, or is now about to commence, between the Regent and the adopted heir could hardly be avoided, after he had arrived at years of discretion.

On the death of Scindia, various schemes were brought forward by the neighbouring political authorities for improving our own frontier by getting possession, either by cession in sovereignty, or in perpetual farm, of certain districts which were supposed to dovetail badly with ours. It did not seem to be a part of their scheme to give up any of our districts to Scindia, nor did they appear much to take into consideration that we must have a frontier somewhere, and that all the vexations attending the management of border relations must form part of the disagreement of all Governments. These desired encroachments were however resisted by Government. The resumption of certain Dekhanee possessions, which it did not appear by the treaty of Sirjee Anjungaum that we had transferred to Scindia, (for on the terms of that treaty clearly depended H. H. rights in that quarter,) must have been an unpalatable ingredient in the new terms which it was proposed to negociate. But the most or only thoroughly unpalatable demand was that for the payment of a sum of money. The payment of four lakhs of rupees stipulated by treaty from the British Government terminated with the life of the Maha Raja. This sum had been applied in part payment of the Contingent of Horse, and that resource failing, some other was necessary. It was therefore at first proposed to place in our treasury, by way of loan, a sum of money, the interest of which should be equal to this object. But preferable to this, was deemed an out and out loan of eighty lakhs or a crore, at five per cent. On the strength of this accommodation to us was revived, on the part of the Baeza Baee, an intention of pawning on the Scindia state and family, a relation of her own by the adoption of a boy, whom it was proposed to bring from the Colapore family, to which she belongs, instead of one from the Scindia family, with whom was the right and the voice of the chiefs and people of the country. This intention the Baeza Baee soon found would not be any where tolerated. A batch of boys, five in number, were brought from the Dekhan, and the choice fell on Moogut Rao, a youth of eleven years of age, who was declared to be the nearest relation of the late Maha Raja, who could from his age be adopted. This was too advanced an age to secure that protracted minority which suited the views of the Baeza Baee; some delay accordingly took place, and greater delay was apprehended. It is remarkable enough that the decision of the question was hastened more apparently by the voice of the bankers, than any other class: "who do not consider matters secure here, until the Musnud is occupied, began to show

their alarm by discontinuing their business. These circumstances probably had the principal effect in making the Baee give her assent to the elevation of Moogut Rao."

On the 19th of June, the resident reports, "I have the satisfaction to report to you, for the information of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General, that the boy Moogut Rao was married to the youngest grand-daughter of the late Maha Raja on Sunday, and yesterday seated on the Musnud (under the style and title of Maha Raja Ali Jah Junkojee Rao Scindia Bahadoor.)

"My letters to your address of the 8th and 18th instant will have prepared his Lordship for these events. On Saturday evening the whole of the chiefs and ministers of this Government were assembled at the Durbar, when the Baeza Baee's intention to adopt Moogut Rao, and place him on the Musnud was formally announced, and the opinion of the assembly on the subject was asked: not a dissenting voice was raised on the occasion; all agreed to and applauded the measure. The Shastrees were next consulted as to the propriety of uniting Moogut Rao in marriage unto the youngest grand-daughter of the late Maha Raja; the Shastrees having declared the union legal, and that it might take place either before or after Moogut Rao was placed on the Musnud, it was determined that the marriage should be solemnized immediately. That ceremony having accordingly been solemnized on Sunday, I was invited to assist at the ceremony of Moogut Rao's installation yesterday." It did not of course escape the observation of the resident that such a marriage could hardly be legal, but dispensations may be obtained for crowned heads at Gwalior as well as at Lisbon.

After this important arrangement was concluded, little remained for future adjustment with the court of Gwalior. The lady who was betrothed to the young Prince unfortunately died; and we had in a greater degree than elsewhere all the difficult questions which arise during a minority and the Regency of a woman. That woman not being the mother of the Raja, and the adoption having been, in a measure, forced upon her; much cordiality or good feeling towards the young Prince were not to be expected, particularly after the death of her grand-daughter. We had accordingly constantly to remonstrate with the Regent Mother on her treatment of the young prince, whose approach towards maturity, as it was calculated to place a rival near the throne, also tended to render him more obnoxious to her. His education was neglected, every thing tending to raise or bring him forward in the estimation of his people was studiously avoided; her open declaration was that she would be sovereign or nothing. "Nobody," she said, "ever wished to qualify another for the exercise of power they themselves wished to retain." It continued her object to obtain from the British Government an acknowledgment of a life Regency, and it is the less surprising that the Baeza Baee should feel reluctance to render up her authority, since the resident has stated so short a time since as the 14th of June, 1830. "It was by no means

imperative on the Baee to make an adoption, and she might, I conceive, have continued to rule this state during her life, without raising a boy to the Musnud." Being a clever and spirited woman, she appears to have conducted the affairs of the principality without involving us in trouble. The loan was a point open to discussion. It became a question whether a receipt should be granted for the money as her property or the property of the state, and when Government came to the resolution of paying off the amount rather than consider it in the former light, it was found that this did not at all accord with her expectations ; for she calculated on the interest becoming a perpetual fund from which, like one of our Lucknow loans, various provisions might be made for ministers or dependents.

Of this loan, which was eventually paid, ten lakhs was understood to be Her Highness's private property, 40 or 50 advances by bankers on assignments on the revenue, and the remainder from the Maha Raja's treasury.

In 1830, the funds from which the Auxiliary Horse were paid arose from the appropriation of the proceeds of the Baeza Baee's Jageer granted to her by the British Government,.....Sa. Rs. 2,00,000

Kotah Tribute,	1,02,430
Kotrees ditto,	10,610
Jeypore ditto,	1,00,000
Rutlam and Sillana ditto,	1,12,140
Revenues of Gura Kotah, and Multan.	70,000
Ditto of Yowla and Chopira in Kandeish,	73,560

making in all an annual amount of rupees 6,75,696, whilst the expence of the Contingent was 7,09,224, and on the death of the Baeza Baee the revenue of her Jageer will lapse.

The Gwalior Government effectually resisted or evaded all our endeavours to bring them into our Malwa opium arrangements, and frequently complained of the loss sustained by commerce, and in revenue, through our measures, exaggerating the amount at one time to 10 or 12 lakhs a year.

In June, 1830, two things were required of the Regent—first, that she should adopt the seal of the Maha Raja, and administer the Government in his name. Secondly, that she should allow a free and unreserved intercourse between the Maha Raja and the resident ; and to both of these, after long and protracted discussions, she agreed,

The following specimen of the young Maha Raja's character, as developed in his first interview with the resident when in his fifteenth year, is not very promising :—" He declared that he was happy, and he then said that the Baee possessed all the authority. I replied that of course at his age he could not expect to have the authority in his hands, that he must be under the control of some person, and the Baee was the most proper person. I still urged him, if there was any thing in the treatment he received of which he had reason to complain, to state it to me. He again replied in

an indifferent kind of way that he was happy. I then said, If you are, as you say, happy, and have nothing to complain of, how came you to act in such an extraordinary manner as you have done occasionally in drawing your sword on your attendants, and more recently on the occasion of your marriage, why did you shoot arrows on the people? Are you aware that on that occasion you killed a man! (this is the case, a servant of the Powar Raja's, who was wounded, died of the wound.) He replied with the greatest indifference, "God (Bugwan) did it!" I said that God had been very kind to him in raising him to a station of such dignity, but that if he conducted himself in such a manner he would forfeit the good opinion of all men. To this he replied, "I have given up all that!" Conceiving that he meant he had given up such conduct, I said I was most happy to hear it. But he did not allow me to remain under this erroneous impression. He immediately said, "That is not what I mean. I mean that I have given up all regard for the opinion of people, I do not care for any body."

In the last interview which Major Stewart had with His Highness before quitting Gwalior, he declared that he was perfectly happy. "When I suggested to him the propriety of attending on the Baee at the transaction of public business, he said he did attend unless when indisposition prevented him. On the whole, instead of showing any disposition to confide in me, and to impart his grievances to me if he had any, he seemed inclined to show a kind of indifference and disregard of my proffered services bordering on rudeness."

From that period up to the present there has been little at Gwalior calling for the interference or notice of the British Government in the affairs of that principality. The Baeza Baee continues her administration without requiring our support, and the young Raja, if he has any adherents in the state, has so far failed to make any impression on her power. It may be supposed that as he advances in years and approaches manhood, he must, if he has the ordinary ambition, and the proper feelings of a man, desire to exercise a portion of that power which sooner or later must be his own; that those of the chiefs of the state who are likely to worship the rising sun, as well as those who would prefer the Government of a man to that of a woman, will at no very distant period array themselves on his side; and that the Government of the Regent will fall before their united force. The command of the treasury and the resources of the state must for a time give a preponderance to her party, and may enable her to prolong the struggle. In such a contest it will be very possible for the British Government to stand aloof, and the more we allow the parties to have a fair field and no favor, the more shall we secure a national and efficient Government for that country, and the less will it hereafter be necessary for us to interfere in its affairs.

6th Class.—Protection with right on the part of the British Government to control internal affairs.

1. SATTARA.—Sevajee the first sovereign of the Mahrattas assumed the title of Raja, and struck coins in his own name in 1664. The first Peishwa or minister had been appointed previously to this; but Sattara did not become the capital till 1698. The grants to the Mahrattas for the *chout* on the six soubas of the Dekhan were obtained at Dehlee through the Peishwa in the reign of Mohamud Shah, and are dated in 1719. In 1749 the Brahmin Peishwa or minister Ballajee Bajee Rao, who had long exercised almost sovereign power in the empire, obtained or pretended to obtain, from the fourth Raja on his death-bed, "a deed empowering the Peishwa to manage the whole Government of the Mahratta empire on condition of his perpetuating the Raja's name, and keeping up the dignity of the house of Sevajee through the grand-son of Tara Bye and his descendants." (For the above particulars see Duff's Mahrattas.) From this period the Peishwas have been considered the sovereigns of the empire, negociated with as such by other powers, and obeyed by the chiefs and princes; the Raja being subjected to an honorable and not very rigid confinement in the fortress of Sattara.

After the commencement of the war of 1817, the first notice of the Sattara Raja, and indeed the first notice that ever had been taken of H. H. by the British Government, who found him a prisoner and his minister in possession of his throne, is in the concluding part of a proclamation issued on the 11th of Feb. 1818, by the Commissioner at Poona to the chiefs and people of the Peishwa's country. "The Raja of Sattara, who is now a prisoner in Bajee Rao's hands, will be released and placed at the head of an independant sovereignty of such an extent as may maintain the Raja and his family in comfort and dignity: with this view the fort of Sattara has been taken, the Raja's flag has been set up in it, and his former ministers have been called into employment. Whatever country is assigned to the Raja will be administered by him.

In the Cavalry affair at Ashte on the 20th of February, where for the first and only time during the campaign the Mahratta horse charged with any effect the British line, composed of two squadrons of dragoons and two regiments of native cavalry supported by horse artillery, and in which Gokla the leader of the Mahrattas was killed, the head of the Mahratta empire was released from a confinement of 69 years duration. In Sir Lionel Smith's letter to the Commissioner at Poona on the 21st of February he says, "I have infinite satisfaction in reporting that the Sattara Raja, his brothers and mother, were in these circumstances rescued and brought safe into camp to their great satisfaction and joy."

The Commissioner reports on the 9th of May—"The Raja now made his entry in procession (into Sattara) escorted by detachments from all the corps of the division, and accompanied by most of the officers in camp. On this occasion he formally took his seat on his throne in full Durbar, and soon after published a proclamation

announcing his connection with the British Government, and the peculiar injuries he had received from Bajee Rao. Among them was an order, the existence of which was confirmed by the Killadar of Wussota, to put the whole family to death rather than suffer them to be rescued."

In his instructions to the political agent appointed to superintend the affairs of the new Sattara principality, which were kept very much under our management during the minority of the Raja, the Commissioner observes—"The Governor General's intention in founding a small state for the Raja is to afford an honorable maintenance to the representative of the ancient princes of this country, and to establish among the Mahrattas a counterpoise to the remaining influence of the former Brahmin Government. In the extent which I intend to propose for the Raja's territories, I have taken in the further object of providing for a portion of the soldiery of the country whose habits might be unsuitable to our service, and likewise of retaining some of the civil and religious orders whom it might be difficult to dispose of under our own direct Government."

The question as to which of the southern Jageerdars should come under the authority of the Raja of Sattara, and the degree in which they should be subject to his authority, were left open for further consideration.

The young Raja proved of good disposition and sufficiently intelligent, but it was found necessary to interfere more than would otherwise have been desirable on account of an extravagance, foreign to the natural disposition of a Mahratta, which showed itself in his first proceedings. As a sample of this H. H. gave in an estimate of his expences, amounting to nearly half a crore. He considered that half a lakh and half a crore were the same to the Company's Government when disposed to bestow a favor. The political agent told him that he should confine his expenditure within his income. "He gravely assured me that it was impossible, that on such a pittance he could scarcely feed his immediate dependants; elephants and equipage were out of the question. After much conversation I found him so very unreasonable that I could not help telling him that he ought to contrast what was proposed with his former situation, that it was a temporary arrangement, and his affairs would gradually improve, if he did not mar his own prospects by attending to the opinions of foolish people."

The Raja's mother was found more difficult to manage than even the Raja himself, as we seem to find invariably the case, whether amongst Rajpoots, Mahomedans, or Mahrattas. "Balajee Punt on his return from his first visit described the Raja's mother as so extremely violent that he was afraid of losing his character by being abused by her. I therefore told him to address himself entirely to the Raja, and to take little notice of any thing the others might say. On finding that her opinions were little attended to, the mother complained of being insulted, cried bitterly, said she would jump off the rampart of the fort, or throw herself down a well; regretted that she

had not gone Suttee with her husband, and said she would that instant apply to me to be sent to Benares."

The conduct of this good lady bears a remarkable resemblance to that of the elder wife of the Shao Raja in 1749, the last closing scene of the power of the Sattara family; who "true to the inherent violence and ambition of her family" acted a part as much in conformity to the troubled times in which she lived, as that of the mother of the present Raja was to the more subdued and tranquillized period of his accession. Her threat of going to Benares was turned against herself by the wily Brahmin of the latter period, in the same manner as the threat of the other to become Suttee was turned against her by Ballajee Bajee Rao, though not with equal effect; and both the Raja and his mother agreed for the present to limit their expences to 27,000 rupees a month. Eventually the political agent reported that the year had passed without their having exceeded the amount specified. Bajee Rao, it appeared, "scarcely allowed them half a lakh of rupees annually in ready money, but he used to send them presents of very rich clothes on all the great festivals, which must have been very expensive."

The naturally good disposition of the young prince very much assisted the political agent in arranging the affairs of the principality. Like the Maha Rana of Oudepore, whom one of his attendants asked, "What was the use of being a Raja if he could not act according to his inclination?" the Maha Raja himself turning round suddenly observed, Dajeeba, you are a blockhead, don't you see I may do whatever I like, provided I do what is right? for neither amongst Rajpoots nor Mahrattas has the refinement that "the king can do no wrong" been maintained. Like political agents elsewhere Captain Grant found that the Raja's own natural disposition to do good was counteracted by a worthless set of people about him, so situated as not to be displaced. After some months' intercourse I found no difficulty in obtaining his confidence (partially of course), and he has frequently told me things which I should otherwise never have become acquainted with. Opposed to the Raja's good qualities, he is very sly, and this he mistakes for wisdom; some of the intrigues and tricks he practised during his confinement prove that he is an adept at dissimulation. He had certainly great excuse for this, but it has given him a taste for intrigue, and unfortunately this dangerous propensity is a weakness on which he is easily flattered. The Raja's disposition is in itself encouraging, but almost all those who are near his person, and who must naturally have influence over his actions, are worthless.

"The name of the elder of his brothers is Raja Ram, familiarly Rao Sahib. He is the best brother of the family, but possesses none of the Raja's quickness or intelligence. He dresses well, rides well, and has a great turn for show. He is idle and dissipated, but he is gentlemanlike and spirited in his notions, and something could be made of him if withdrawn from the example and influence of his mother."

"The name of the younger brother is Sevajee, familiarly Appah Sahib. He is an obstinate ill-disposed lad, with very low vicious habits, which all the admonition of the Raja cannot get the better of.

"The name of the Raja's mother is Omda Bace, and styled Baee Sahiba; she is the daughter of Bowanjee Raja Sirkec; she is good looking, and her manners are extremely plausible. Since the death of the Raja's grandmother, about five years ago, she has not only quitted the seclusion proper for Mahratta ladies of rank to observe, but become notoriously infamous in her habits. She is a bold ambitious intriguing woman, exceedingly violent, vindictive, and obstinate.

"Balla Sahib Bhosla is an exception to all the rest. He is the Raja's first cousin, and the son of the late unfortunate Chittoor Singh. He is said to resemble his father in disposition as well as in appearance, but I have had occasion to remark a great deal of good sense and propriety of conduct in Balla Sahib. He certainly has the same qualifications as his father for becoming a popular leader, but I hope with better sense to direct him."

There is something interesting in this description of the character and disposition of persons so long prisoners, and so lately raised to rank and affluence, from a pen like Captain Grant's.

On the 25th of September, 1819, a treaty was concluded with the Raja of Sattara, by which the British Government ceded to H. H., his heirs and successors in perpetual sovereignty, certain districts specified in a schedule annexed.

The territory to be held in subordinate co-operation to the British Government, and the Raja to be guided in all matters by the British agent at H. H.'s court. The military force never to be increased or diminished without consent. To forbear from all intercourse with foreign states, even to the contracting of marriages, otherwise than through the political agents. The possessions of the Jageerdars within His Highness's territory to be under the guarantee of the British Government, together with the possessions of the Raja of Akulkote, the Punt Suchew, the Prittee-nidhee and the Jageer of the Dufflays in the pergunnah of Ihutt.

The British Government wisely reserved to itself the administration of the country, until the officers of H. H. Government shall acquire experience and evince ability to govern, when it will gradually transfer the whole administration into their hands.

Still that withering stipulation—"He will at all times attend, as above agreed, to the advice which the political agent shall offer him, for the good of the state and the maintenance of general tranquillity," remains for ever.

The revenue of the tract of country transferred to the Raja amounted in 1820, to about fifteen lakhs of rupees, when the Commissioner observed, "The highly cultivated state of a great portion of the Sattara territory must preclude any considerable augmentation of revenue, except from the more easterly pergunnahs, where there is abundance of waste land susceptible of tillage.

I am of opinion that the direct revenue to be placed at the Raja's disposal might under tolerable government eventually approximate to the maximum contemplated to be given to him, which in the dispatch No. 78 of the Hon'ble the late Commissioner to the Governor General was stated at 18,00,000 of rupees."

In March 1821, Mr. Chaplin, the Commissioner at Poona, reported to the Bombay Government—"In my late tour to the southward I had an opportunity of personally witnessing the general prosperity and good order that prevailed throughout the Raja's districts, and the satisfaction which was shown by all classes of the people towards H. H. Government and the existing system of management.

"The Raja himself at a private interview which I had with him reiterated the expression of his respect and gratitude for the benefits that have been conferred on him, and in acknowledging with much apparent sincerity the obligations under which he was placed, he repeatedly declared to me his determination to be regulated in every act of his administration by the wishes of the British Government. He was by no means urgent in soliciting that he might be emancipated from the restraint under which he at present exercises his authority, but he trusted, he said, that when he should be found qualified, a more unlimited freedom of controul would be entrusted to him, assuring me at the same time he would never adopt any measures without previously obtaining the political agent's assent to them.

"The Raja was warm in expressing how sensible he was of the kindness and consideration which Captain Grant had uniformly observed towards him, both publicly and privately; and I took my leave of him, impressed with a very favorable opinion of the good sense and judgment and the respectability of the acquirements which H. H. evinced, both at this interview, and on the occasion of a visit at which I received and entertained H. H. on the following day."

The young Raja of Sattara continued to evince the same good disposition and attention to business. And on the 5th of April, nearly the same date on which three years before he was raised by the Hon'ble Mr. Elphinstone to the Musnud of his forefathers, the entire management of his future principality was transferred to his charge. He was then in his twenty-fourth year. He considered the laws and revenue regulations introduced by Captain Grant, so like the laws of the Medes and Persians, that on the next political agent suggesting some alteration calculated to be beneficial, the Raja like a true Hindoo objected, saying, that they had so long worked so well that he had rather continue them as they were than run the risk, by altering any portion, of injuring them as a whole.

The designation of political agent was changed for that of resident. The resident's advice was only to be enforced under the second article of the treaty when the Raja's conduct was likely to lead to inconvenience or injustice, but always to be given when

requested; the resident bearing in mind the wish of Government to leave the Raja uncontrolled in his internal Government.

The Raja was not to have the power of punishing his Jageerdars by fine or sequestration without the previous consent of the resident, who, in important cases, should refer to Government for orders. In issuing orders to the Jageerdars the Raja to communicate all of importance to the resident. When desirous of quitting Sattara for the purpose of visiting his territories, the Raja to communicate his intention to the resident, who, if for any reason the measure appears very objectionable, may advise to the contrary. Communications between the Raja and British subjects, or the subjects of foreign states, to be conducted through the resident.

In 1829, the Governor of Bombay, in a minute on this subject, describes the Raja's territories as well governed, and that he himself continued to do justice to the trouble that had been bestowed on his education. It appears that the survey made of his country has never been practically useful in revenue affairs, but that it is valuable from the minute information which it contains both fiscal and geographical.

In describing the condition of the country subject to the southern Jageerdars, extending over a tract yielding a revenue of twenty lakhs a year, the Governor observes—"I was surprised to find from the most minute inquiry how comparatively little the character of this rule depended upon that of the chief. But the principal reason of this I discovered to be in the village system being preserved complete, and the almost invariable usage of the local officers (even to the highest) being seldom ever changed. Many of the finest districts have Umuldars and other officers who have succeeded to those duties like an inheritance. The consequence is, that all the money made in the districts is spent in them."

"Whatever may be the reason, it is impossible not to acknowledge the fact, that the towns and villages under these Jageerdars are in a better condition than any in our provinces of the Deckan; and notwithstanding the impressions of some to the contrary, I must, from all I saw and heard, be of opinion that justice is in most cases administered in a way fully as satisfactory to the inhabitants as under our improved system."*

The late Mr. Thackeray, contrasting the advantages of our administration with the advantages of the Jageerdars, observes—"without allowing that, whichever Government is best administered is best; we may I think infer, from the flourishing state of some of the Jageers where the Government is patriarchal, and where the machine of state seems to work imperceptibly, that the simplest form of administration is best adapted to this country. The

* It is curious enough that in these Jageers we have assumed to ourselves the right of laying open their towns and villages to the visitations of our police in pursuit of criminals from the British territory, whilst in the Jageer of Feroz-pore and other Jageers in the Dehlee territory, conferred by ourselves, we do not claim this privilege.

Jageerdars, however, have certainly advantages which we shall never possess. They require less revenue and can afford better terms to their ryuts. Their managers are generally their friends and relations, who live and die in the country they manage, and look as much to their own popularity with the ryut as to the favor of the Jageerdars.

A great portion of these Jageerdars do not come under the jurisdiction of Sattara.* But some of them who were formerly dependent on that house preferred being again brought under its authority. "Two of these, the Phultun and Duffela Jageers, have been brought under his (the Raja's) direct rule, from the incompetence and involved state of their possessions, and he has just taken charge of the country of Akulkote from its chief, being a minor."

The charge of this latter possession, yielding between three and four lakhs a year, did not continue under the tranquil management of the Raja. He assumed an authority over the Jageer which was not justified by usage, nor had it the sanction of the resident; governing it as a portion of his own dominions. Those interested in the young Jageerdar, naturally resisted this assumption of authority; and when the Raja found that his measures had excited an insurrection which he had not the means of quelling, he called for the aid of our troops. The resident took the management of the affair into his own hands; the troops were opposed and sustained some loss, and eventually it became necessary to station a detachment of Sepoys under an European officer at Akulkote, to watch over the interests of the minor Jageerdar. There are four other Jageerdars belonging to the Sattara principality under the guarantee of the British Government, which render our relations with that state somewhat complicated, and more requires the presence of a political authority at that court than any other portion of our relations with it.

2. Kolapore.—The "engagement" of the British Government with this small state, which was then a dependency on the Peishwa, is dated the 1st October, 1812. Its chief, like the Raja of Akulkote, derives importance from his connexion with the Sattara family.

The principal object of the "engagement" was to settle some differences between the Peishwa and the Raja through our mediation, in the same manner as was done with the Putwurdun family

* Against one of these, Chintamun Rao of Meritch, it was necessary to employ a force in 1822, under the command of Colonel Molle. He had been required by the Commissioner to render up Balajee Punt Gokla, the murderer of Captain Vaughan and his brother; and his reply was—"You write to me that Gokla should be sent under a guard to Darwar, but to deliver up to punishment a cow or a Brahmin who may have happened to commit a crime against the Company's Government, and may have fallen into my hands, would be a reproach to my family (or caste). I therefore request you will not write again to this effect. It was the duty of that person (Gokla) to perform the service and obey the orders of whomsoever he served, and on this consideration he does not appear to be guilty of any crime."

at the same period. To save itself from piracy the British Government obtained the cession of the harbour of Malwan, with that of certain forts in its neighbourhood, and the lands dependant on them. In consideration of these cessions the Raja was guaranteed in his remaining possessions against all foreign powers and states; he agreeing to abide by the mediation of the British Government in all his differences with other powers.

At the termination of the Mahratta war the Kolapore state received from the British Government the districts of Chickoree and Manowlee, yielding three lakhs of rupees per annum.

In July, 1821, the Raja of Kolapore was murderd in his own palace by Saeajee Bajee Mohite, whose Jageer the Raja had resumed.

During the disturbances at Kittoor, in 1824, and the reports which were so prevalent in the southern part of India of disasters in the Burmese War, the conduct of the chief of Kolapore was considered very suspicious. He suddenly left his capital at the head of 5000 Infantry, 1000 Horse, with seven guns, and it was reported by the commissioner that his proceedings, if not actually hostile, had, at such a conjuncture much the effect of hostility. He continued to increase his levies, and to summon his dependants with their armed followers. Yet there was no certain proof that his designs were hostile to the British Government, and the fall of Kittoor put a stop to his proceedings, "which had been to give countenance to the rebellion, and to inspire insurgents with confidence."

Mr. Chaplin described the Raja—"Though not wholly destitute of occasional shrewdness, to be a youth of the most capricious, suspicious, and vindictive disposition; violent in temper and abusive in his language, addicted to the lowest company and the most vicious pleasures. I entertain very little expectation of any permanent amendment in his Government. In the mean time, his extravagance appears likely, if it has not already done so, to exhaust his finances, and to compel him to continue in the same course of extortion which has already rendered him highly unpopular."

Under these circumstances his mother requested that a British officer might be deputed to reside for three or four years at Kolapore, and she and the chiefs offered to defray the expense; and if no amendment took place it was thought likely that the respectable part of the subjects of Kolapore would come forward with a request to the same effect.

The Honorable Mr. Elphinstone observed on this—"The residence of an European gentleman at Kolapore, as desired by the Ranee, would be attended with no good effect: it would only involve us more deeply in the internal affairs of the Raja's Government, and would encourage His Highness by repeated contests, in which, as our interference is not supported by treaty, he must invariably be successful.

The only point on which the Raja could be accused of an infraction of the treaty, was his refusal to abide by the award of the

British Government regarding a dispute with the neighbouring territory of Sawuntwaree, and this was considered to justify an appeal to arms on our part when the proper time should arrive.

On the question of Scindia's and Hindoo Rao's claims to Kungal, it was agreed—"It is doubtful whether the Raja is not entitled to dispossess Hindoo Rao for his refractory conduct, even if he were the rightful Jageerdar of Kungal. It is doubtful whether Hindoo Rao is the rightful Jageerdar, and it is again doubtful whether he would have any claim to Wiswas Rao's villages if his title to Kungal were undisputed."

In March, 1825, the Kolapore Raja proceeded to reduce the fort of Kungal and its subordinate villages, which he soon effected, having a battering train of four guns, two mortars, with some field artillery. This measure of the Raja's was considered indecently precipitate. In the mean time Hindoo Rao produced at Gwalior a Sunnud for these possessions, from the father of the present Raja of Kolapore, to his father Surjee Rao Gutkea, which went to prove the relative position of the parties.

In the following year, the Raja moved with a similar force to the frontier of the Sattara territory, without any communication with our Government, and as was supposed by our ally, with hostile intentions, which led both H. H. and us to prepare to act on the offensive.

In 1825, the conduct of the Raja compelled the British Government to march a force into the Kolapore territory, and on the 30th December, a treaty was negotiated with that state, the principal stipulations of which were, that the Raja was to reduce his force, and maintain it at a strength not calculated to disturb the public tranquillity within or without his territories; to attend to the advice of the British Government on all measures calculated to affect the public tranquillity; to be independent within his own territories, and not to molest Hindoo Rao, and certain other Jageerdars in their ancient rights.

Shortly after the conclusion of this treaty, the Kolapore Raja proceeded to Poona, the object of his journey being to induce the Governor of Bombay to relieve him from the conditions by which he was bound. Failing in this, he returned to Kolapore, committing some extravagances and aggressions on the road, and conducting himself on his journey, as he had done at Poona, in a manner that showed him hardly to be of sane mind. On his return to Kolapore he was immediately guilty of an infraction of the terms of the treaty, by levying troops in excess to the stipulated number, and in seizing on the possessions of his Jageerdars, who were under our guarantee. A force had been assembled on the Kolapore frontier to chastise the Raja for this breach of treaty, but as some delay occurred in the discussions necessary for calling it into active operation, and as the season got far advanced, it was in the end of April broken up. The political agent reported in his letter of 10th April, 1827—"With respect however to the reducing of his army to the peace

establishment, or adjusting the numerous demands for which he has been called to make reparation, I see not the smallest chance excepting by the presence of an over-awing British force at his very capital."

The Raja accordingly proceeded in the career of strengthening his forces, and in August commenced aggressions on his neighbours. It was therefore necessary again to order a force into the field, to operate against him. It reached his capital on the 15th of October, which was found to be in possession of 2 or 3000 Arabs and Scindians. It was peaceably delivered up to the British troops, the Arabs and Scindians marching in search of other service, and the rabble that the Raja had collected from all quarters dispersing in all directions.

A definitive treaty was concluded at Kolapore on the 23rd of October, 1827. The Raja was not to maintain more than 400 horse and 800 foot, exclusive of garrison. The Talooks of Chickoree and Manowlee, formerly granted to the Raja, were resumed. Certain chiefs whom the Raja had molested received perpetual instead of life guarantees, and certain villages which he had resumed were restored. The forts of Kolapore and Pannallagurh to be garrisoned by British troops, the Raja paying the expense. The sum of 1,47,948 rupees was charged to the Raja for the damage done by him to his neighbours, and territory yielding 50,000 rupees a year was reserved until the amount was liquidated. A minister was appointed by the British Government to administer the affairs of Kolapore, the power of removing and appointing resting with it.

In February, 1829, the Governor of Bombay visited Kolapore and observed, " Mr. Nisbet's last report which has been delivered into the Board is very satisfactory, and I am quite of opinion with the political agent, that the fort of Punnallagurh may be given up, and our regiment now at Kolapore spared. The management of the country is at present in the hands of a Dewan of the Raja's own choosing, but who could not maintain his place, or discharge the obligations imposed upon this petty state, without the complete support of the political agent, which is given on the full understanding that every proper attention and respect will be paid by the minister to his proud though incompetent prince.

" All my intercourse with the Raja of Kolapore was regulated by the same forms as that with the Raja of Sattara, with whom he claims equality, being of the same family, and with full as high pretensions to rank and consideration. His court has the same officers, and he assumes on all points similar state. Several of his chiefs were at Kolapore, during my visit, and they, though possessed of independent Jageers and forts, give him as their prince, every respect and obedienee.

" The part of the Kolapore country through which I passed is well cultivated, notwithstanding the injuries to which it has been exposed from the incompetence and quarrels of its late rulers. The ryuts appear satisfied, and I was surprised to find that the acknow-

ledged excesses and weakness of character of the present ruler, had in no degree deprived him of the regard and attachment of his subjects. He is on the contrary popular among the lower classes, and the inhabitants of the villages are, I was assured by those who mixed with them, still vain of their allegiance to a descendant of Sevajee."

DEHLEE.

Before closing these sketches, meant to describe the political relations of the British Government in India with the native states, it may be necessary to notice the condition of the royal family of Dehlee, for although its political importance had ceased long before we sought to establish our supremacy, yet its importance in some shape or other in the estimation of the princes and *people* will long continue.

His present Majesty Akbur Shah is the twenty-fifth sovereign in decent since the establishment of the Timoor dynasty on the throne of Dehlee in 1413. Eighteen kings had reigned before that period from the first conquest of Dehlee by the Mahommedans under Kootub-ud Deen in 1193. But the sovereign power of the present house of Dehlee may of course be considered to have terminated with the life of Aurungzebe in 1707.

It is unnecessary to repeat the story of the first conquest of Dehlee, since that period, by the Mahrattas: the conquest by Nader Shah; by Ahmed Shah Dooranee; the second conquest by the Mahrat, or its subjugation to British supremacy by the army of Lord Lake in 1803.

The king of Dehlee was then released from an honorable captivity. The houses and lands outside of the palace walls, and belonging to the royal family, had been appropriated by the officers of the Mahratta Government; and a sum amounting to about two lakhs of rupees per annum was allowed by Scindiah for the maintenance of the royal household. The houses and lands were of course immediately restored, the latter yielding a revenue of about a lakh a year; and the sum of 76,500 rupees per mensem was set aside for the support of His Majesty and the members of his family.

No stipulations were entered into with His Majesty, and the following is the declaration of Government in November, 1804.

"The Governor General does not deem it advisable to enter into any written engagement whatever with His Majesty; nor is it His Excellency's intention to solicit any concession."

In 1805, the resident at Dehlee recommended to Government—"That the provision to be assigned to the king should be a fixed stipend, payable in ready money, out of revenues of our territory on the west of the Jumna." And after receiving the orders of Government on the subject, he appears to have delivered to His Majesty a paper founded thereon; and on the strength of which the king now claims certain immunities, the withholding of which has lately led to an appeal to the king of England, through Ram Mohun Roy.

The principal articles in the paper delivered to the king in 1805 were: That certain districts situated west of the Jumna shall be considered crown lands, the management of them to remain in the hands of the resident. The sum specified below (76,500 rupees) to be paid to His Majesty, whether the territory so situated should yield that amount or not. When the collections from this territory increase, a proportionate augmentation of the king's stipend will take place. The king's stipend was increased in 1809, and is now twelve lakhs per annum.

It does not appear that the communication made to His Majesty, by the resident at Dehlee, in 1805, of the intentions of Government, was authorised; and "it was never proposed either to limit the stipends by the amount of the produce of the territory, or to augment them to an extent equal to the revenue which the territory might eventually yield: the obligation which the British Government had imposed on itself was that of providing adequate means for the support of the king and his household in a manner suitable to the condition in which he was placed; while in policy it was inexpedient that the provision granted should exceed an amount sufficient for that purpose."

On the occasion of the Governor General's visit to Dehlee, in 1827, the king came forward with a paper containing certain demands, grounded on the communication which the resident had made in 1805, and through which His Majesty claims the revenue of what have lately been called "the assigned districts." The gross revenue of the territory on the right of the Jumna is now supposed was designated by the term "assigned," or how any portion of it acquired that designation, does not very clearly appear, for all was alike conquered from the Mahrattas. A great portion of it was afterwards assigned in Jageer to individuals, and has since reverted to Government; if it be charged with the civil establishments, and the troops maintained within its limits, at the stations of Dehlee, Kurnal, and Hansee, but little would remain for the payment of the stipend of the king of Dehlee.

The king of Dehlee has lately either deputed Rammohun Roy as his agent to England, or taken advantage of that person's proceeding there to convey a letter to our most gracious Sovereign on the subject of the insufficiency of his stipend. The same letter conveyed also the expression of His Majesty's dissatisfaction with the footing on which the Governor General had met His Majesty in 1827; although the ceremonial on that occasion had been either dictated by the king himself, or was settled in conformity with His Majesty's wishes.

As the ceremonials of that occasion were described as derogating from His Majesty's dignity, and as His Lordship the Governor General on his late visit to Upper India could not depart from the forms observed by his predecessor, and would not consent to impose on His Majesty any terms which could bear such an interpretation, no civilities of this nature were exchanged between them.

One of the most remarkable proofs of the attachment of the

people of India to the forms and ceremonies which their forefathers have been accustomed to observe, is the avidity with which all court and pay for honors emanating from the pageant throne of Dehlee. It might be expected that in the long period which has intervened since the power of the house of Dehlee terminated, it would have ceased to be considered as the fountain of all honor; but such is not the case. The princes of Rajpootana, the Nizam, and generally the Princes of India do not consider their accession to their several principalities complete, until they have done homage to the throne of Dehlee. If this arose from sentiments of loyalty or devotion to his fallen Majesty, all would honor and respect such principles; but they are purely selfish, and may be received in proof of the subordinate condition in which those states have heretofore existed; and in which, even in their own estimation, they must continue to exist.

All-powerful and supreme as the British Government now is in India, certainly more so than ever was His Majesty of Dehlee, it must be doubtful, whether it can turn this tide of loyalty towards itself. The establishment of the Royal Government in India might produce some effect in this respect. The King of England, although far removed from the scene, may, through a Viceroy or a Governor General, confer honors and distinctions which would be prized by the princes of India. But even then there would be an absence of that majesty in the ceremonials, to which people in their degree of civilization attach so much importance.

It may be a question, whether it be worthy of us to do violence to the feelings of the king of Dehlee, and the princes and people of India, by endeavouring forcibly to restrain the inclination on the one part to receive, and on the other to pay, that fealty and homage which has been sanctioned by the practice of ages. It is absurd that we ourselves should ever have done, or that we should now do homage, to the king of Dehlee, or that we should encourage it in others. But as no political consequences are involved, or likely to follow these pageant exhibitions by others, it would perhaps be wise to allow them to pass unnoticed. The cupidity of those by whom the king is surrounded would very soon render such honors too common to be much prized any where; and when they ceased to have attraction for the people, we might with greater effect substitute some titles or honors of our own in their place.

SUMMARY.

The above classification of our political relation shows, that in Internal India there are four independent Mahommedan states; viz. Hyderabad, Oude, Bhopal, and Tonk.

That there are eight Mahratta states, if Dhar and Dewas may be classed amongst them, the others being Sattara, Gwalior, Berar, Indore, Baroda, and Kolapore.

There are nineteen Rajpoot states; viz. Oudepore, Jeypore, Joudpore, Kotah, Boondee, Ulwur, Beekaneer, Jessulmere, Kishen-

gurh, Banswara, Purtabgurh, Dongerpore, Kerowlee, Serowee, Cutch, Rewah, Dhuttea, Mahratta, Jansee, and Tere.

There are six other Hindoo states, viz. Mysore, Travancore, Cochin, Bhurtpore, Dolpore and Sawunt Waree.

There are the Seik protected states, the principal of which are Putteala, Keytul, Naba, and Jeend.

Besides these there are smaller states and Jageerdars under British protection, amongst which may be ranked the remaining states of Saugor and Bundlekund.

The chiefs of the northern hills—Siccum, Muneepore, Singboom, Chota Nagpore, Sirgooja, Sumblepore, Oudepore, Tanjore, Coorg; the Bareitch family, Ferozpore; and the Jageerdars of the southern Mahratta country.

It is remarkable enough, that of all the splendour of the Mahommedan Empire of Dehlee, and of the kingdoms of Ahmedabad, Ahmednuggur, Beejapore, Koolburgah, Golkonda, Beeder, Malwah, &c., there should now only remain the independent states of Hyderabad, Oude, Bhopal, and Tonk; neither of them possessing any claims to antiquity. The Nawab of Hyderabad and the king of Oude were, to a very late period, officers of the Dehlee Government. The former still considers himself in that capacity, and the latter did so, until we endeavoured to exalt him, by conferring a few years since, a kingly designation; this has however never been conceded to him beyond the limits of his own court or territory, and his assumption of the title has been the cause of much ridicule amongst his Mahommedan brethren throughout India.

More fortunate than either of the other Dehlee Soobas they maintained their positions amidst the wreck of the other portions of the empire, and eventually, with our assistance, have secured their supremacy. The chief of Bhopal if not of later date, is of much inferior station, and he of Tonk is of our own creation. The revenues of these four Mahommedan states cannot exceed four crore of rupees.

When Aurungzebe, the last of the emperors who exercised a shadow of sovereignty, conquered the kingdoms of the Dekhun, and failed to establish any permanent power in their stead, the Mahrattas rose rapidly on the ruin which he had worked to occupy the vacant space. The latter days of this sovereign's existence were embittered by seeing Mahratta outposts and plunderers at the gates of his capital of Aurungabad; and in his last march from the neighbourhood of Singurh to Ahmednuggur, the imperial army was defeated, and the emperor narrowly escaped falling into their hands.

In fifty-three years after Aurungzebe's death, or in 1760, the Mahrattas were in possession of Dehlee, Sirhind, Lahore, and Moultan; and were levying contributions through the whole extent of what had been the Mogul empire.

The Mahommedans certainly never possessed the genius of governing in peace an empire so extensive as India, for there can

hardly have been in the world, through so long a period of time, scenes of greater devastation and bloodshed than attended their great career, whether in their conquests of the Hindoo principalities of Anagoonde, Wurungul, Deogurh, Oujein, Gurra, &c.; whether in the struggles of the several Mahommedan kingdoms with one another; or in those of the imperial house of Dehlee against the other powers of India.

We need seek for no better proof than we have in the rapidity of their downfal, and in the wretched condition and insignificance of the states that have survived, and generally in the condition of the Mahommedan people and power throughout India, of the impossibility that, that form of Government should take deep root in the affections of the people.

The despotic form of Mahommedan Governments and institutions was calculated to produce some bright periods in their history. And accordingly we find that both under the imperial house of Dehlee, and in the separate kingdoms of the Dekhun, greater splendour and prosperity were attained through the individual character of kings and princes, than can be expected to arise out of a foreign administration conducted like that of the British in India, however superior and enlightened the instruments whom it may employ, or however benevolent their intentions in seeking to suit the nature of their institutions to the character and wants of the people subject to their sway. But as these bright periods in the history of the Mahommedans depended on the individual character of their rulers; as there were no fixed or permanent principles of administration emanating from the people themselves; as the governing party was of a different religion and a different race from the great majority of the people, as it gradually ceased to receive an infusion of new material from abroad, and in energy of character and licentiousness, sunk below the natives of the country; it was a moral impossibility that this condition of things should last; and that it lasted so long is to be attributed to the character of the great body of the Hindoo people over whom the Mahommedan rule prevailed.

The population of the four Mahommedan states that now exist does not differ materially from that of the other countries of India. It is remarkable to find in the form of the Afghaun Government of Bhopal an infusion of those popular principles which govern the Afghaun kingdoms of Central Asia. But in the institutions of the other states there is nothing different from the usual despotism of Mahommedan Governments. They are neither grounded in the affections of the people nor supported by an aristocracy, for there are no rights of either inheritance or titles belonging to an aristocracy under Mahommedan rule. All are servants obeying implicitly the will of a master; and in the Vizier's dominions His Highness claims to be heir to the property of all that die in his service. It is therefore no wonder that such Governments do not, over a foreign people like that of India, whose very laws they have subverted, take root in their affections.

There is no instance in late days of Mahommedan states combining against the British Government, for although highly national, and inimical to all other forms of Government, and all other religions, the material of combination is generally wanting amongst them, from their separate interests and isolated positions. Neither would they carry along with them the great bulk of the people, for they are generally considered to be in the proportion of only one in ten to the Hindoos. However hostile therefore the whole of this race may be to our power, they are the less formidable from their scattered condition amid the Hindoo population. We may be almost certain that in any attempt of the Mahommedans to subvert our power, religious fanaticism will be the mainspring in all their operation; and as this must necessarily bring them into collision with the Hindoos as well as with us, we have the less to fear from their united hostility.

Of the eight Mahratta states neither possess any claim to great antiquity. Sattara is of course the most ancient, and dates it origin from 1664, although great fluctuation, if not complete subversion of its political power, has taken place since that period. The others are of later acquisition, and were conquests from the Mahommedans, conferred on relations of the Sattara family, or on distinguished military commanders to be held in subordination to the empire. Berar and Kolapore are of the former, and the others of the latter description. The revenues of these eight states amount to about three crore per annum.

The Mahrattas possessed in a greater degree than the Mahommedans the means of governing India in peace; although apparently not as an united empire. For even in the first years of the supremacy of the house of Sevajee (1750,) the sovereignty was usurped by a Bramin minister, whose descendants continued to exercise the nominal power of the head of the empire until its subversion in 1817, by the British Government. The other chiefs had in a great measure long before that period gradually seceded from their allegiance and were for all the purposes of Government independent in their several principalities. There is too, good reason to believe, that Nana Furnavese had in the intermediate period nearly succeeded in usurping the place of Peishwa.

It is remarkable enough that in all the wars of the British Government with the Mahrattas, none of the principalities have been entirely subverted, nor have either of their capitals been permanently conquered, for that of Poona had to all intents and purposes become a Bramin and not a Mahratta Government. This probably arises from the Mahratta form of administration and institutions, being calculated to take deeper root in the affections of the people than those of the Mahommedans.

The most distinguished period of the Mahratta history is 1760, when the united army of the several states into which the empire had then divided assembled in Upper India, under the command of the heir-apparent Wiswas Rao, and the chief minister of the empire,

Shudashoo Bhow. Such discordant materials could only have been brought to act in concert by religious and national feeling. They were joined too by an army of 30,000 Jauts, under their great leader; Sooraj Mull, and by contingents from the states of Rajpootana, which even then were tributary to the Mahrattas. It seems the last struggle of the Hindoos against their Mahommedan conquerors; and there is no doubt that all the Mahommedan powers of India must have fallen before this mighty army. But the occasion which called it forth, the invasion of Ahmed Shah, the Dooranee King of Cabul, was sufficient to meet the exigency; and the defeat of the Mahratta army at Panniput, by the more hardy sons of the north, with the loss of its principal leaders and two hundred thousand of its numbers, threw back the tide of their conquest for a period of years.

The power of the Mahrattas was, however, of a nature not to be easily subdued, for it had already taken deep root in different parts of India. The army consisted of a light national force, composed chiefly of Cavalry, capable of performing long and rapid marches; which if defeated in one quarter could readily re-assemble in another, and which, from the position of the several states of the empire in Malwa, Berar, Guzerat, and the Dekhan, found a resting place every where. It was not the object of the king of the Dooranees to establish an empire in India, and after the defeat of the Mahrattas at Panniput, he returned to his own kingdom of Cabul, leaving them in almost undisputed possession of the field.

It is unnecessary to my purpose to follow this people through the series of divisions, discords, and internal wars that intervened between the battle of Panniput and the period that placed the British Government in the position of controlling the head of the Mahratta empire. Towards the close of the last century, Scindia had established himself in the vicinity of Poona, at the head of a powerful army, controlling the councils of the Peishwa. In the end of 1802, the army of Scindia was defeated by Holkar, who took possession of Poona, from which the Peishwa had fled, to seek the protection of the British Government. On the 31st of December, of the same year, the treaty of Bassein was negotiated, and on the 13th of the following May, the Peishwa returned to his capital, and resumed his functions as head of the Mahratta empire, protected by the British force which he had subsidized; and which had before, under the command of the Duke of Wellington, expelled the army of Holkar from Poona.

The states of the empire were not likely quietly to resign this control to the hands of foreigners, and accordingly the league between Scindia and the Berar Raja followed, and in the subsequent year the war with Holkar. The united armies of the former powers in the Dekhan were subdued by the Duke of Wellington at the battles of Assye and Wurgam, which with the loss of the fortresses of Ahmednuggur, Asseergurh, Gawilgurh, Chandore, and Golna, completed our triumphs, and the subjugation of those powers in

that region. Lord Lake subdued the armies of Scindia and Holkar in Hindoostan, at the battles of Dehlee, Laswaree, and Deeg, which with the conquest of the fortresses of Allighur, Agra, and Gwalior, established our supremacy in that quarter.

In 1817, the Mahratta nation, with the exception of the Baroda principality, with which we have never been at war, again combined against us. The Peishwa lost his dominions, and has since been a pensioner on the bounty of the British Government. Berar and Indore lost a great portion of their territory, and their political importance; and Scindia was only prevented from joining the confederacy by the position of the grand army. A small principality was conferred on the long imprisoned Sattara family, out of the territory conquered from the Peishwa.

Except in the Sattara and Kolapore principalities, the Mahrattas are as much foreigners in the countries which they govern as the Mahommedans are in theirs. There may be a few Mahrattas in the western portions of Berar, but there are none in the Gwalior, Indore, or Baroda territory. Their Government is nearly as despotic as that of the Mahommedans, but being Hindoos they come nearer to the great body of the people, and are better calculated to take root in their affections, than either the Mahommedan or British Government. Sattara and Berar are perhaps the best Native Governments, and the most prosperous countries in India. The machinery of a Mahratta Government is certainly more easily directed than that of a Mahommedan, and that people are free from many of the vices and corruptions of the other; which, arising from the system of education, and security under our protection, have rendered them unequal to administer the affairs of an extensive country.

Of the nineteen Rajpoot states, many are of the highest, and most of them of great antiquity. Here too the rulers are generally of a distinct tribe from the great majority of their subjects. But the same system of administration, and the same institutions will be found under Rajpoot Governments, to prevail every where. In countries the most remote, in Rajpootana, in Cutch, and in Chota Nagpore, we find institutions calculated to ensure permanency, and a beneficent form of administration. The will of the prince is every where directed and controlled by a body of powerful hereditary nobles, who have rights and possessions separate from his; and whom, through all times, we find ready to unite with him to defend his and their possessions against foreign encroachment, as well as to unite against him to support their order against his usurpations. These struggles are necessarily calculated to bring both parties to lean on the people for support, and consequently to infuse democratic principles into Rajpoot councils.

The princes of Rajpootana, although generally unequal to forming a confederacy against the encroachments of foreigners, made individually glorious stands in defence of their country; and some of them were hardly ever subdued, whilst others took their places as

the first nobles under the throne of Dehlee, commanding armies, and conquering and governing provinces even beyond the limits of India. The Mahrattas found but little difficulty in imposing tributes on the unprotected country of Rajpootana, as in almost every other country in India, for the Rajpoots had not Cavalry to meet the Mahrattas in the field, who inflicted such evils on the unprotected inhabitants that Governments were always ready to purchase relief from these sufferings by a sacrifice of a portion of their revenues. Yet this did not long afford protection, but on the contrary, may be supposed to have encouraged a repetition on their part of visits which proved so profitable.

The states of Rajpootana gladly placed themselves under the protection of the British Government, engaging to pay for their protection the same amount of fixed tribute as they had formerly paid to the Mahrattas; and escaping from the future encroachments, and the extra collection levied by that people. Holkar ceded to the British Government, after the battle of Mahidpore, the tribute which he had formerly collected from Rajpootana; and the British Government agreed to pay to Scindia the amount which he had collected, thus saving that region from any further connexion with the Mahratta powers. The Mahratta system of collecting a fractional part of the revenue, which was found to be injurious to the independence of the native states, by leading to constant interference in their internal affairs, has been discontinued every where; and a fixed sum has been substituted. In some instances, Oudepore and Jeypore, the tributes bear a large proportion to the amount of revenue, and are perhaps so heavy as to injure the substantive character of those states. The days of Mahratta anarchy have been forgotten, and it may be doubted whether some of the states would not rather revert to the period of unequal and uncertain exaction, than continue the payment of a fixed and never-ceasing tribute, which they will feel to be enhanced too, with the increasing value of money.

The alliance of these states with a powerful Government like the British can hardly fail to produce a great change in the relative positions of the prince and the federal nobles. The former has now ceased to require military service or support from the latter. His resources will be concentrated and augmented, and his encroachments on their privileges may be expected to keep pace with his power. It might be supposed too that princes were likely covertly to support one another with their standing armies, in the struggle against the rights of their subordinate chiefs. But in the contests that we have already witnessed in Joudpore, Kishenghur, and Dongerpore, the feudal chiefs seem to have gained more assistance from abroad than the princes did. It may however in a long period of peace be expected that the power of these chiefs, as in some of the feudal nations of Europe, will gradually fall before the power of the throne. Such a result is certainly not desirable, in so far as the interests and freedom of the people of those countries are con-

cerned; nor is it perhaps for the eventual interest of the sovereigns themselves that the union should be dissolved, which has hitherto given stability to their power, when most of the other Governments of India have passed away.

The yearly revenues of these nineteen states hardly exceed two crore and a half of rupees.

Of the other six Hindoo states, Bhurtpore is perhaps more national than any other principality in Internal India, and it was this which enabled it to oppose so formidable a resistance to Lord Lake after most of the other powers of India had been subdued. When the army was last advancing to the siege of that fortress, an intelligent native observed that they were to be attacked with caution, for although they had only mud walls, they were an united people, and that we had to war against a tribe of men fighting for their country. The revenues of these six states may be estimated at a crore of rupees.

The Sikh states on the left bank of the Sutlege are a confederacy of powers, which like the Mahrattas, could no doubt unite, and would be joined by the great Sikh power their neighbour, to oppose foreign aggression. But like Mahommedans and Mahrattas the Sikhs are foreigners in the country under their rule, and cannot therefore be expected readily to take root in the affections of their subjects. Runjeet Singh's rule is a pure despotism, and so is that of each of the states under our protection. The yearly revenue of the whole is estimated at fifty lakhs.

The other petty states and Jageerdars under British protection may be considered to yield a revenue of a crore and a half per annum.

The revenues of the whole of these states by this estimation amount to twelve crores and fifty lakhs.

The accompanying sketch map, prepared under Major Everest's instructions, shows the territorial possessions of each of the principal states, in square miles. There were not sufficient materials in the Surveyor General's Office to mark off the boundaries of all the minor states, but the whole extent of territory is square miles 449,845 whilst that of the British possessions is 626,746. The condition of this community of states has materially changed since their connexion with the British Government, which found them independent principalities, each holding foreign relations with its neighbour, and with all other states, as suited their mutual convenience; each striving for power and extension of territory; maintaining or extending its place in the scale of nations, either by combination or by the extent of its military resources; and all subject to great change and convulsion.

The consequence of one great power undertaking the direction of political relations, has necessarily caused the loss of much political importance on the part of the minor states. Their former connexion with one another is cut off, and they appeal for the adjustment of their differences, not as formerly to the sword, or to the

aid of neighbouring states, but to the decision of that governing power whose supremacy all acknowledge.

The rise of the British Government to this prominent station has been gradual, certainly unsought, and almost forced upon it by the progress of events.

The alliance with the Nizam and the Peishwa, the defeat of our great enemy Tippoo, under the walls of his own capital, and the conclusion of a treaty with him, in which he lost half his territory and almost all his treasure, were the great political results of Lord Cornwallis's administration, and forced us into a position in which we necessarily assumed a higher tone in our political relations with the states of India.

The administration of the Marquis of Wellesley overthrew the remaining power of Tippoo, restored the head of the Mahratta empire to his throne, overthrew the disciplined army of Scindia, the armies of Indore and Berar, established our supremacy in the Dekhun, and our dominion in Hindoostan, leaving us for a series of years, in spite of our vain attempt to withdraw from that position, almost without a rival to dispute our power.

The administration of the Marquis of Hastings imposed humiliating terms on the Goorkas, conquered the territories of the Peishwa, subdued what remained of the armies of Indore and Berar, extirpated the hordes of Pindarees and plunderers by whom Central India was infested, and left us thirteen years thereafter without a power in India to dispute our supremacy.

This condition of things has necessarily imposed new and distinct duties on the British Government, which do not appear to have been ever properly defined; and which, judging from the conduct of our political authorities, as shown by their proceedings in the accompanying sketches of our relations with the several states, are not generally understood.

Whilst we were rising to power, and struggling against hostile combinations, it was naturally our object to seek for partisans and friends. An alliance with one of the principal states, or a friend in its councils, were considered of the highest importance to us. It was in short our object to divide and to govern. When our supremacy became acknowledged by all, we should have withdrawn from interference in the internal affairs of the several states, beyond what was necessary to insure universal tranquillity. We had little interest or object beyond that of securing peace to those states, of saving each from the aggression of its neighbour, and of mediating between them in all questions of dispute. We had to give a direction to the energies of states which had been established under our supremacy, and with our guarantee, more particularly during minorities, as in the case of Sattara and Berar, and in each of these cases this duty was performed in a manner that called forth the admiration of their subjects and the applause of the surrounding states; and which has secured, in so far as can at present be judged, the lasting gratitude of their chiefs. With respect to other powers, it

should have been our object to have left the conflicting parties of whom they were composed to find their own level; to have left them in short to form national administrations, which could not have failed, sooner or later, to have produced measures of beneficial internal administration; and which eventually would have relieved us from much of that interference into which we have through a different line of policy been forced, alike productive of embarrassment to ourselves, and calculated to paralyze the energies of the native state.

Those Governments in whose internal affairs we have interfered the least are the most united and the most prosperous: Kotah, Bhopal, Joudpore, Gwalior, Ulwur, Bickaneer, Jessulmere, are instances of this. Mysore is unhappily an instance to the contrary. Hyderabad, Oude, and Jeypore, are the states in which we have interfered most largely, without in most instances doing so either for the purpose of benefiting, or in a manner calculated to benefit the people of those countries; and they are undoubtedly the worst governed in India.

It is, too, curious to observe how little our interference in the affairs of the states of India has depended on the nature of our treaties with them. In Mysore, where we had the right by treaty to interfere, we were too long in exercising that right. In Hyderabad, Jeypore, Oudepore, and some other states, where we had not the right, we have been constantly interfering even to the nomination and support of ministers.

It may however, with respect to Hyderabad and Oude, be feared, that there is in the form of a Mahommedan Government, supported as it now is by our power, and administered by a prince educated as the Mahommedan princes of India must now be, something incompatible with the interests of the great majority of the people, and the prosperity or advancement of any country. It would not be difficult to trace the causes that have produced this change in the Mahommedan character, if indeed any change has been produced; for it is doubtful, whether that people were calculated to govern an extensive country in peace, or whether this can be the province of an uneducated and an ignorant despot, placed in authority over a race of men, the great majority of whom differ from himself in religion, and in all the ordinary pursuits and relations of life; and between whom all the ordinary sympathies and interests that bind men together are wanting. He is naturally jealous of the rising power or the interference of other men, and they have neither the right to council him, nor the power to take the direction of affairs into their own hands.

There are therefore causes, arising out of the connexion of the native states with the British Government, which, in spite of its anxiety to uphold or advance their individual supremacy, and to continue their independent position (certainly amongst the most sacred as well as the most interesting duties that belongs to it in India,) must, it is feared in some instances gradually work their

subversion. It may be questioned, whether the paralyzing effects produced in these independant states by their reliance on a foreign power for protection; whether the absence of all motive to generous exertions; and whether the severing of that sympathy which binds the chief and his people together, when they have to struggle against other power, either for their liberties, or for their individual or national advancement, are not reasons, not only why they should fail to attain future greatness, but that whatever is great or good amongst them, must gradually pass away. I have often heard it remarked by those best fitted to judge, that amongst Mahommedans one never sees a son equal his father in energy of character or in virtue. Who would have expected to see any thing virtuous or heroic in the character of the people of Greece whilst under the domination of Turkey, or in the character of the Poles whilst under the yoke of Russia, except what might arise in their exertions to free themselves from the dominion of foreigners.

Formerly the princes of India had to struggle either for the maintenance or the advancement of their several positions, almost throughout the whole period of their rule: nothing appeared to stand still. They were either advancing or retrograding. There is no country in the world where revolutions were so frequent, and although to our notions there may be something revolting in these wars and struggles, they were nevertheless the scenes in which men were formed and rose to greatness. The son fought by the side of his father, and from the very dawn of his career entered on those scenes which were calculated to bind the prince and the people in mutual ties of affection and allegiance. He who was fittest to govern was, by the support of his people, and in conformity with the laws, raised to the succession.

The change that has now taken place is very remarkable. The future ruler of a country is brought up without education or knowledge of the world, under the care of women. He is through the jealousy of his father excluded from all interference or share in public affairs, until the time of life for attaining habits of usefulness has passed away. Whether suited to govern or not, his succession is secured through the introduction of our deadening laws of primogeniture; and when brought, under all these disadvantages, into public life, the British functionaries are disappointed if they do not find him an accomplished prince, having the interests of his people at heart, and disposed to govern his country in conformity, in some degree, with their own advanced and enlightened views. Neither is an ignorant or a jealous despot the least likely to give the reins to others which his own fingers have so long itched to handle, or if he be of this supine disposition himself, we are sure to find some one behind the scenes, who will talk to him of the danger of power altogether passing out of his hands if he ceases to exercise it. If he does exercise power, it is almost certain, from the lamentable state of ignorance in which he has been bred, to be for evil; or if he entrusts it to another, and the British Govern-

ment comes forward to approve of that person's measures, to applaud or to support him; he is sure to take alarm, and to meditate how to accomplish his destruction.

It is not on the native character alone that the changes which the last twenty years have worked in India is felt. Fortunately education qualifies the Englishman to govern in tranquil as in troubled times. But in the present condition of things, and in the comparatively limited sphere of individual operation, we must not expect to see such men as Munro, Elphinstone, Malcolm, Metcalfe, Ochterlony, Close, Wilks, Walker, Russell, or Jenkins.

When this unnatural condition of things has produced consequences which all the world acknowledge to be destructive to the best interests of the community, or results calculated to endanger the tranquillity of neighbouring states, it necessarily becomes a question what part the British Government is to take; for from its position in India it will be forced sooner or later to interfere. The very existence of our treaty promising protection; the presence of our resident; and, above all, the presence of a subsidiary force, may be considered measures of interference which will be felt by the people to be altogether on the side of their prince.

The remedy seems a very simple one. It is only necessary to announce to our ally that the British Government considers that a long period of misrule, persisted in, in opposition to its advice and remonstrances, and destructive to the best interest of his subjects, in a degree that it is impossible that we can countenance, by the presence of our political authorities or troops, has forced on us the declaration that our interference must be admitted for the correction of these evils, or that all the stipulations which before bound the Governments together must be annulled. It is true that in this case we place ourselves in the position of judges in what may seem our own cause. But there can be little danger that in such a question the Governor General in Council, or those appointed to the investigation, will judge wrongfully. The magnitude of the evils complained of, the prevalence of intestine wars and commotion, the insecurity of life and property, and other proofs of misgovernment must be obvious (as in the Mysore, the Oude, and the Hyderabad countries) to all.

If our ally be satisfied to undertake the Government of his country without our assistance, our officers and troops may at once be withdrawn, continuing of course to save the country from foreign conquest; and we may be sure that after a period of commotion the people will force on their Government such measures of internal administration as will relieve them from the pressure of which they complain. If in progress towards this relief such effects are produced as may fairly be considered to endanger the tranquillity of the British territory, or the territories of its allies, then the prince may be given to understand that the British Government will consider itself entitled to interfere authoritatively for the correction of such abuses, in whatever manner may seem best to itself. Should, on

the other hand, the prince fear to place himself in that situation of dependence on his subject which would necessarily result from the withdrawal of our political authorities and troops, and call for our assistance in the future administration of his affairs; then of course we could negotiate our own terms, and adopt such measures as to ourselves should seem best. In a country like Hyderabad, where the evils are chiefly of our own working, where our interference has been so long and often so minutely exercised, and where the interests involved are so complicated, it would be almost impossible to withdraw; nor could the Government in all probability, unsupported by us, exist for a single month. There would however be no chance that the question of withdrawal would be there entertained by any administration; when therefore the necessity for a more direct interference on our part shall be considered to have arrived, it will be a mere question of mode and degree; and we have in that which has already been adopted, the finest example of that which we should again adopt.

There is nothing more simple or more beneficial to the people than the mode of administration conducted during our interference at Hyderabad, Nagpore, and Sattara. It is unnecessary to repeat here what has already been described in the political sketches of those states: contrasted with what has hitherto resulted from our interference in the affairs of Mysore, no doubt can exist as to which is best. In the latter instance, the commissioners commenced with a resumption of land and money stipends, and a discharge of troops, which must have been more unpalatable to the people than any of the measures of the former administration against which they were in arms. They were measures of aggravation rather than of healing; nor does it appear that any thing has yet been done to quiet men's minds, by fixing and defining the Government demands on them. The commissioners have apparently been too much employed in their own quarrels to be able to turn their thoughts to any measures of real public utility. A single commissioner, like Mr. Elphinstone in the Poona territory, Sir Charles Metcalfe in the Hyderabad, or Mr. Jenkins in the Nagpore, with European officers in subordination to him in each district, would long before this have given to the Mysore country that most healing and beneficial of all measures, a moderate village asssessment for a period of years, which would have drowned the voice of the dissaffected; or, at all events, have prevented its reaching, and tampering with the spirit of our troops, where it is so calculated to lead to fatal results.

The employment of natives in authority, except under the strictest superintendance of Europeans; every where, in the present condition of their morals, destructive in a great degree to the condition of their morals, destructive in a great degree to the best interests of the people, must be more so in a country circumstanced like Mysore than in most other places. We have instances of the injurious effects of entrusting natives with too much

power, and at too great a distance from the eye of their master, in Kandeish, Assam, Chota Nagpore, and the Jungle Mehals, which may serve as a warning to avoid the system elsewhere.

The exercise of authority, for the adjustment of boundary disputes, and of mediation in the other differences that may arise between the native states, are the most usual and important of the duties of the British Government towards them. We may allow them, and encourage them, as far as possible to adjust those differences themselves; but when they fail to do so, and appeal to our decision, the question must be taken up more in a judicial than in a political point of view; our decision must be respected by both parties, and when necessary enforced with the whole weight of our power. When questions arise affecting the general tranquillity or the well-being of the community, such as the extirpation of the Pindarees and the Thugs, both enemies to all mankind, our sovereign power must be asserted. We are entitled to expect the cordial co-operation of the states of India in such a cause, and where they, from interested motives, either thwart or resist our measures, we may proclaim them public enemies, and proceed against them accordingly.

A political code, which should define the duties of the British Government and its officers towards the states of India, and which would be calculated to bring home to the understandings of the princes and people of those countries, the obligations by which they are bound to that Government; would be of very easy construction, and might prove highly beneficial. It would have the effect too of fixing the British Government to one system of measures, which would soon become understood, and on which all would be prepared to act. A system has undoubtedly guided the British Government in the last few years in its relations with the natives states, but it may be doubtful whether it is understood throughout the political department, although the diaries of proceedings which are now required to be furnished, must tend gradually to produce this result.

It is difficult to estimate the number of troops which the twelve and a half crore of revenue belonging to the native states will enable them to maintain: nor is this very important; for in times of war, troops are entertained for the occasion; and in the unsettled condition of India, have heretofore been found in any number that Governments could afford to pay. If, as has generally been calculated, every 500 rupees of revenue enables a Government to maintain one horseman, according to the native fashion; that one horseman is equal in expence to four foot; and should a moiety of the revenue be expended on each arm; there would be in Internal India 120,000 horse and 480,000 foot. But this, which was the former mode of estimating the armies of the native states, must be very inapplicable to the present condition of things: since they are now secured against foreign invasion, and almost against internal convulsion, through our supremacy. No Government in any

part of the world now stands, or apparently ever did stand, in the same relation to a community of states, heretofore accustomed to exercise, and, still in internal affairs, entitled to exercise sovereign powers; as the British Government does to the states of Internal India. The present relations of the great powers of Europe to the thirty-eight states of Germany, as settled at the Congress of Vienna, has been supposed to bear some comparison with that of the British Government to the thirty-six states of Internal India, with which it has relations through treaty. But, besides that the powers of Europe are many, and we are one, the states of Germany have a federal union, "the object of which is the external and internal security of Germany, and of the independence and inviolability of the separate states;" "all the members of the confederation, as such, have equal rights;" "every member engages to protect not only all Germany, but each state of the confederacy against any hostile attack."

Such a combination as this amongst the states of India is just what the British Government would most fear, and against which it has been its object to contend, and to stipulate with the several states under its protection. There is therefore no arguing with respect to our position according to any of the received axioms of international law. We must be considered the great protecting power, bound to preserve the substantive integrity of each state; entitled therefore to judge what measures may be necessary for that purpose, and to dictate to each and to all such terms as the exigency of the occasion may seem to us to require for the general good.

The only question of really vital importance to the British Government, beyond that of maintaining universal tranquillity, is the degree of authority which it is entitled to exercise over the armies of the several states for the general defence of the empire. Those armies are of sufficient magnitude to render it in the highest degree important that we should look to the nature of their temper, and the degree of their organization. The very existence of this military force is at present almost unknown to us; it rests quietly in its several positions, and apparently subject to our will. But should any thing occur to call our forces to an advanced scene of action, or which may be calculated to disturb the stability of our power, we shall find this enormous mass of men rise into active existence, if not in combination, or directed immediately against us, at least for the purpose of asserting the authority, and aggrandizing the power of their several sovereigns.

No one who has thought of the nature of our position in India; of the character of the four great powers on our external frontier; their united armies superior in numbers to our own; and those of Nepaul and Lahore alike formidable from their discipline, and the character of the people of whom they are composed; can consider our condition in the present reduced and neglected state of our army, broken into exactly a hundred different detachments, otherwise than highly critical.

The army of India may be considered to consist of about 30,000 European troops of all arms, ten or twelve thousand Native Cavalry, and about 110,000 Native Infantry. It protects a land frontier of 3,536* British miles, and covers an area of 1,111,162* square miles within that frontier, giving of course about 42 men to each frontier mile, and only one man to every seven miles of Internal India.

It may be possible to augment our army as the occasion requires, and by extending promotion and employment to the sons and brothers of our old soldiers, we may at the commencement of a war give an impulse to native feeling which may once more carry us to a glorious termination. But we cannot afford, as we have lately been doing, to turn our whole attention in times of peace to the improvement of our civil institutions, and to the advancement of the condition of the persons of whom that branch of administration is composed; and to neglect and over-work our army until the respectable classes of whom it formerly consisted refuse to take service in our ranks, and seek for other employment.

Next in importance to the efficiency of our own army, for the general defence of our position in India, is the extent of the armies of the several states, the nature of their organization, and the manner in which they stand affected towards us. An estimate has already been made of their numbers. The nature of their organization, except in the few instances where they are under the control or command of British officers is of the very worst description. Ill paid, undisciplined, and dissatisfied to a degree which renders their allegiance to their own sovereign a matter of very doubtful contingency, and prepares them to enter on any enterprise promising better pay or a prospect of plunder; yet all disposed to look upon us and our power as the principal cause of their degradation.

It has at all times been found impossible for the native states of India to maintain, without the assistance of European officers, a regularly disciplined army. The absence of system and energy in the native character seems unsuited to this. But above all, the absence of any regular system of payment, where the prince has a private as well as a public treasury, and draws into the former every farthing that he can appropriate without any reference to the wants of the latter.

Neither is there in any of the states of India any thing approaching to a national army. It is probable that there was at Bhurtpore before the conquest of that place. But then, as elsewhere, there is now a force composed mostly of mercenary foreigners, in the shape of a few battalions, approaching in formation and appearance to those in the Company's service. The same description of force exists at Hyderabad, Sattara, Oude, Nagpore, and most of the states of Rajpootana. In Guzerat and most parts of the Dekhun, Kandeish, and Malwa: Arabs, Sindees, Mekranees, and Sikhs are common

* Major Everest.

and in considerable numbers; but these have not found their way into the service of the states of Rajpootana and Hindoostan. The Cavalry of most of the powers bears a more national character than their Infantry, and is always composed of a superior description of men, who with regular pay and good management may be rendered a very valuable force.

Our control over the army of the Nizam is of sufficient extent to secure our supremacy in His Highness' dominions, if the subsidiary force should be entirely withdrawn. It consists of five regiments of Cavalry, eight of Infantry, four small corps of Artillery, and an Engineer corps; all of the finest description of native troops, and equal to any of either presidency in our own service. For this advantage we are indebted to our connexion with Rajah Chundoo Lall, and to the energetic measures of Mr. Russell whilst resident at Hyderabad. Our position in the dominions of the Rajah of Nagpore was equally advantageous, and was the more acceptable as we owed it to conquest, and neither to negotiation nor to favor. But that we have relinquished. We can through treaty command the services of 4,000 horse at Mysore, 3,000 at Baroda, 3,600 at Indore, 600 at Bhopal, and under particular circumstances 1,000 at Nagpore, and 1500 at Joudpore,* and under a sort of sufference we have the services of about 2,000 horse at Gwalior.—But of these 15,700 horse there is only the Bhopal Contingent, and a small portion of the Contingent of Indore, organized in a manner that would render them efficient to act with British troops. The manner in which the Joudpore Contingent has lately been brought into the field on our requisition, and the nature of the troops of whom it is composed, are sufficient proofs of what we may expect even when our power is at its meridian. If that power were shaken, or its permanency doubtful, we need have little hesitation in believing that but few of these contingents, in the present degree of their organization, would be at our disposal, and that most of them, as at Poona and Nagpore in 1817, would be thrown into the scale against us.

The degree of control which Napoleon introduced into the contingent of sixty thousand men, forming the army which the states of the Confederation of the Rhine placed at his disposal, for the maintenance of his supremacy in that region, would not be found sufficient to suit our purposes with the contingents of the native states of India. To be useful to us, or indeed to cease to be dangerous to our power, our authority over these auxiliaries must be superior to that which Napoleon found it necessary to exercise over the contingents of the Confederation of the Rhine. If we could calculate on the states of India acting in co-operation with us for the general defence of the empire, or if we could hope that their interest would ever be blended with ours, or cease to be opposed to them, then indeed might we intrust those contingents to their own management, interfering only in so far as might be necessary to see

* By the terms of the treaty, we can call for these at any time.—Ed.

that their numbers were complete. But as there is little chance that the states of India will ever consider their interests blended with ours, or that they will cease to look upon us rather as their great enemy, against whose encroachments they most require to combine and to arm, than as a friendly power whose interests they are called upon to defend, it is obvious that troops acting under their authority cannot be calculated upon as likely to prove useful to us.

To be efficient for our purpose, those troops must be under the immediate command of our own officers, dependant on them for the regularity with which they are paid, for their promotion; and relying on our Government for the permanency of their service. Holding these essentials in our own hands, the contingents may be composed of the old soldiers of the native states, for there is nothing national in the character of their armies which need lead us to fear that in the day of our adversity they will turn against us, as the German contingents did against Napoleon after the battle of Leipsic. We have in the conduct of the Mysore, the Hyderabad, the Poona, and the Nagpore Contingents during the last war, proof that under this form of organization their gallantry and fidelity to our cause will not be inferior to those qualities in the troops of our service.

Most of the native states are bound by treaty to aid the British Government in time of war with the whole or a specified portion of their armies. But those stipulations would be little binding on them, nor could we under any circumstances of adversity calculate on their fidelity or usefulness, unless, like the contingent of the Nizam, they were placed under the command of our own officers. No one will doubt the importance to our cause of the services of such auxiliaries thus organized, either for the purpose of fighting our battles in advanced positions, or for the maintenance of our interests and of general tranquillity in Internal India, when it may be necessary to call our own army to other scenes of action.

We have not generally the right of drawing portions of the native armies from their sovereigns in a degree that would render them useful to us. And it is at present doubtful how, or whether ever, this most important of our political objects can be attained. We may be sure that the native powers will not readily or voluntarily render up their armies to our control; for their confidence is not, and probably never will be, so great in our good faith, and in the permanency of our power, as to lead them implicitly to trust to us for their defence. The real condition to which they have resigned themselves by treaty, or to which they have fallen in the progress of time and in the course of events, is very different from that which they would arrogate to themselves. Cut off from foreign relations, and protected as they substantially are and have been, for the last fifteen years, almost without an exception to the contrary, each against the aggressions of his neighbour and of all other powers, their armies have virtually become useless, except for the purpose of internal government.

It is a question whether without an army a Government can exist even for the purposes of internal administration, and the instances which we have of late seen of the necessity which Governments are under, in more civilized countries than India, of calling for the aid of troops in support of civil institutions, may serve to convince us that even for this purpose an army is necessary.

We must calculate upon such portions of these contingents as placed under British officers being as entirely withdrawn as our own troops from the support of the native Government in its internal administration, and applicable only to the general defence of the empire. Some of the states already pay a subsidiary force for this purpose, others pay tribute, and in addition nearly all promise to supply a specific contingent, or to hold their whole army at our disposal. It is on this latter account that we may consider ourselves justified in endeavouring to gain a control over such portion of the native armies as is extra to what they require for internal government. From the nature of their organization, and their temper, those armies are at all times dangerous to us; and on these accounts, when we were assailed from without, might become destructive to our power. Self-preservation therefore requires, that when we have the right these portions of the native armies should be brought under our authority, for the purpose of fighting their battles and our own.

If the employment of troops under British officers in support of vicious native Governments be an evil, as no doubt it is, the greater the extent to which this system were carried, the greater of course would the evil become; but if enough remained with the native Governments for the purposes of internal administration, there would be no more reason for the employment of these contingents on such duties, than for the employment of the British forces stationed in their territory, for the general defence of the country. The system of employing troops under British officers in support of the measures of native Governments is chiefly objectionable for these reasons. We must under any circumstances become ourselves the judges, whether there be occasion for their active employment. We must interpose between the Government and its subjects, as well to inquire into the necessity for coercive measures, as to guard the interests of those whom we have been the instruments of reducing to the tender mercies of the native state. In either case the measure tends to give rise to a double or divided and therefore a weak and loose, form of government. There is too the danger that this constant interposition of our authority may serve as a premium to resistance or rebellion on the part of the people against their sovereign, in the hope of eventually gaining our mediation. But, as I have said before, there is no greater reason for employing the contingents, placed at our disposal by the native states for the general defence of the empire, in matters of internal government, than there is for employing any portion of our own army.

Great difficulty will necessarily be experienced in gaining such control over the contingents of our allies as would render them efficient and faithful to us. When we proposed lately to render up one of the three thousand horse maintained for general service by the Guickwar, provided he would place the remaining two thousand on a footing considered more desirable by us, he would not yield to the arrangement. Yet until this control over those armies has been obtained, our situation in India, under particular circumstances, must become highly critical; for it is obvious that we cannot afford to pay an army in India sufficiently extensive to fight our frontier battles, and to support our position against hostile combinations within. It will become a house divided against itself.

No opportunity should therefore be lost of taking advantage of every opening promising a result so favourable to us. It is the point on which the greatest importance to ourselves now hinges, in our relations with the states of Internal India. Every man gained is a double gain, by strengthening ourselves, and taking away from their strength and their power to do us harm.

FINIS.

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